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ABSTRACT 
This investigation grew out of my experiences while working as a mental nurse 
with people deemed to be insane. The behaviours which they presented and the 
medical and legal control exercised over them became of concern to me 
because I felt their rights were not being respected. A primary issue is the extent 
to which adherence to the medical-somatic view of insanity held by psychiatrists, 
lawyers and politicians has led to the exclusion of viable custody and treatment 
alternatives. 
The purpose of this research is to question the role and functions of mental 
nurses. It suggests that 'caretakers' might be a more suitable title for such 
workers with the insane. The hypothesis underlying the research links the work 
of 'caretakers' of the insane to changes in government policies and legislation; 
the thesis examines this hypothesis in the light of changes in the roles and 
functions of 'caretakers' over the period from 1890 to 1990. 
Research activities included the examination of primary sources, Hansard, 
newspapers, and professional journals. Interviews were also carried out with 
nine contemporary caretakers who have worked with the 1959 and the 1983 
Mental Health Acts. These research methods provided an historical background 
to the debates in the Houses of Parliament when mental health legislation was 
discussed; information from the writings of the professionals who worked with 
the insane at the times of new mental health legislation; data on the public and 
media debate of these issues; and information on the perceptions and duties of 
caretakers working with the insane at the times of new mental health legislation. 
The research findings show that both those who cared for the insane and the 
insane themselves have been subjected to changes brought about by mental 
health legislation since 1890. These changes affected the working conditions of 
the caretakers and the social control and rights of the insane. The changes in the 
work of caretakers led to new directions in their education. Workers with the 
insane became a part of nursing by adopting the somatic approach to care. 
When this occurred, many of the care activities of keepers, attendants and 
mental nurses became redundant. Over time, there has been a move to, and 
then away from, the clinical-somatic model of nursing towards caretaking skills 
such as group work, therapeutic community skills, counselling skills and 
psychotherapy skills. These caretaking skills are seen by contemporary 
caretakers as going beyond their custodial and social control functions, towards 
providing a space in which people can be respected, encouraged, supported 
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CHAPTER 1 
FOCUS, BACKGROUND AND DESIGN OF STUDY 
The subject of this thesis is the work of the caretakers of people deemed to 
be insane or mentally ill. The thesis makes an important new contribution to 
our understanding of the nature of the work carried out by people charged 
with the responsibility of looking after the insane. 
The thesis spans several important areas and disciplines; the sociology of the 
health and welfare professions; the social construction of mental illness; the 
historical development of medical treatments for mental illness; the evolution 
of civil rights and liberties; and the relationship between law and the legal 
system, on the one hand, and social practices and policies, on the other. The 
central hypothesis of the investigation is that the work of the caretakers of the 
insane has changed with changes in government policies and legislation. 
The work described in this thesis therefore contributes directly to the 
knowledge available on the professionals who work with people deemed to 
be insane. The investigation examines the role of the function of mental 
nurses and the changes that took place in caretaking activities over the 
period from 1890 to 1990. It argues that over this period the workers with the 
insane became a part of nursing by adopting the somatic approach to care. 
As a consequence, many of the traditional care activities of keepers, 
attendants and mental nurses became redundant. 
The focus of the investigation 
A number of important questions proceed from the central hypothesis of the 
study. These include: how do government policies and legislation influence 
the roles and responsibilities of the caretakers and the rights of the 'insane'; 
and how does the work of caretakers of the insane relate to changes in social 
and legal definitions of insanity? The thesis seeks answers to these questions 
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through an examination of documentary/historical sources and a qualitative 
study of contemporary caretakers. Its primary emphasis is on the evolution of 
caretaking work in the UK. 
By developing the concept of 'caretaker', the thesis reflects on the titles 
workers with the insane have used or have had thrusted upon them during 
the period under study. In the thesis, the single title 'caretaker' is used to 
denote all those workers referred to as attendants and mental nurses. This 
term embraces the medical, the social, the psychological, and the 
philosophical, as well as the concern for users' rights and their active 
participation in their own care. 'Work' in this context includes both the formal 
and informal roles of caretakers and their responsibilities and rights in relation 
to the insane. The underlying assumption here follows Rose's (1986) 
suggestion that the picture presented by a benevolent psychiatry could be 
considered illusory, in that its treatment and institutional regime may be 
experienced as degrading, dehumanizing and damaging. The thesis argues 
that it is largely within this web of social control that the caretakers of the 
insane have operated. 
The selection of the period from 1890 to 1990 period gives the thesis a 
defined focus, offering both historical and contemporary evidence. This 
period was chosen to include the 1890, 1930, 1959 and 1983 Mental Health 
Acts, so that issues around reform and civil liberties and rights could be 
addressed. 
Background 
The men and women who care for the lunatic, the mad, the insane and the 
mentally ill have had a long history and a variety of titles. In the Middle Ages, 
care was provided by a care worker called 'master' who appointed men and 
women to administer to the needs of the insane in special institutions. The 
master was supposed to be a priest who managed the institutions with the 
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help of guardians and wardens. In almshouses, the master was also known 
as 'custos', 'keeper' or 'rector'. In the eighteenth century, care was provided 
by keepers and attendants, and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by 
attendants and mental nurses. These changes in the titles of workers with the 
insane in institutions have reflected altered conceptualizations of the insane 
by workers themselves, and by the medical and legal establishments. 
Carpenter (1980) argues that the men and women who look after the insane 
seldom achieve public attention except as a result of scandal or a case of 
alleged ill-treatment. The literature on the history of psychiatry and nursing 
documents the work of doctors with the insane in madhouses, asylums and 
mental hospitals. But, as Walk (1961) observes, nursing and psychiatric 
histories almost completely neglect the carers of the insane, despite the fact 
that it was (and is) the twenty four hour a day work of caretakers in watching 
and caring for the insane that has been central to their social control and 
management. The study described in this thesis is an attempt to remedy this 
situation. Are caretakers custodians, carers, advocates or the police of the 
insane? The research sheds light on the culture formed by caretakers, on 
their organization, the extent to which they have autonomy as professionals, 
and the kinds of control they have exercised over the insane within 
institutions. 
Insanity is, of course, a highly problematic concept, and the thesis also 
attempts to address changes in the social definition of insanity. The 
problematic nature of the concept of insanity derives from the fact that 
religion, law and medicine provide the rationale for the labelling and the 
management of the insane: religion through a variety of ritual practices aimed 
at the spiritual; the law through the management of crime and the surveillance 
of populations; and medicine through the control of the body (Turner 1987). 
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According to Carpenter (1980), the early asylums were governed by books of 
rules issued to staff. Some of these rules were circumscribed by law, for 
example, Sections 322-24 of the Lunacy Act, 1890, made the neglect of 
patients or the helping of patients to escape punishable offenses. However, 
the existence of rules did not guarantee compliance, and as Scull (1979) has 
argued, medical superintendents were increasingly removed from the day-to-
day functioning of the asylum, and there were few assistant medical officers 
to deputize for the superintendents. This meant that the attendants were left 
largely unsupervised, and were heavily depended on for the case reports 
which were used to determine treatment. In Scheff's (1961) study of a mental 
hospital, despite administrators' attempts to change traditional treatment and 
care policies, these changes were frustrated by the staff, and in particular by 
the attendants. Scheff's work is of interest because it questions how and why 
the staff were able to resist the changes introduced by the administrators. In 
his study, the staff were effectively able to do this because, being left 
unsupervised, they could interpret the administrators' policies to suit 
themselves. The staff also belonged to a stable and well-organized 
community. Within this community and over the years they had developed an 
informal system of sanctions to keep discipline in their own ranks. Such a 
system was able to neutralize the staff who wished to accommodate their 
work to the changes desired by the administrators. 
Scheff's study raises important questions about the informal social 
organization of caretaking work. Unsworth (1987) has observed that the 1983 
Mental Health Act affected the division of labour in asylums by allocating 
different roles to different sets of personnel. While maintaining the hegemony 
of the medical profession, the Act accorded new roles to other social and 
health care workers. Unsworth sees the law as restricting the power of the 
professionals working with the insane in the interests of civil liberty and 
accountability in their functions as social control agents. 
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The issues around the law and services for the insane in the civil sphere are 
an area of tension. Jones (1972:155) has argued that a legal approach to 
insanity is '...piling safeguard upon safeguard to protect the insane against 
illegal detention, delaying certification and treatment until the person 
genuinely in need of care was obviously (and probably incurably) insane'. 
Jones's critique of legalism comes from a perspective of sympathy with a 
social welfare approach to insanity. For her, insanity is a social administrative 
problem, an element of social policy. 
Although the work of caretakers is under-researched, some work has been 
done. In the history of nursing, work with the insane receives mention, but in 
a limited sense. The question here is: does the caretaking of the insane have 
a separate history from nursing, and if so what is it? 
Research methods 
Methodologically, this is a qualitative investigation. Two main research 
methods were used: historical investigation and documentary analysis; and 
interviews with contemporary caretakers. The use of the two approaches 
enables the work of contemporary caretakers to be compared with that of 
their predecessors. The historical background is essential to the study's main 
hypothesis concerning the relationship between caretaking work and mental 
health legislation. 
(a) Historical investigation and documentary analysis 
Primary and secondary sources relating to the period from 1890 and 1990 
were examined using the following archives and libraries: the Bethlem 
Hospital Archive, the Royal College of Psychiatry Library, the National Mental 
Health Association Library (MIND), the Wellcome Institute for the History of 
Medicine Library, the British Museum Newspaper Library, and the South Bank 
University Library. The main documentary sources consulted included: Bills of 
Parliament and Mental Health Legislation; Reports of the Lunacy 
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Commissions and Board of Control; Reports of the Societies concerned with 
the reform of legislation, for example, The Mental Patients' Union, MIND and 
similar organizations; the Report of the House of Commons Select Committee 
on Lunacy Law, 1878; the Special Report of the Commissions in Lunacy to 
the Lord Chancellor on the Alleged Increase of Insanity, 1897; writings of 
workers with the insane, including the work of Sam Roberts, a 'Madhouse' 
Keeper at Nathaniel Cotton's house, St Albans; Records of the Asylum 
Workers Union; Tuke's writings on the Moral Management of the Insane at 
York; Hansard 1890-1983, and especially speeches made in the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords relating to mental health at times when 
Mental Health Act Green Papers were debated, and around the passing of the 
1890, 1930, 1959 and 1983 Mental Health Acts. 
(b) The collection of information from contemporary caretakers 
A sample of caretakers who have worked with the 1959 and the 1983 Mental 
Health Acts was interviewed using a semi-structured interview schedule. Nine 
experienced caretakers (mental health nurses) from different care settings 
were interviewed. An interview to provide data on his own reflections was also 
carried out with the researcher who has worked as a Registered Mental 
Nurse. 
Access and ethics 
Ethical concerns arise in relation to several aspects of the research process 
(Kidder 1981). Ethical issues may be generated by the kinds of questions 
studied, the methods used to obtain information and answers, the procedures 
used to choose subjects, how subjects are treated and the uses to which data 
are put at the end of the research. Some of the historical documentary 
materials consulted for the research were clearly collected without the 
knowledge that data might be used in this way. This situation presents 
something of a dilemma in relation to the ethical requirement that the rights of 
those from whom the original data were gathered should be respected. 
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Access to the Bethlem Royal Hospital Archive and to other relevant 
documents was gained by writing to the archivists, librarians or information 
officers with a synopsis of the research interests and a request for access. 
Attention was paid to any necessary considerations of confidentiality. The 
caretakers who were interviewed were all given full information about the 
research both verbally and in written form, and any requests they made 
concerning the conduct of the interviews and confidentiality were respected. 
Their freedom to decline to participate or to withdraw at any time was 
respected. 
Organization of the thesis 
The next chapter provides details of the plan of the investigation and 
discusses the methodological issues and the methods employed in the study. 
The advantages and disadvantages of doing historical social research are 
presented, and the case for the use of primary and secondary sources, 
documentary analysis, interviewing and incorporating the reflections of the 
researcher is argued. 
Chapter three is concerned with the theoretical approaches underpinning the 
investigation. The theoretical approaches of power and social control in the 
context of medicine and insanity are explored. The role of medicine in 
contributing and maintaining medical power and social control is discussed, 
along with some of the ways in which mental health laws provide for the 
social control of persons deemed to be insane. 
Chapter four looks at the arguments, the debates and the evidence 
concerned with defining insanity, madness and mental illness. The social 
dimension of insanity, particularly the relationship between social values and 
psychiatry, is addressed. Alongside these debates are the experiences of 
users and their organizations which work to sustain them as psychiatric 
survivors. 
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In chapter five, issues concerning madness in relation to gender, social class 
and ethnicity are addressed. The debates as to how psychiatry is used within 
oppressive and racist societies to control women and black people are 
presented. 
Chapter six deals with the suggestion that the caretakers for the insane 
perform their roles and responsibilities differently from nurses. This 
suggestion rests on the idea that caretakers, at the same time as carrying out 
their care activities, engage in significant social control functions. 
Chapter seven details the mental health legislation enacted between 1890 and 
1983. The main provisions of the Acts are outlined, as are their intended 
functions in relation to the social control of the insane, the provision of care 
and the protection of rights. 
Chapter eight is concerned with legislation, caretaking and rights. Evidence 
from Hansard and reports in the Times newspaper which are relevant to the 
1890, 1930, 1959 and the 1983 legislation are examined to see what they say 
about the impact of these laws on the work of caretakers and the rights of the 
insane and mentally ill. 
Chapter nine looks at changes in caretakers' roles between 1890 and 1990 
using the same documentary sources: Hansard, Journals and the Times 
newspaper reports. 
Chapter ten presents the views of contemporary caretakers about their roles 
and functions in providing care and treatment, about the rights of users and 
the social control of users. 
Chapter eleven discusses all the evidence drawn in the investigation, and 
chapter twelve concludes the report by providing a summary of the 
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arguments and some suggestions about how the work of caretakers might 
develop in future. 
10 
CHAPTER 2 
DOING HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
To do sociology without reflecting on the past is a one-sided exercise. This 
chapter discusses what it means to undertake historical sociology. It includes 
a detailed overview of the dominant epistemologies within sociological 
research, and also explores the advantages and limitations of the methods of 
documentary analysis, interviews and autobiography. 
History and sociology 
As Erickson (1973), amongst others, observes, the relationship between 
sociology and history is beset by debates and arguments. There is, 
nevertheless, an underlying insistence that sociologists should devote more 
attention to history. Traffic across the boundary dividing sociology and history 
has increased by historians seeking new techniques to help in their ordering 
of the past in social terms, and by sociologists who are interested in the rich 
sources of data located in the historian's archives. Sociologists might also 
profit from being able to employ historical methods to assist in the analysis of 
sociological data. The scope of sociological enquiry can be broadened by the 
systematic study of the past. For example, paying attention to historical 
method may enhance the acquisition of a sharper sense of relationships 
between social events over time. 
Wright Mills (1959) has insisted that the sociologist is really a contemporary 
historian; he/she is observing the history of the age, as well as looking for 
broader indicators of regularities and laws. In the course of this a setting that 
appears to reflect certain general social properties may later be 
demonstrated to have been but a part of wider changes. Perhaps history 
written with a sociological awareness has something to offer sociology, by 
restoring the methods employed by the early pioneers of sociology such as 
Weber, Durkheim and Marx. Sociology has certainly been criticized for 
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departing from the historical concerns of the nineteenth century European 
founding fathers. There are many examples of studies in which sociological 
researchers have made errors by ignoring historical evidence. Thernstron 
(1964) gives one illustration of the weakness of an historic sociology in a 
critique of Warner's (1959) Yankee City series of studies of a New England 
Community. Thernstron argues that Warner misinterpreted a number of 
patterns by relying on contemporary reports of past patterns and by ignoring 
the actual history of the community as available in documentary sources. Carr 
(1961) has suggested that the more sociological history becomes and the 
more historical sociology becomes the better it is for both, as this leads to an 
open frontier allowing for a two way traffic. 
In his paper 'The Relevance of History To Sociology', Goldthorpe (1962) 
discusses the relationship between the two disciplines and touches on the 
philosophical origins of the differences and the ways in which the two 
subjects have impinged upon one another. Attempts to establish strict 
distinctions between sociology and history have been concerned with 
studying their respective logics and methods. Perhaps the most forceful case 
which has been made for creating a distinction between history and sociology 
rests on the differences between 'idiographic' and 'nomothetic' disciplines. An 
idiographic discipline such as history is held to be concerned with unique and 
particular events or instances which are studied for their intrinsic interest. By 
contrast, a nomothetic discipline such as physics or chemistry is concerned 
with the formulation of general propositions through which practitioners seek 
to understand, and to explain, the class of phenomena which constitutes its 
subject matter. Sociology has been placed along with the natural sciences in 
the nomothetic category as being an essentially generalizing discipline. The 
sociologist in his/her quest for general propositions about society has to 
develop extensive conceptual schemes to analyse, reduce and order the 
diversities of our social existence. The historian, on the other hand, is said to 
have little interest in such general concepts, but to be interested in 
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developing even more reliable and penetrating methods of ascertaining 
historical data. Thus the sociologist and the historian are represented as 
working on quite different levels of abstraction. 
These arguments have attempted to draw strict lines of demarcation between 
history and sociology, but they involve considerable difficulties. For example, 
the attempt to distinguish sociology from history on methodological grounds 
requires that sociology be restricted to the study of present-day societies, 
and that the scope of the subject being studied and researcher be restricted 
in terms of research methodology, methods and techniques. Goldthorpe 
(1962), considers that studies on 'classic lines' remain of crucial importance 
to contemporary sociology. Studies which focus on patterns of variation in 
social structure and in culture are those most likely to help in the sociologist's 
effort to explain societies and their social processes at the present time. 
Through comparisons with other cultures, historically as well as 
geographically, social existence may be made more intelligible. 
Historical method: problems and possibilities 
Best (1970) has argued that there are problems in doing historical research. 
For example, there is a need to have the relevant historical knowledge to 
understand the period under study. The problem of meanings, both 
denotative and connotative, must be carefully reflected on, as meaning and 
words not only change from generation to generation, but may also be 
context-specific. According to Borg (1963), historical research is the 
systematic evaluation and synthesis of evidence in order to establish findings 
and draw conclusions about the relationships between past events. 
Researchers must reflect on evidence; evidence is interpreted, and different 
people looking at the same evidence often ascribe different meanings to it. A 
researcher's reconstruction of the past is easily distorted. Lewenthal (1985) 
has argued that the researcher is more aware of events occurring prior to, 
and after, the period or events studied. This awareness, he suggests, gives 
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the researcher a greater, and more artificial, sense of coherence than was 
experienced by those living in the past. A researcher's broader awareness 
can create the illusion that things happened because they had to, or that they 
fit together neatly. 
Foucault (1967,1972,1976,1977,1980), challenges much of what passes as 
historical investigation. His work, from the early Madness and Civilization, to 
his recent History of Sexuality, can be seen as history, or to use his own 
terms an 'archaeology'. Knowledge, for Foucault, is constituted by ruptures in 
previous ways of thinking. His concern has been with discontinuities in 
thought, and the impact which these ruptures have had on the delimitation of 
truth. In his history he rejects claims to be practising science. At the 
beginning of his 'Archaeology of Knowledge' he evokes the French Annales 
school approach to history which stresses the study of change in material 
civilization over periods as long as a millennium, as well as the layered and 
overlapping time scales of historical transformations. The Annales influence is 
evident in his advocacy of what he calls a 'general' history, as opposed to a 
'total history'. Total history, for Foucault, is attempting to draw all phenomena 
around a single causative centre, so that the same form of historical influence 
is thought to be operating at all levels in a society at the economic, social, 
political and religious levels. On the other hand, general history is concerned 
with series, segments, limits, differences, time lags, anachronistic survivals 
and possible types of relationships. The task proposed by general history is 
precisely to determine what relations may legitimately be made between the 
various forms of social categorizations, but this is done without recourse to 
any master schema, or any ultimate theory of causation. Most past histories, 
Foucault argues, have been concerned with reading documents for hidden 
meanings; his concern is, rather, with an understanding of the conditions for 
the emergence of particular forms of knowledge, and with an analysis of the 
past to discover traces of the present. 
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Cicourel (1964) sees the use of historical materials as a method depending 
on materials produced in the past. These materials are unique records and 
expressions of behaviour, and the sociologist seeks to reconstruct and to 
analyse them by means of a set of interpretive categories. Such materials are 
useful for suggesting hypotheses, testing them, and helping to establish a 
general perspective in which to place contemporary sources of data. Cicourel 
also views historical materials as containing built-in biases which the 
researcher might be unaware of as he/she has no access to the settings in 
which they were produced. Gottschalk et al. (1947) rightly insists that 
historians must ensure that their data really do come from the past and that 
imagination is directed toward re-creation and not creation. He suggests that 
there are at least three ways in which the present determines how the 
historian may interpret the past. Firstly, there is the inescapable tendency to 
understand others' behaviour in light of one's own behaviour patterns. 
Secondly, the contemporary intellectual atmosphere is a deciding factor in 
the historian's choice of subjects for investigation. Thirdly, there is the 
historian's exploitation of current events; from the episodes and 
developments of his/her own day the researcher may draw historical 
analogies to the episodes and developments of the past. 
Berelson (1952) refers to the notion of 'communication content'. This is the set 
of rules used by the researcher to categorize and make sense of the materials 
he/she is researching, and the effect which these rules have on making sense 
of, and communicating, the information found. When the sociologist uses 
official records of a mental hospital, or a prison, some form of communication 
content analysis occurs, as a response to the challenge of making sense of 
often abstract, highly condensed and incomplete records of complex events. 
Organizations themselves develop various ways of communicating official 
and unofficial material which are not formally recorded. Berelson (1952) asks 
researchers to remember that official records are often written for a particular 
audience, usually with a view to enabling the organization to be seen at its 
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best. He also points to other impinging factors, such as the public and private 
character of the meanings in such documents, the language used and the 
cultural and sub-cultural definitions which are employed. Naturally occurring 
social situations can be studied from records which are available. For 
example, in his study of suicide, Durkheim's (1951) primary hypothesis was 
that a basic cause of suicide is lack of integration in a social group. He 
examined three kinds of social group integration: religious, familial and 
political. He found suicide rates to be lower among catholics than among 
Protestants, lower among married people than among single people, lower 
among those with children than those without children, and lower during 
periods of national fervour. Durkheim argued that all these findings supported 
his hypothesis that belonging to a cohesive social group is a deterrent to 
suicide. 
Documentary analysis 
Documentary and archival studies such as Durkheim's rely on the analysis of 
data collected for purposes other that those of the particular study. Critiques 
by Douglas (1976) of Durkheim's research on suicide point out that the over-
reliance on official records and official statistics may deny the impact of the 
social processes involved; for example, in deciding which cases were those 
of suicide and which were not. The social meaning of suicide is problematic. 
It is important for researchers to guard against any uncritical acceptance of 
official records and official statistics. 
Primary sources which have survived may be published or unpublished; 
these are excellent documents from which to study past social activities. As 
Newman (1991) points out, a frequent criticism of such documents is that 
they were largely written by elites or those in official organizations: thus the 
views of the illiterate, the poor and, in this research, the insane, may be 
overlooked. For example, it was illegal for slaves in the United states to read 
or write, and thus written sources on the experience of slavery have been 
16 
difficult to find. 
An additional issue is that there are sometimes rules of confidentiality which 
allow access to documents only after certain periods of time has passed. For 
example, the Bethlem Archive records are open when they are thirty years 
old, but records containing information relating to individual patients are 
closed until they are one hundred years old. 
Researchers may have a tendency to use easy-to-find secondary sources 
rather than sufficient primary sources which are harder to locate but are 
usually more trustworthy (Best 1970). Information may be inadequately 
criticized by, for example, accepting a statement as necessarily true when 
several observers agree, and not realizing that they were all influenced by the 
same inaccurate source of information. Simplistic analyses may fail to 
recognize the multiplicity and complexity of past events. Finally personal bias 
and distortions may be revealed by statements lifted out of context and in an 
uncritical manner, or by an unrealistic admiration for the past or an equally 
unrealistic admiration for contemporary events. 
Studying the caretakers of the insane 
The present research attempts to reconstruct through critical historical and 
contemporary enquiry the nature of caretakers' work with the insane. The 
value of selecting this method lies in facilitating an analysis of how past 
mental health legislation affects present legislation, in generating information 
from the past which throws light on the question of how the rights of the 
insane were, and are, addressed, and in permitting an analysis of any 
changes in the role and responsibilities of the caretakers of the insane. 
(a) Analysing relevant documents 
Information was gathered from selected primary and secondary sources 
within the United Kingdom. The primary sources include the relevant Mental 
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Health Acts, Hansard, information in the Bethlem Royal Hospital Archive, 
research reports and official publications. The verbatim parliamentary record 
of what is said in the House of Lords and the House of Commons is possibly 
the most trusted official record (Mann 1985). A member of parliament may 
deeply regret what he/she said in the heat of a debate, but he/she can never 
have the record changed. He/she can only have it corrected if the official 
Hansard writers can be shown to have misreported what was said. The 
situation however, is different in the U.S.A., where the Congressional Record 
proofs are submitted to the Congressperson, who can alter the proofs to 
eliminate his/her peccadilloes. The secondary sources include the writings of 
caretakers of the insane, journals relevant to medicine, nursing, health and 
the insane, and contemporary newspapers, books and articles. 
All these historical records and materials were subjected to careful 
assessment, categorization and selection, attention paid to authenticity as 
argued by Platt (1985). The historical data were evaluated through historical 
criticism which consists of two activities: the authenticating of the source 
(external criticism); and an evaluation of the worth of the information (internal 
criticism). External criticism is aimed at discovering frauds, forgeries and 
distortions. One way of checking is to ascertain whether the information a 
document contains is consistent with what is known about the period or area 
of study from another source. Another approach is to ascertain if the 
document has been 'ghosted', that is, prepared by a person other than the 
alleged author or signer. Internal criticism means evaluating the accuracy and 
the worth of the information contained in the document. 
(b) Interviews with contemporary caretakers 
Information was also collected from caretakers working in different mental 
health care settings (community, hospital and education), who have had 
experience of the working of both the 1959 and 1983 Mental Health Acts. The 
aim here was to obtain information and to attempt a comparison of the 
18 
provisions and workings of the 1959 and 1983 Mental Health Acts in relation 
to any changes which came about in relation to the roles and the 
responsibilities of caretakers, and any changes in relation to the caretakers' 
role vis-a-vis the rights of the insane. 
Nine respondents with substantial experience of caretaking work took part in 
a semi-structured interview. The interviews lasted for half an hour and they 
were tape-recorded. The nine respondents included: a manager of mental 
nurses in-service education, a manager of hospital and community services, 
a manager of staff delivering community mental health services, a teacher of 
mental nursing in a hospital training school, a teacher of mental nursing in a 
university, a clinical nurse specialist working with drug abusers in the 
community, a teacher who trains mental health nursing teachers, a mental 
nurse/counsellor who practices as a teacher practitioner and the researcher, 
who is a trained mental nurse. 
The interview schedule contained some structured questions and the 
respondents were allowed to build themes and provide their own accounts. It 
was of the open-ended type, which, as Kerlinger (1970) argues, supplies a 
frame of reference for respondents' answers, but puts a minimum of restraint 
on the way they express these. Open-ended questions are useful because 
they are flexible, allowing the interviewer to probe so that depth can be 
achieved, and for opportunities to clear up misunderstandings, encourage 
co-operation, and help in establishing and maintaining rapport. Such 
questions may also result in unexpected or unanticipated answers which 
suggest new relationships between variables. 
There are, however, problems. A main one is bias. According to Cohen and 
Manion (1987), bias may be reduced by careful formulation of questions so 
that their meanings are clear. Another problem which Kitwood (1977) 
highlights is the issue of reliability and validity. He argues that, where 
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increased reliability of the interview is brought about by greater control of the 
questions, this is done at the cost of reduced validity. 
The interviews with the nine caretakers were sympathetic to Oakley's (1981) 
view that successful interviewing should validate the respondent's subjective 
experiences. The interviews allowed the respondents to question the 
interviewer and so maintain rapport in a honest, warm and friendly way. A 
balance was aimed at between friendliness and a 'researcher-respondent' 
relationship. The personal and social situation generated by the interview was 
recognized rather than ignored. My own position as researcher, being male 
and black and an ex-caretaker, might have affected interviewer-interviewee 
interactions. My experiences as a caretaker for the insane meant that I had 
some knowledge of the situations the interviewees were describing, and the 
language used by interviewees was also familiar; this allowed the interview 
situation to be more of a collegiate relationship with interactions emphasizing 
equality. 
In interviewing myself, I allowed my own reflections on the questions in the 
interview schedule to be collected in a manner similar to that of the other 
respondents in the study. The reflections of the researcher can be considered 
as potentially biased information because of his closeness to the context 
which is being researched. Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) argue that in 
self-interviews of this sort researchers may have an interest in presenting 
themselves favourably; they may have axes to grind, scores to settle, or 
excuses and justifications to make. 
Following Kohli (1981), the self-interview is an auto/biographical method 
which is defined as a text that represents the participation of the author in a 
specific social situation by drawing on his/her personal conception of that 
situation. As Stanley (1993) has argued, the auto/biographical method in 
general as a data resource tells us something about life 'out there'; some 
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auto/biographers describe events as they occur, thus representing feelings 
happening in a current situation, while other auto/biographies are written 
years after the event and so rely upon the vagaries and tricks of memory. 
Barthes (1975) expresses this in terms of the self who writes not having an 
unproblematic access to the past; the past, therefore, has to be recovered in 
traces rather than as a whole. 
The qualitative/quantitative debate 
The research enterprise described in this thesis is primarily a qualitative 
investigation. It seeks to generate a rounded indepth account of the work, 
role and responsibilities of the caretakers of the insane. This approach to 
research is well documented in the field of anthropology, and is not a new 
tradition, but one which saw a resurgence in the 1960s, which has resulted in 
it being a conspicuous force in social science research today. 
The concept of methodology within social research embraces a mixture of 
philosophical issues and considerations of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the approach, perspective, tradition or paradigm used in 
the collection of data and evidence. Debates within methodology address the 
two traditions of quantitative and qualitative research. Such debates look at 
the underlying philosophical positions and at their differences or similarities. 
The quantitative research tradition is usually depicted as exhibiting many of 
the procedures of the natural sciences. Quantifiable data on large numbers of 
people who are known to be representative of a wider population are 
generated in order to test theories and hypotheses. In following this tradition, 
many practitioners view their activities as capturing the essential ingredients 
of science. Interest in this debate can in part be attributed to Kuhn's (1970) 
work on the history of science. The most influential aspect of Kuhn's thesis 
was that of a 'paradigm', a cluster of beliefs and dictates which for scientists 
in a particular discipline influence what should be studied, how research 
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should be done and how results should be interpreted. Feyerabend (1975), a 
philosopher of science, has remarked on the dangers of introducing such 
issues into the language of the social sciences; he accuses Kuhn of 
encouraging people who have no idea of science to talk with assurance 
about the scientific method. This incursion of broader philosophical issues 
into the study of methods conveys the notion that methodology is a complex 
philosophical and conceptual domain. 
The main characteristic of qualitative research is its expressed commitment to 
viewing events, actions, norms, and values from the perspectives of the 
people who are being studied. It is contrasted with quantitative approaches 
which are concerned with testing theories, while qualitative approaches are 
deployed in order to generate theories. Social scientists who see quantitative 
and qualitative research as separate paradigms have produced ideal-type 
descriptions which obscure the areas of overlap, both actual and potential, 
between them (Bryman 1988). Any assertion which associates quantitative 
and qualitative research with different epistemologies is questionable, once 
the actual practice of social research is examined. For example, a good deal 
of qualitative research shares a quantitative empiricist agenda, and much 
quantitative research embodies a concern for subjects' interpretations, which 
is assumed to be the arena of qualitative research. 
Quantitative and qualitative research can therefore be understood as views 
about the ways in, and by which social reality ought to be studied; as such, 
they embody different combinations of epistemological assumptions as to 
what should pass as warrantable knowledge about the social world. Bulmer 
(1991) characterizes a variety of views which sees social scientists as taking 
on the issue of quantitative versus qualitative approaches. Some see 
quantitative and qualitative research as demonstrations of different ways of 
conducting social investigations, appropriate to different kinds of research 
questions and methods. Bulmer further contends that the two approaches are 
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more than merely different kinds of research methods; they also involve 
different styles of exposition. For example, the employment of a scientific 
rhetoric, an experimental research design and concepts of 'variables' and 
'control' in quantitative research impose expectations on the reader about the 
sort of framework that is about to be encountered. The self-conscious 
endorsement by many qualitative researchers of styles of presentation and 
literary devices which entail a rejection of a scientific rhetoric, can be seen as 
a countervailing genre. Qualitative researchers, through rejecting the scientific 
idiom and the adoption of a different framework, expect their work to be read 
and judged within the confines of that framework. 
Many social science researchers have become progressively disillusioned 
with the products of the scientific quantitative approach. According to Bryman 
(1988), in quantitative research the researcher's contact with the people being 
studied is fleeting or even non-existent; indeed many methods associated 
with quantitative research may require no contact with subjects at all. 
Quantitative researchers adopt a posture of outsiders applying a pre-
ordained framework to their 'subjects'. Subjects can therefore be considered 
to be largely 'fodder' for the researcher's concerns, rather than people with 
their own views and perspectives in relation to the area being investigated. 
Max Weber's idea of verstehen is one of the intellectual precursors of the 
qualitative approach. Weber placed verstehen - understanding - at the 
forefront of his view of what sociology entails: 'Sociology is a science which 
attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order to arrive at a 
causal explanation of its course and effects' (Weber 1949:90). The suggestion 
that Weber's verstehen has been a major influence on qualitative research 
has been challenged by Platt (1985). In her research on the history of 
qualitative research, Platt points out that early qualitative researchers of the 
1920s and 1930s appeared to be unaware of the concept; while those of the 
1940s and 1950s were either unaware of it or did not regard it as relevant. 
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She further argues that qualitative researchers had access to other theories 
such as those of Cooley (1902) and Thomas and Znaniecki (1918-1920), 
whose work converged with Weber's. Perhaps the use of Weber's verstehen 
as an intellectual precursor of qualitative research is a source of legitimation 
for a tradition which has been a poorly regarded paradigm when compared to 
the widespread acceptance of quantitative research. 
Doing qualitative research embraces the philosophical tenet of naturalism. In 
quantitative research this concept is interpreted as the applicability of the 
natural science model to the study of the social world and social reality. 
However, in qualitative approaches there is another interpretation of the 
meaning of naturalism. Matza (1969) and Randall (1944) have pointed to a 
meaning of naturalism which implies that the researcher should treat the 
phenomenon being studied as naturally as possible, so as to avoid or 
minimize the adulteration of the setting and strive to remain true to the nature 
of the phenomenon under study. Thus naturalism, in this sense, departs from 
the practices of quantitative researchers, who are thought of as imposing 
their own conceptual schemes on the social world. 
The ethos of the qualitative approach fits well the concern in the present work 
of trying to examine the intersubjective world of the caretakers of the insane -
that is, searching for evidence which offers an analysis of the meanings 
caretakers have of their work, their roles and their responsibilities. The 
attempt here is to focus on trying to understand the events, actions, norms, 
values and perspectives of the caretakers being studied. There are difficulties 
in achieving this, as Birkstead (1976), amongst others, has found. Birkstead 
focused on his subject's interpretation of social reality, and examined 
academic performance at school from the perspective of the students. But 
how feasible is it to perceive as others do? This concern over interpretation 
has been discussed by McNamara (1980). McNamara examined a brief 
transcript from Keddie (1971). A boy asked the teacher, 'How do you 
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unlearn?' The teacher replies, 'Well, you simply forget'. This response is 
interpreted by Keddie as devised to render the question unproblematic. The 
question McNamara raises is, how does Keddie know that this is what the 
teacher intended? Such concerns also surface when there are differences of 
opinions between two researchers looking at the same data. 
An open and unstructured research strategy allowing for flexibility, rather that 
one which is rigidly pre-defined, is the preference in qualitative investigations. 
The argument is that an open research strategy enhances the opportunity of 
coming across unexpected issues. Critics of this approach could argue that 
such an open approach ignores the need to ground research in a problem. 
The commitment to openness and flexibility varies considerably between 
researchers and the topic area being researched. For example Ditton (1977), 
writing about his ethnographic study of 'fiddling' in a bakery, affirms that his 
research was not set up to answer any pre-set empirical questions. His 
decision to concentrate of 'fiddling' was not made until a considerable 
proportion of the research had already been conducted. Other researchers 
have a more precise focus for their study at the outset. For example in the 
work of Bloor (1978), the focus is clearly stated. Bloor carried out an 
observational study which includes data from conversations in Ear, Nose and 
Throat (ENT) Clinics; his primary concern was to establish whether or not 
geographical differences in the incidence of adenotonsillectomy among 
children could be attributed to differences in the routine assessments of ENT 
specialists in different areas. However, as any investigation develops there is 
always the possibility of a change in direction or an emphasis on the need for 
more or different data. 
The role of theory 
Within the debates about qualitative research, there is a sensitivity to 
theoretical issues, and to the dilemma of having a standpoint, a 
preoccupation, a theory, which is juxtaposed with a concern and a 
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commitment to explore subjects' own perceptions of the social world and 
social reality. Having a theory may introduce premature closure on the issues 
to be investigated. It is also possible that the theoretical constructs depart 
from the views of the subjects (Bryman 1988). 
A frequently cited approach to the link between theory and investigation is 
analytic induction, a term coined by Znaniecki (1934), and developed by 
Robinson (1951). An example of a piece of research which embodies the 
basic steps in analytic induction is Lindesmith's (1968) study of opiate 
addiction. The strategy used involved checking the information collected for 
categories of phenomena and for relationships between such categories. 
Negative instances, or phenomena that did not fit the initial categories were 
sought, and throughout the process all cases were explained. 
Another approach to establishing the relationship between theory and data is 
grounded theory. The process was first formulated by Glaser and Strauss 
(1967). It provides a framework for the qualitative researcher to cope with the 
complexity of social reality and render it manageable. Bulmer (1991) has 
questioned whether the researcher is genuinely capable of suspending his or 
her awareness of relevant theories and concepts until a relatively late stage in 
the process. There is, therefore some ambivalence about the nature and role 
of theory among qualitative researchers. Depending on the research at hand, 
there is the view that qualitative research ought to be more consciously driven 
by theoretical concerns, while on the other hand there is the belief that 
theoretical concerns ought to be delayed until a later stage in the research 
process. Bryman (1988) argues that, apart from the question of whether it is 
desirable to defer theoretical reflection, the belief that research may be 
conducted in a theory-neutral way is open to some doubt. 
In other words, the qualitative enterprise is not without its critics, both within 
the perspective and without. The issue of interpretation, and the idea of 
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looking through the eye of the subject, are not unproblematic practices. The 
connection between theory and research indicates that analytic induction and 
grounded theory have provided qualitative researchers with frameworks for 
attending to theoretical issues. 
The emphasis in the present research is on the belief that theoretical 
concerns must be made explicit in order to provide a framework, while still 
allowing for some level of analytic induction to take place. This approach to 
doing research has as its main commitment the 'taking on' of the actor's point 
of view, or seeing through the eyes of the people being studied. There is an 
emphasis on description, and a naturalistic approach which retains contact 
with the real world. It shares with the quantitative perspective the use of 
comparative method, a commitment to disciplined systematic analysis, and 
an interest in causation, structures, patterns and frequencies. 
By drawing on the evidence from primary and secondary sources, from 
documents such as Hansard and from newspapers, from the interviewing of 
contemporary caretakers and the reflections of the researcher, the 
investigation provides a rich source of data enabling an informed analysis to 
take place. 
The substantive theories on which this work draws come from the conceptual 
frameworks of power, role, social control and social change. The concept of 
power facilitates the examination of the relationships between the caretakers 
and the insane. Issues of power are linked to social control, particularly in the 
area of the power and social control over the insane which is afforded by the 
legal establishment through mental health legislation and through medicine 
by psychiatry. The concepts of role and social change allow for an analysis of 
caretakers' work when new mental health legislation comes into effect, with 
consequent social changes. The theoretical and conceptual framework of the 




Any attempt at trying to examine the relationship between the caretakers, the 
insane and social and legislative policy requires theoretical constructs to 
facilitate systematic analysis. This chapter outlines some appropriate 
theories, and considers how and what aspects of theory might enable 
description, evidence-production, analysis and synthesis. The main 
theoretical approach drawn on is power and social control. 
Theory and inquiry are interwoven in a mixture of operations, with theory 
guiding inquiry, inquiry seeing evidence and evidence affecting theory. 
According to Kerlinger (1970), theory is a set of interrelated constructs, 
concepts, definitions and propositions that together present a systematic 
view of phenomena. Theory gathers together all the isolated and independent 
parts of information collected into a coherent conceptual framework of wider 
applicability. Theories organize unsorted facts, laws, concepts, constructs 
and principles into a meaningful and manageable form. Cohen and Manion 
(1987) suggest that theory is a potential source of discoveries, new 
hypotheses and hitherto unasked questions, identifying areas for further 
investigation. According to Bulmer (1991), the aim of theory is to facilitate the 
development of analytic schemes; such schemes then become guides to the 
investigation with the object of seeing whether they or their implications are 
true. 
Power in sociology 
The issue of power has occupied a central position in sociological analysis. 
Using the concept of power to investigate the relationships between 
caretakers of the insane and their service users is problematic in the light of 
theoretical debates as to the meaning of power. Two broad approaches to 
power are drawn on in this investigation; firstly, power as an element of social 
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action; and, secondly, power as an aspect of social relationships. 
a) Power as social action 
The work of Weber (1949), particularly his work on bureaucracy, 
demonstrates that power and domination are constitutive features of social 
life. Power is the probability that a person in a social relationship will be able 
to carry out her/his own will in pursuing goals of action despite resistance. 
Weber's approach to power is linked to his view of domination as the 
probability that a command will be obeyed. Power has the following 
characteristics: when exercised by individuals, it includes a choice, agency 
and intention; it involves an individual achieving or bringing about goals 
which are desirable; it is exercised over others, and may involve resistance 
and conflict; there are different interests between the powerful and the 
powerless; power can be negative, involving restrictions and deprivations for 
those subjected to deprivations. When the exercise of power is regarded as 
legitimate, it becomes authority. The Weberian approach emphasizes 
decision-making in power relationships, but neglects the processes of non 
decision-making as also a way of exercising power. This failure to act may be 
considered as evidence of inequalities of power. 
b) Power as social relationship 
In Marxist sociology, power is regarded as a structural relationship which is 
independent of the wills of individuals. Power is seen as the consequence of 
the class structure of societies. Poulantzas (1978) defined power as the 
capacity of one class to realize its interests in opposition to other classes. In 
this perspective, power cannot be separated from the mode of production, 
and it involves class struggle and not just conflicts between individuals. 
Power, the sick role, and the caretakers of the insane 
Parsons (1967) argues that power is a positive social force which facilitates 
the achieving of communal ends. Power is diffused through society rather 
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than being concentrated in a ruling elite. The political system is seen as open 
and pluralistic, permitting the whole community to participate in the political 
process. Parsons suggests that power is shared by members of the 
community. 
When applied to particular social situations, this notion becomes problematic. 
For example, as regards the caretaking of the insane, the need for care 
suggests an incapacity of the service-users to exercise a full adult social rota. 
Parsons' (1952) concept of a 'sick role' sought to explain the relationship 
between health care workers, especially doctors, and people who are ill. The 
doctor-patient relationship is inherently one of power, with power vested in 
the doctor. The same is true of the caretakers of the insane, as in their role 
and function they, too, are a part of the medical and care establishment. 
Parsons's 'sick role' has four main themes: the sick role legitimates exemption 
from normal social responsibilities; the sick person needs help and cannot be 
expected to become well through unaided action; there is an obligation on 
the sick person to get well; there is an obligation to seek technically 
competent help and to cooperate with that help in trying to get well. These 
themes are balanced by obligations, and the role is both temporary and 
dependent on the sanctions of the wider society. When a person is sick, it is 
acceptable for her or him not to go to work or attend to family and friendship 
obligations. This results in a situation whereby, in accepting the 'sick role', 
power is given to others within the health care establishment to define who is 
and who is not sick, and who therefore is eligible for a restricted social role. 
Following Parsons's analysis, the 'sick role' is socially desirable because it 
provides an incentive for people to get better, and at the same time limits the 
pressures associated with the meeting of work, family and social obligations. 
In these terms the 'sick role' contributes to the equilibrium and stability of 
society by regulating who can opt out and protecting those who opt out from 
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being regarded as deviant. 
Wolinsky and Wolinsky (1981) argue against the Parsonian conception of the 
sick role. They contend that Parsons' sick role concept applies only to acute 
physical health and not to chronic or psychiatric problems; and the concept 
denies cultural differences, sexism, racism or social inequalities. Access to 
the 'sick role' is affected by wider issues of social inequality. Wolinsky and 
Wolinski (1981) suggest that less powerful groups may try to use the 'sick 
role' to cope with social failure, and in so doing they are required to accept 
the power of those in authority. Those in authority and with power are likely to 
be white, male and middle class, while those accepting such power relations 
are likely to be black, female and poor. 
According to this view, the insane are outside the sick role; they are 
conceived as lacking the capacity to get better and may be defined as 
deviant. The lack of power on the part of the insane and the exercise of power 
by others in relation to them results in the insane being contained, and even 
punished, rather than supported. Both the 'sick role' and the designation of 
the 'sick role' to particular sections of the community provide the basis of the 
power exercised by the health care establishment of which caretakers are a 
part. The caretakers of the insane expect compliance with their directions, 
and the insane expect to be asked to comply. When the insane refuse to 
comply with caretakers' instructions, it is likely that the situation arises 
because they are located on the ambiguous boundary between the 'sick role' 
and deviance, and because caretakers have to refer to the greater power of 
the medical profession, that is, the caretaker's work is open to medical 
scrutiny and control which circumscribes their power. In such situations the 
power of the caretakers of the insane is grounded in the institutions of law 
and medicine. Whatever indirect power caretakers may have is also mediated 
through the institution, the power they have over resources, and the extent to 
which their knowledge and expertise are recognized by the public. 
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Wilding (1982) argues that health care workers have considerable control 
over the deployment of resources within health care organizations. For 
example, irrespective of the intentions of policy makers, caretakers can 
determine the ways in which the service actually operates; services may be 
organized to meet the interests of the caretakers rather that to meet service-
users' needs; caretakers may be involved in undermining management. 
Caretakers also exercise power over the considerable resource of their own 
time. Examples are: being available to help someone with a physical task 
such as getting on or off the toilet; providing time to consult and give advice; 
deciding how much time to spend with any one person, and how it is used; 
writing reports for doctors and managers which affect the career of the insane 
person; being an advocate for the insane; and attempting to ensure that 
practice protects the civil rights of the insane. 
The debates around power as an element of social action draw on the work of 
Lukes (1974). His approach to power involves the consideration of three 
dimensions: situations where observable decision-making takes place in a 
context of overt conflict concerning the interest of the individuals or the 
group; situations when decision-making is hampered because there is covert 
as well as overt conflict concerning the interest of the individual or the group; 
and situations in which the agenda is established but there exists covert, 
overt and latent conflict over both objective and subjective interests of the 
individual or the group. 
It is the third of these dimensions which is most useful analytically, because it 
enables coercion, influence and authority as forms of power to be examined 
and explored together. The social nature of power is emphasized, and it is 
recognized that there is power over others as well as power to act. Hugman 
(1991) argues that the difference between Lukes' three dimensions can be 
illustrated with an example from nursing practice, where a nurse administers 
a drug to a patient. The one-dimensional approach would only apply the 
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concept of power to an analysis of the nurse's action in situations where the 
patient refuses to take the drug. The two-dimensional approach would also 
allow for power being evident through the nurse's actions in avoiding the 
possibility of an overt refusal by the patient. The three-dimensional approach 
considers situations in which the patient is in agreement, but such agreement 
may conflict with her/his objective interests; for example, the patient's 
understanding of the treatment to be given may be limited, making it difficult 
for informed consent to be exercised. Here the power of nursing can be seen 
in the general acceptance by patients of treatments administered by nurses. 
There are two important potential implications for the caretakers of the insane 
in Lukes's three-dimensional approach. Firstly, the individual caretaker or 
caretakers as a group may exercise power and be unaware of doing so, and 
may even reject the idea that they exercise power. Secondly, what caretakers 
do must be examined in terms of relationships within their group, their 
relationships with other care workers and service-users, the institutions within 
which they work and the wider social structures and cultural patterns of 
society. 
Lukes's three dimensions generate a framework for theorizing about 
underlying and unobservable conflicts of interests. What is left unresolved is 
the question of interests that may lie between the 'objective' and the 
'subjective'. A possible resolution to this would be to follow Marcuse's (1964) 
injunction that individuals cannot recognize their real interests as long as they 
are subject to distorting dominant ideologies. 
Habermas (1977) advances the view that power is often exercised through 
the manipulation and/or the distortion of communication. Different groups 
have a different say in the construction of what passes for consensus, and 
communication may be directed towards the achievement of ends and not 
towards reaching agreement. An example of this could be where a caretaker 
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asks a service-user to agree to an intervention; the request here is directed 
towards achieving professional goals and not to reaching an agreement with 
the service-user or to give him/her equal status in the relationship. Essentially 
the caretaker is using his/her power to pursue his/her professional work as 
prescribed by law, medicine and the relevant professional body. 
Power, social divisions and care workers 
(a) Social class 
Both the control of knowledge by caretakers and their relationships with the 
insane are connected through class positions and relations. Service-users are 
more likely than caretakers to be working class (Jones 1983). This is not 
surprising, given the origins of the caring occupations as a response to the 
wider social concern with the 'cleaning up' of industrial-capitalist society. 
Although the care occupations also recruit from the working classes, the 
social processes of training serve to separate those workers from the working 
class. Education and training here create a divide in knowledge, skills and 
values. Dingwall's (1977) study of health visitors' training provides an example 
of how patterns of speech, dress and behaviour develop in parallel with an 
ideology of professionalism and a particular model of relationships with 
clients. Language use communicates class, and reinforces social divisions 
(Mayer and Timms 1970; Sainsbury 1975; Bernstein 1973). The claim to 
knowledge by caretakers thus serves to establish an element of their relative 
class position and adds to the legitimizing of their power. 
Caring occupations also exercise ideological power through the production of 
images and meanings relating to the status and role of service-users. This 
has consequences both for service-users and for care-workers, as it is a 
process which serves to establish and sustain the identity of each group. One 
essential strategy is the production of the categories 'clinical' and 'social'. For 
example, the insane may be identified as suffering from a particular mental 
disease or illness which reflects the dominance of medical knowledge. The 
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insane person becomes a case with a particular mental disease. Such 
categorizations provide a method for caretakers to structure their thinking 
and their communication, and one which crucially, as Smith (1980) points out, 
excludes outsiders, and so helps to determine the nature of the insane 
person's problems and the kind of response that is seen as appropriate. 
These structuring categories are routinized and rarely subjected to critical 
scrutiny; their power rests on their taken-for-grantedness. 
Power is also a means whereby care-workers can maintain a physical and 
social distance from service-users. The strategies used include: the use of 
separate facilities such as toilets: doors marked 'private' and the formality of 
interactions (Satyamurti 1981). For example, the use of 'nurse' or 
'sister/charge nurse' instead of names is part of a process whereby the 
anonymity of the care-worker maintains a subtle control in a 'well-mannered' 
exchange, and the care-worker is enabled both to control interactions and to 
use interactions for control. 
As well as class, ethnicity and gender are significant social divisions affecting 
the nature of health care and welfare work. There are women and men from 
different ethnic/racial and gender groups working as doctors, occupational 
therapists, social workers, psychologists, administrators and nurses. Service-
users are also divided by ethnicity and gender. In addressing the power 
relations between caretakers and service-users, we need, therefore, to 
consider the extent to which the processes of racism and sexism occur in 
mental health care work. 
(b) Ethnicity and racism 
All health care workers share to a greater or lesser extent similar theoretical 
frameworks, and they may use these in their interactions with ethnically 
different service users. Any criticism of psychiatry is also relevant to other 
health care workers involved in the mental health services. Some psychiatrists 
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have identified racism in mental health services. Culture and ethnicity as 
social statuses and as stereotypes affect diagnosis, treatment and care 
(Littlewood and Lipsedge 1988; Rack 1982). Health professionals, including 
the caretakers of the insane, may fall into the trap of dealing with racism by 
thinking that all that is needed to make a non-racist care worker is cultural 
knowledge. But this type of debased psychiatric anthropology may only 
mean that care-workers falls back on racist cultural stereotypes (Mercer 
1986). 
Hugman (1991) offers three explanations for racism in the mental health 
services: the experience of migration to a new culture may be too stressful; 
aspects of black people's life experiences, for example racism in white 
society, may contribute to mental illness; psychiatric practices are racist 
because they are ethnocentric. Each of these views is central to psychiatric 
practice, including the work of the caretakers of the insane. 
While migration may exact a psychological toll, this explanation cannot be 
taken out of the context of racism more broadly. Littlewood and Lipsedge 
(1988) point to the potentially destructive effects of adjustment to a new 
culture on personality, resulting in mental ill-health as the price of adaptation 
to a society which only accepts the migrant on racist terms. Most black 
people in the United Kingdom are not immigrant, yet the incidence of mental 
ill health appears to be high amongst black people whether migrant or not 
(Torkington 1983). This suggests that there are common features of the social 
position of black people which may precipitate psychological crisis. However, 
as Brittan and Maynard (1984) point out, the capacity of black people to resist 
is largely ignored. Resistance exists, and it often takes the form of asserting 
those aspects of black culture which white society devalues. This can result in 
confrontations which may lead to psychiatric diagnosis and treatment; and 
psychiatry is supported by a relationship with coercive state agencies such as 
the police. Mercer (1986) argues that it is this process which is behind the 
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over-representation of black people diagnosed as mentally ill. The black 
person's resistance is interpreted as bizarre and deviant by the dominant 
white culture. The psychiatric diagnosis rests not in the lack of awareness of 
black cultural forms, but in the power of white psychiatry to impose 
ethnocentric concepts on the experience of black people. The issue here is 
not that black people do not experience mental distress, but that there are 
complex factors involved. 
(c) Gender and sexism 
Interwoven with racism is the gender dimension. Gender refers to the social 
construction of femininity and masculinity based on ascribed sex differences 
(Oakley 1972). Gender segregation occurs within the caring occupations; 
there is a tendency for specific types of work to be undertaken by women and 
others by men. For example, in social work practice women are more likely 
than men to work with the elderly, while men are more likely to work with 
mental health or child care (Howe 1986). This situation is similar in nursing 
where there is a sharp gender division between general and psychiatric 
nursing. The places in the caring occupations occupied by men have been 
associated more with control than care. This is seen in the male dominance in 
work with offenders and in asylum work (Carpenter 1980). 
The service-users of the caring occupations are predominantly women 
(Dominelli and McLeod 1989). According to analyses such as that provided 
by Hugman (1991), the experience of being a service-user is structured by 
patriarchy. This has implications for the provision of services and the 
relationships between service-users and care-workers at both the individual 
and the collective levels. The operation of patriarchy is clearly seen in the 
work of psychologists who fail to address the issues pertaining to gender 
(Mitchell 1974). As Broverman et al. (1970) argue, the higher incidence of 
women diagnosed as having mental health problems can be explained as a 
consequence of the social construction of women's lives, and the problems 
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associated with the domestic role, where social definitions of motherhood 
play a key role in restricting and devaluing women (Brown and Harris 1978). 
These arguments and critiques have had only a partial impact on the work of 
caretakers. Care relationships, argues Goldie (1977), parallel aspects of 
marriage; the passive women patient comes to rely on the active man as 
therapist for acceptance and approval. This can be applied to the work of 
caretakers, where the control of treatment and therapy is in the hands of 
mostly male psychiatrists supported by mainly female caretakers. Male and 
female caretakers who attempt to work against this may find themselves 
confronted by arguments formed to preserve the patriarchal status quo. 
Because psychiatric theories are implicitly or explicitly gendered, caretakers 
may be faced with a choice between complicity, confrontation and covert 
opposition. 
This analysis points to power as an inherent and often covert aspect of the 
work of caretakers. Caretakers may find it difficult to confirm that they do 
exercise power in their relations with service-users, because in making this 
explicit they would be challenging the institutions and organizations 
concerned with the care of the insane. 
Social control 
The concept of social control refers to something that happens in the social 
world of which people may or not be aware. Whenever the terms 'persuade', 
'restrain', 'discipline', 'coerce', 'direct', 'manage' or 'regulate' are used to 
describe the activities of individuals, groups or organizations, the exercise of 
social control over people's minds and bodies is relevant. 
Social control may be direct and overt or indirect and covert. In some 
instances, overt and covert social control go hand in hand; for example, 
within schools, families and health care facilities. Society as a whole is 
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governed by a complex system of legal statutes and other law-enforcing 
mechanisms which regulate behaviour in a wide range of areas. Social 
processes in general may have a control element which is intended or 
unintended, recognized or unrecognized by the parties concerned. For 
example, in the course of working with the insane, doctors and caretakers 
may influence service-users' lives through shaping their attitudes, beliefs and 
actions, and in either reinforcing existing patterns or in others changing them 
(Edwards 1988). 
Social control is related to the concepts of authority, law and order and 
morality. The implication here is that people need regulation and restraint. For 
Marx, Durkheim, Weber and other major social theorists, social order and 
social control are essential analytic concepts in reaching an understanding of 
how societies achieve and maintain social order. There are different 
approaches to the problem of social order, and different conceptions of what 
social control is and what it does (Watkins 1975). Edwards (1988) argues that 
the differing perspectives have certain common underlying assumptions 
about social order and social control. The following assumptions, Edwards 
suggests, are common: that social control is an essential and desirable 
function on which the survival of society depends; that social control involves 
the use of mechanisms, techniques and strategies to discourage, restrict, or 
prevent behaviour which constitutes a threat to the majority; that the 
responses of social control agents such as doctors and caretakers are 
justified when individuals exhibit disruptive, disturbing, dangerous or deviant 
behaviours; and that specific activities and processes of social control belong 
to certain categories of people and to special institutions. The examples here 
are the police, magistrates, psychiatrists, caretakers, social workers and 
teachers. All these workers may contribute to the social control of the insane. 
The principal social control institutions here are the mental health system and 
the legal-judicial system. 
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A critique of Edwards' view is offered by Matza (1969), who contends that it 
accepts too unquestioningly the need for social control. Of relevance here is 
the analysis of social control offered by functionalists, labelling theorists, 
Marxists and feminists. The functionalist approach is exemplified in the work 
of Pal sons (1951). Parsons argued that social control is universally present in 
all societies. Social control is a 'normal' social phenomenon serving the 
interests of the community. Within societies there are pressures and tensions, 
and social control is necessary to contain and counteract such situations. 
Medicine is a major social control system and the main alternative to law and 
criminal justice in the modern world. Parsons describes both illness and 
crimes as having common and different characteristics. A different 
characteristic is that the sick role confers a conditional legitimacy while crime 
is regarded as illegitimate. This results in the person deemed to be sick 
being subjected to reintegrative processes, while the criminal experiences 
exclusion. In the services offered to the insane we can see that there is both a 
criminal and an illness element; such individuals may be placed in a 
confusing situation where they experience the integrative processes of the 
medical system and the exclusionary effects of the criminal justice system. 
According to Orcutt (1983), Parsons worked with a medical model of a self-
regulating and self-maintaining social system, where the problem of social 
order is solved by referring to the existence of an underlying normative order 
of shared moral and social values, which is prior to, and independent of, the 
social relationships within a given society. The integration of the various parts 
of the social system therefore rests in value consensus. 
Functionalism does not deal effectively with questions about sources or 
causes of particular modes of social control. It deals poorly with questions 
concerned with who is subject to social control, on whose behalf it is 
exercised, with what purposes and interests, and how social control 
mechanisms are linked to the political structure and power relations within 
societies. Pfohl (1985) argues that both Parsons' social system model and the 
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functionalist mode of analysis are problematic. In these approaches, social 
control is viewed as taking place in a social world which is unproblematic, 
homogenous, stable, deterministic and based on a moral consensus. Conflict 
is relegated to the periphery, where social control is exercised by agents 
enjoying full authority and official legitimacy. Perhaps all functionalism can 
usefully say about social control is that it may indeed be a universal aspect of 
all human groups and societies, and it may be related in complex ways to 
other aspects of social order. 
Since the 1960s, the application of labelling theories to the study of social 
control has extended the debate on concepts of social control. The diverse 
contributors to this perspective approach social control by seeing it as part of 
the broader social construction of insanity, deviance and criminality. It is 
involved in rule-making, norm-defining and standard-setting as to what is 
socially appropriate; it contributes to the fixing of labels and to the creation 
and implementation of various types of sanctioning. 
Labelling theorists see social reality as a construction created by human 
action and consciousness (Edwards 1988). Integration, cohesion and 
consensus are not taken for granted but are regarded as historically variable 
aspects of the social order. Society is seen as characterized by pluralism, 
diversity and competing ideas and interests. This perspective is vulnerable to 
the accusation that it offers only a micro or social psychological account of 
social control, and runs the risk of lapsing into relativism (Davis 1975; Taylor 
et a/. 1973). Another criticism is that this perspective lacks an adequate 
theory of structure, power and ideology. 
By contrast, Marxists look behind these phenomena to uncover what they 
believe to be fundamental structures and processes - the forces and relations 
of production. In classic Marxism, society is divided into groups with unequal 
access to the means of production. This gives rise to a social structure 
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characterized by conflict and struggle in which the dominant groups have to 
employ coercion, regulation and repression to maintain their control over the 
productive system and over subordinate groups. The problem of social order 
is seen as being a product of historical conditions and social practices. These 
conditions and practices create and maintain social inequality and 
exploitation, along with the imposed order which is necessary to safeguard 
the beneficiaries of the system from attacks by the oppressed majority. 
The State and social action 
Jessop (1978) argues that the modern capitalist state is the principal 
institutional locus of power. The state operates in a number of arenas -
economic, political, socio-cultural and ideological - and through a range of 
agencies, both public and private. The state employs a number of strategies, 
including legitimation and regulation. An important distinction between two 
major social control approaches - the repressive and the ideological - is 
made by theorists such as Gramsci (1971), Althusser (1971) and Poulantzas 
(1973). Both the repressive and the ideological dimensions of social control 
are present in institutions and are operations of the modern state, which 
accordingly regulates and manages all sectors of society. Common to all 
such institutional regulation are the processes of bureaucratization, 
professionalization and the application of scientific knowledge and 
technology. The provision of welfare is part of the State's control process; the 
negative image of capitalism is offset by a demonstration of the benevolent 
side of capitalism and state regulation. Gough (1979) sees the modern state 
as embodying tendencies to enhance social welfare, and to develop the 
powers of individuals, as well as instituting mechanisms through welfare 
institutions such as education and health for repressing and controlling 
people. 
Gender, the state and social control 
In a class-divided society both women and men are subjected to material and 
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ideological forms of social control. Men and women are affected differently. 
Women are principally controlled within the private domain, where they are 
subordinate to men economically and legally. This control extends to other 
areas which are experienced only by women; the reproductive cycle; a 
subordinate social and legal status in relation to men in the family; the 
separation of home and work; and the ideology of the woman's place (Smart 
and Smart 1978). According to Mitchell (1971), the oppression of women is 
due to the social structures concerned with production, reproduction, 
sexuality and the socialization of children. As Klein (1981) observes, sexism 
results in economic exploitation, political domination and psychological 
oppression. In a radical feminist analysis, many institutions and organizations 
of social control form part of the state patriarchy. The institutions and 
organizations of importance here are the judiciary, the welfare system and 
medicine; these all reinforce social divisions and inequalities. 
Feminist critiques in this field have argued that established academic 
disciplines, such as sociology, criminology and psychiatry, have relied on 
sexists stereotypes of women. In such stereotyping, women are characterized 
as irrational, immature, suggestible and governed by their biological-sexual 
nature (Edwards 1988). But these institutionalized perceptions themselves 
operate as social control systems. When women are seeking medical or 
psychiatric care, welfare benefits or legal assistance, their problems are likely 
to be trivialized, individualized and attributed to their own inadequacies, and 
both the role of men and that of socio-economic circumstances are likely to 
be played down. 
Power and social control 
Like Marxist labelling theorists and feminists, Foucault regards power as 
central to any analysis of social control. Starting with the construction of the 
modern concept of madness, moving on through medicine to the prison 
system, Foucault offers us insights into the development of discourses, that 
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is, techniques and ideologies for the management of human beings (Foucault 
1967, 1976, 1977). This discipline, as he calls it, operates through the control 
of minds, wills and behaviours. The people subjected to these techniques and 
ideologies are regarded in the same was as machines, that is, to be made as 
efficient and useful as possible. Power is seen as positive and productive, not 
a thing to be possessed, but exercised through particular techniques and 
strategies. For Foucault any analysis of power starts at the micro level and 
works upwards; his analysis denies the existence of any Structural economic 
or political determinants of power. 
Social control and the health care system 
The case for treating medicine as a major institution of social control is made 
by Zola (1972), Freidson (1970) and others. Freidson argues that medicine 
functions as a formal, official instrument of control. With responsibility for 
regulating the entry into, conduct in, and exit from the sick role, it has a 
crucial function in the management of illness and disability. Medicine's 
operation as a control mechanism has been concealed because of its 
characteristics as a 'science' offering clinical treatments. In this perspective, 
the medical model is a social construction, a dominant social control 
paradigm, and a mode for understanding human behaviour and the natural 
and social worlds. Theorists such as Freidson (1970) and Conrad and 
Schneider (1980) see medicine as the most powerful institution of social 
control apart from the legal system itself. More and more problems of human 
and social behaviour are regarded as requiring medical and therapeutic 
intervention. This therapeutic control philosophy is generally welcomed as a 
sign of a socially progressive and civilized society. With the increase in 
medicalization, 'undesirable' aspects of the human condition are increasingly 
being treated as caused by biological, psychological or environmental 
factors. In order to achieve this ideological objective, medicine employs 
metaphors of illness or sickness and a theory about causes and remedies 
which purports to rest on the 'objective' basis of 'science'. 
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Social control and the mental health services 
The mental health services are an area where the appropriateness of 
mediating social relations by legal forms has been hotly debated. Central to 
the legal aspects of mental health care delivery are the people who wish to 
subject the psychiatrist and all other mental health workers to a tight regime 
of legal rules. These rules define the relationship between service-users and 
service-providers in terms of rights and duties. There are those who see such 
rules as imposing a legal straightjacket on the discretionary nature of the 
therapeutic processes of psychiatric care. There are also those who view 
service-users and service-providers as being polarized by conflicting interests 
and power relations. The most extreme illustration of this is the compulsory 
admission of service-users. For this reason, service-users need legal rights in 
order to defend their civil liberty. 
It can be argued that the law actually constitutes the mental health system. It 
constructs, empowers and regulates the relationships between providers and 
users of mental health services. In so doing, the law preconditions the social 
control functions of psychiatry through surveillance and discipline; without the 
law the system would not function in its present state. The law determines 
relevant skills and qualifications and the division of labour between service-
providers. Furthermore, the law fulfills an important function as an agency of 
social control in inhibiting and restraining psychiatric power in the interest of 
civil liberties and the accountability of the psychiatric services. The law also 
legitimates the psychiatric services, and enables psychiatrists to distance 
themselves from the coercive operations of the system. This is evident when 
powers and decisions concerning hospitalization are shifted towards 
members of service-users' families, social workers, magistrates, and mental 
health review tribunals and/or multidisciplinary panels. Unsworth (1987) 
argues that all of this helps to medicalize the psychiatrist's image as a healer 
rather than a gaoler. 
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In the mental health services, two social control disciplines come together, 
namely the legal-judicial and the medical. The legal-judicial system is widely 
regarded as the main regulatory mechanism of the state. Both the psychiatric 
and the legal-judicial systems are agents of social control and, as such they 
are essentially political activities (Heather 1976). The area of law which deals 
with compulsory treatment is unarguably a means of social control. 
Moreover, it strengthens the social control of psychiatry by ensuring that 
psychiatry can do its social control job through using legitimized force. 
According to Langman (1980), the legal judicial system colludes with 
psychiatry to enforce the moral codes which legitimate the social order. The 
status and power of the psychiatric system are thus maintained. The mental 
health law allows for the formal enforcement of the sick role and ultimately the 
psychiatrist's orders. 
Mental health law, which is civil law, overlaps with criminal law. The criminal 
justice system usually has more stringent procedural safeguards to prevent 
wrongful deprivation of liberty. It may therefore be seen as quicker and 
cheaper to involve mental health law rather than criminal law in some cases. 
Should this situation occur then the individual's rights would have been 
ignored. Criminal law centres on provable and defined offenses; these 
considerations are rarely important in mental health law. What this means, 
according to Cavadino (1987), is that there may be a tendency and a 
temptation to use psychiatric law as a means of social control in 
circumstances where morally and politically it would be more desirable to use 
the criminal justice system. 
The 1960s and 1970s saw a rise in critiques of medico-legal social control in 
the mental health services (Cavadino 1987). The critiques of authors such as 
Laing (1959,1967), Cooper (1967), Szasz (1971,1972,1974), Scheff (1966), 
Goffman (1968) and Foucault (1967) offered a powerful indictment of 
traditional psychiatric attitudes. The 'anti-psychiatry' movement seemed to be 
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saying, keep people away from the mental health services. Szasz claimed 
that mental illness was a myth, and that there should be no such thing as 
mental health law. Laing suggested that the mad might be saner than the rest 
of us, that their madness was an understandable response to oppression, 
and that to medicalize it by calling it mental illness was to add to this 
oppression. Scheff argued that labelling people as mentally ill was what 
caused mental illness. Goffman saw psychiatric institutions as inherently 
inhumane. According to Foucault, labelling of people as mad is closely linked 
to the social relations of capitalism. 
The delivery of a public service requires distinctions to be made between 
individuals so that their needs can be met. However, the mental health 
services tend to function through diagnostic labels which gives the 
impression that the mentally ill are a uniform group. Such a situation 
maintains the social control of people deemed to be mentally ill, and so could 
perpetuate the infringement of their rights. While the law through mental 
health legislations provides a framework for the provision of services, civil 
liberty organisations, The National Association for Mental Health (MIND) and 
user groups, are asking for the safeguard of the rights of users through: the 
right to have appropriate care, treatment and rehabilitation in a humane 
environment; the right to care and treatment in the least restrictive 
environment; the right to decide whether to consent to treatment or have a 
second opinion; the right to retain normal civil rights and social opportunities; 
and the right of appeal, regular review and representation when restrictions 
are being considered or imposed. 
Social control is both a sociological concept and a social phenomenon. 
Attention has to be given to changing definitions, perspectives, approaches, 
institutions and processes, when control over people is exercised. Social 
control is closely related to other concepts, including discipline, authority, law 
and order and morality. In the twentieth century, medicine has expanded as 
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an institution of social control. The legal-judicial system, the psychiatric 
system and the providers of psychiatric and mental health services all share 
in the social control of the insane. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INSANITY, MADNESS OR MENTAL ILLNESS? 
As the last chapter demonstrated, psychiatry has come under sustained 
criticism recently as that branch of medicine which provides for the medical 
and legal control of the insane, the mad or the mentally ill. Much of this 
criticism is articulated through the language of rights, liberties and justice. 
This chapter looks at aspects of psychiatry which may be considered as 
violating or ignoring the rights of individuals. It explores the nature of insanity, 
critiques of the medical model, and the relevance of the user perspective. 
Defining insanity 
A varying number of people in Britain are likely at sometime in their lives to 
enter a state of acute or severe emotional or psychic disturbance in which 
they are unable to cope with everyday life. They might identify a need for help 
themselves, or they may be identified by others such as work colleagues, 
friends or relatives as being either at risk of harming themselves or of 
harming others. Their behaviour may be considered so disturbing that they 
have to be removed from their usual social setting. Such removal is usually to 
the care of psychiatrists, who may employ a medical model of care and 
treatment (Lindow 1990). 
Today there is no general agreement as to the nature of insanity, that is, what 
it is, what causes it, and what will cure it. There are conflicting opinions about 
insanity, and among psychiatrists there is hardly a body of knowledge on 
which all agree. The concept of mental illness is beset by debates and 
interpretations. Is it a label for rule-breaking and socially unacceptable 
behaviour? Is it a concept which misleads with its medical connotations by 
suggesting that distorted interpersonal relationships amount to mental 
sickness? Is it a political expedient enabling those who hold power within 
society to devalue dissenters and violate their freedom? Or is it a concept 
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which is analogous to physical illness and applicable to those who manifest, 
not physical pathology, but a psychopathology which impairs judgement and 
personal responsibility? Given the debates which rage it is hardly surprising 
that people are variously referred to as 'insane', 'mad', 'lunatic', 'mentally ill', 
'deviant' and 'socially disturbed', and the professionals working with such 
persons refer to them as 'patient', 'client', 'deviant', 'dissident', 'consumer' or 
'service-user'. There is also confusion over the criteria used to diagnose 
people as mentally ill. 
Insanity has a long tradition. Since biblical times there have been records of 
people who seemed 'odd', who said they could hear voices or see things 
which no one else present could hear or see. At various times such people 
have been regarded as witches, wizards, warlocks, saints or persons 
possessed by the devil. According to Rosen (1968), some such people were 
accorded prestige as oracles and prophets, but more commonly they were 
called insane and were subjected to abuse, scorn, or ridicule. The insane 
have commonly been deprived of rights. For example, under Roman Law 
they could not marry or dispose of property. In the Middle Ages they were 
believed to be witches and wizards who possessed evil spirits, and the 
priests were turned to, to exorcize the evil spirits. They were also subjected to 
ceremonies of ritual purgation, demon expulsion, herbal baths and other 
physical and surgical treatments. In contemporary society parallel care, 
treatment and cure activities are still used within psychiatry. 
Porter (1987) argues that insanity has remained an elusive state. He asks, is 
insanity truly a 'disease' rather in the way that we all accept that measles is? 
Or might it not be better regarded essentially as a badge we pin on people 
displaying a rather subjectively defined bundle of symptoms and traits, but 
who at bottom are just mildly or severely 'different' or 'odd'? If this is the case, 
is the bottom line simply that we call people mentally 'confused' because we 
find them 'confusing' or 'disturbed', and essentially because we find them 
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'disturbing'? The 'mad' are strange. But does that mean anything more than to 
say that they are strange to us? And then what about the fact that we are 
strange to them? (Porter 1987:8-9). 
Hunter and McAlpine (1974) argue that psychiatry is foremost a branch of 
medicine and subject to its discipline, and that mental illness is not somehow 
different from physical illness (as terms like 'neurosis', 'psychosis' and their 
subdivisions might imply). They contend that patients suffer from mental 
symptoms which are caused by disease in just the same way as bodily 
symptoms, and that it is the psychiatrist's task to identify the cause and 
nature of these using the methods of modern investigative and laboratory 
medicine. This argument attributes little importance to the social context 
within which insanity develops; social conditions are seen as having only an 
incidental effect. The approach assumes there is such a thing as mental 
illness which exists objectively. But not even physical illness is like this, 
because both cultural and historical definitions vary. 
All societies have systems for coping with people whose behaviour is 
different, disruptive or dangerous. But the ways in which such forms of 
behaviours are described, judged and managed differ from society to society 
and from era to era. The language, ideas and associations surrounding 
insanity do not have fixed scientific meanings. What insanity, madness, 
mental illness, physical illness and badness are is not fixed; these terms have 
social, physical and cultural bases which are deeply contested. For example, 
in the UK, relatively mild mental and emotional incapacity is commonly called 
'neurosis', which is regarded as 'functional', a product of worry or stress rather 
than 'organic', and may be treated by the psychiatrist. The opposite is true in 
China, where comparable disabilities are regarded as a 'neurasthenia' - a 
disease of the body itself. This diagnosis of neurasthenia was once common 
in the UK but is now extinct here. Such contrasting diagnoses and treatments 
follow from divergent socio-cultural priorities. In the individualistic UK, mental 
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disorder, if mild, is regarded as relatively legitimate. We have a right to 
complain when we are miserable, and to seek redress. 
Szasz (1971, 1974) has argued that psychiatry has one overall function which 
is to control behaviour. Moral views are translated into medical terms, and the 
making of such terms is powerful in the regulation of behaviour. He argued 
that medicine, and particularly psychiatry, is the means whereby the 
dominant values of society are disseminated. Szasz supports his views by 
citing the rules of admission of the French asylums. These rules state clearly 
that the categories of persons to be admitted are the young, who disobeyed 
their parents, those who refuse to work, unmarried women and various other 
'miscreants' and 'indigents' who could not be dealt with elsewhere. Another 
example which Szasz (1979) cites is the illness termed 'negritude' which was 
discovered and articulated by Benjamine Rush, an American psychiatrist 
(1745-1813). Rush observed an African American, Henry Moss, who suffered 
from 'vitiligo,' a skin disease in which white spots appeared on the skin. Rush 
then argued that all African Americans suffered from a mild form of congenital 
leprosy which was hereditary but not contagious. Therefore African 
Americans were safe as domestic servants, but not as sexual partners. This 
label of 'negritude' provided, according to Szasz, the perfect diagnosis, as it 
upheld the status quo and expanded the power of medicine and psychiatry. 
The development of facilities for the insane 
Before the reform movements of the early nineteenth century, there was 
general state responsibility for lunacy (Scull 1974). With the reform 
movements came a series of parliamentary reports and recommendations 
which resulted in the building of the county asylums. Scull explains this 
change in policy towards the insane as being due to industrialization and 
urbanization. Families were no longer willing, or able, to look after their 
disturbed members, so the development of institutions provided a solution. 
Scull's argument is that economic considerations were largely responsible for 
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the development and growth of county asylums. However, it can be argued 
that this is not a sufficiently broad explanation, as economic necessity cannot 
by itself account for changes in public health policy. There are a great many 
factors which have contributed to changes in the condition of the insane in 
the nineteenth century and in contemporary Britain. 
The state was concerned about the insane, and provided institutional care 
throughout the eighteenth century (Parry-Jones 1972). There were private 
madhouses for private patients and pauper lunatics. In other words, 
institutional care for the insane existed long before the processes of 
industrialization and urbanization. Another factor which contributed to the 
concern with the insane was the illness of George the 111 between 1782 and 
1820. Public sympathy was alerted to the King's plight and Parliamentary 
inquiries on the condition of the insane were set up in 1788 and 1790 and 
heralded some lunacy reforms. All these situations, plus the theory of moral 
management and a general optimism about cures for insanity, affected the 
general public's concern for institutions to provide care. 
In his book Madness and Civilization, Foucault (1971) traces attitudes to 
madness from the Middle Ages onwards. He asked, why was madness set 
apart and feared? His argument is that the treatment of madness in any age 
is primarily an expression of fear and an attempt either to banish, control or 
cure it. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the plight of the insane was 
compounded by the fear that they might contaminate other people. With this 
in mind, 'moral managers' were encouraged. Such people should not, argues 
Foucault, be credited with having liberated the insane; rather they instituted a 
more complete, and more psychological form of control. 
Who is insane, mad or mentally ill? 
There is much debate around the notion of illness being attributed to the 
people who are considered to be insane, mad or mentally ill. Attributing 
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illness to people whose behaviour is different is confusing because illness 
has more than one meaning. Freidson (1973) has argued that a distinction 
can be made between illness as a bio-physical state and illness as a social 
state. The former refers to abnormalities in biological functioning, while the 
latter is bound up with people's beliefs, evaluations and actions. While 
Freidson concentrates on these two meanings of illness, it must be noted that 
a strong approach in psychiatry is to consider the effects of the soma - the 
physical - and the psyche - the psychology - of the individual experiencing 
illness. 
Illness as a social state is a deviation from normality. Norms and deviations 
from them are socially and culturally constructed, in the sense that particular 
societies at different times reach different kinds of general agreement about 
what constitutes health and ill-health. This social analysis of illness provides 
one of the main critiques of the medical model of insanity. Scheff's (1966) 
propositions about mental illness build on the theoretical perspective known 
as labelling theory; he argues that the behaviour exhibited by the person 
deemed to be mentally ill is essentially rule-breaking behaviour - behaviour 
which goes against agreed social rules. This rule-breaking behaviour can 
arise from a variety of sources: organic, psychological stress, external stress 
or acts of defiance, rebellion or innovation. Scheff points out that much rule-
breaking goes unacknowledged. In many ways the important question is why 
some rule-breakers, but not others, become identified as mentally ill. Scheff 
suggests that most rule-breaking is denied by social groups; the social group 
accepts that members may go through a bad phase, that some people are 
eccentric or behave in idiosyncratic ways, and that the rule-breaking is 
transitory. But in some cases there is the opposite social reaction; the 
breaking of rules is magnified and individuals are labelled as mentally ill by 
their families, doctors and social agencies; once the individual is so labelled a 
certain 'mad' behaviour is expected from the person. A person labelled as 
mentally ill will be rewarded by others for accepting the label and playing the 
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ascribed role; if everybody tells you that you are mad you come to accept it, 
especially if the label comes from a person of authority and influence such as 
a judge or a psychiatrist. 
Scheff's model of applying the labelling theory of deviance to mental illness 
amounts to the argument that the act of labelling someone as mentally ill is 
what creates the mentally ill behaviour. Without the labelling process, the 
original behaviours would have gone unnoticed. Scheff supports his 
propositions from research data. He studied patterns of admissions and 
discharges in three state hospitals in a Midwestern state of the USA in 1962. 
He concluded that psychiatrists applied diagnostic categories without 
undertaking detailed medical examinations, and so in this sense were acting 
principally as agents of social and legal control. The implication here is that 
the rule-breakers brought to the attention of psychiatrists behaviours that 
were widespread in the population, and that these behaviours were used as a 
pretext for labelling people as mentally ill. Many patients were suffering from 
nothing more than labelling. Support for this view comes from Goffman 
(1961), in his analysis of the 'moral career' of the mental patient. Goffman 
argues that such individuals suffer from the hazards of labelling by reference 
groups and professionals. Scheff's argument is also supported by a study by 
(Rosenhan 1973). In Rosenhan's study, nine people (mostly professionals 
and academics) behaved as pseudo-patients by presenting themselves to a 
hospital admission department complaining of hearing voices. Once 
admitted, they ceased to simulate abnormal behaviours and told the 
psychiatric staff that they did not need treatment. However, eight were 
diagnosed as schizophrenic and one as manic depressive; they were 
hospitalized for an average stay of 19 days. During their stay, they 
experienced their requests being ignored and being treated as incompetent 
and insane. This experiment shows that labelling is a powerful force in social 
relations. 
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There are other views about the nature of mental illness according to which 
there is some mental disturbance which does exist apart from the social 
labelling process (Grove 1970). Coulter (1973) questions Scheff's assumption 
that people who believe bizarre things and act in 'odd' ways are not genuinely 
insane, and that such individuals internalize without question the imputation 
of mental derangement. Coulter argues that if this were the case mental 
hospitals would be populated by frauds. Another critic of Scheff, Wing (1973), 
points out that it would be difficult for societal reaction alone to cause a 
person to adopt, for example, the behaviours of a schizophrenic; this would 
need special coaching from an expert. 
Within the anti-psychiatry movement, mental illness is regarded as a label 
which obscures the cries of the downtrodden and exploited against an 
alienating and dehumanizing society. Psychiatric intervention is seen as a 
social control arm of the dominant political order and an agent of repression 
and of power. The anti-psychiatrists demand the abolition of existing 
psychiatric institutions and insist that psychiatrists either acknowledge their 
role as society's thought police or become agents of social change. As 
commentators such as Miles (1987) and Sedgwick (1973) have pointed out, 
the anti-psychiatrists have raised the public consciousness about the 
complex social meanings underlying the classification of someone as 
mentally ill; in other societies, or under different circumstances, such 
behaviours would be likely to be interpreted differently. Miles has further 
argued that the anti-psychiatry movement has attacked the 'illness' approach 
to mental illness and the practice of psychiatry, and in so doing it has put 
forward a conspiracy approach in which all psychiatrists and mental hospital 
personnel are seen as agents of an oppressive society with doubtful motives 
and methods of treatment. 
The user perspective 
Rogers et al. (1993) argue that whilst Goffman, and the followers of Szasz and 
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Laing, provide humanistic critiques of traditional psychiatry, they ignore in 
their accounts patients' perspective on their experiences and patients' 
collective voice. Compared to physical health and illness, mental health 
service-users have received considerably less attention from sociologists and 
researchers (Rogers and Pilgrim 1993). 
The involvement of people who use the mental health services has gathered 
momentum in the last twenty years, mainly as a result of their dissatisfaction 
with the service. Users of the psychiatric services are now involved in the self-
advocacy movement. Examples of these organizations in the UK are: 
Survivors Speak Out, Mindlink, Mind User Network and the United Kingdom 
Advocacy Network. Apart from giving users a platform to discuss their 
experiences of psychiatric care and treatment, these organizations can 
influence policy through their representation on national bodies. For example, 
user groups are represented on the Mental Health Task Force, the Mental 
Health Nursing review Board, the Audit Commission, The Department of 
Health's Community Care Support Force and the Mental Health Foundation. 
However, these organizations have little funding, and often feel tokenized and 
exploited by service providers. Some groups, such as the Brent User Group 
and the Afro-Caribbean Mental Health Association, also run a drop-in service 
for the local community. 
Butler (1985) has pointed out that the organized patient voice today is 
relatively weak. Documentary evidence of individual patients' voices can be 
found in literature. For example, John Perceval was confined to two different 
private madhouses between 1831 and 1834. In 1835 he began writing about 
his experiences as a patient. He described his visions and delusions, and 
what they caused him to do; he describes his treatment in terms which are 
remarkably similar to those heard in the current self-advocacy movement 
today: 
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'Now with regard to my treatment, I have to make a first two 
general observations, which apply, I am afraid, too extensively 
to every system of management yet employed towards persons 
in my condition. 
First, the suspicion and the fact of my being incapable of 
reasoning correctly, or deranged in understanding, justified 
apparently every person who came near me, in dealing with me 
also in a manner contrary to nature... 
Secondly, my being likely to attack the rights of others gave 
these individuals license, in every respect, to trample upon 
mine... Instead of my understanding being addressed and 
enlightened, and of my path being made as clear and plain as 
possible, in consideration of my confusion, I was committed, in 
really difficult and mysterious circumstances, calculated of 
themselves to confound my mind, even if in a sane state, to 
unknown and untried hands; and I was placed amongst 
strangers, without introduction, explanation or exhortation. 
Instead of great scrupulousness being observed in depriving 
me of any liberty or privilege... in every dispute, in every 
argument, the assumed premise immediately acted upon was, 
that I was to yield, my desires were to be set aside, my few 
remaining privileges to be infringed upon for the convenience of 
others... Against this system of downright oppression enforced 
with sycophantish adulation and affected pity by the doctor, 
adopted blindly by the credulity of relations, and submitted to by 
the patients with meek stupidity, or vainly resisted by natural but 
hopeless violence, I had to fight my way for two years... I did not 
find the respect paid usually even to a child' . (Peterson 
1982:105-107). 
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Users of the mental health services are asking for more humanity, respect, 
listening, counselling, therapy and alternatives to medication. They seek more 
information, more choice as to treatment, improved and more equal 
relationships with care providers, protection of their civil rights, the availability 
of a safe place when in crisis, and services which respect differences of 
gender, ethnicity and personality. 
The users' agenda may conflict in some areas with providers' sense of doing 
their best within limited resources. The provisions of the medical model with 
its emphasis on emotional distance, objectivity, physio-chemical solutions to 
social and psychological problems and the central power role of the 
psychiatrist, are regarded by some users as obstructing effective care and 
treatment. While accepting that medical science and psychiatry can and do 
provide help, treatment and care for those experiencing both mental illness 
and problems of living, there is a need for professionals providing psychiatric 
services to accept that their social control functions may be overriding their 
caring functions. 
Who then is mad, insane or mentally ill? Different writers and researchers 
would answer this question in different ways, some argue that no one is, 
because madness, insanity or mental illness does not exist; others say that if 
the disease theory can be applied then the individual can be considered as 
being mad, insane or mentally ill. Perhaps what is needed are questions 
about how users get into situations of being regarded or regarding 
themselves as insane and what are the types of behaviours which lead the 
public to conclude that someone is mentally ill, and what actions are taken by 
the public in respect of such problems? 
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CHAPTER 5 
MADNESS AND SOCIAL DIVISIONS 
This chapter discusses the issues, questions and debates relevant to 
psychiatry and the social divisions of class, gender and ethnicity (with 
particular emphasis on African Caribbeans). While it can be argued that 
medicine and psychiatry do contribute to healing and wellbeing, health 
professionals are increasingly being asked to attend to critiques of their 
practices vis-a-vis poor people, women and those belonging to ethnic 
minority groups. 
Social class and insanity 
Skultans (1979) has argued that in the eighteenth century the diagnosis of the 
'spleen' or 'vapours' was a mark of distinction, and 'hysteria' was the mark of a 
lady who lived a life of grandeur and idleness. Szasz's work recognizes the 
social dimension of insanity and the complex relationships existing between 
social values and psychiatry. He points to psychiatry as the protector of the 
rich and the well educated, and as the oppressor of the poor and the socially 
disadvantaged. 
There is a large amount of evidence suggesting that the poor are over-
represented in diagnoses of insanity. In a report on insanity in Massachusetts, 
Jarvis argued in 1855 that the poor contributed proportionately 64 times as 
many cases of insanity as other classes. Faris and Dunham (1939) came to a 
similar conclusion in their report in Chicago. They showed that the areas 
having the highest mental hospital admission rates were those with the 
greatest number of people in the lowest socio-economic groups. 
Hollingshead and Redlich (1958) came to similar conclusions. They also 
found that the association between identified mental illness and social class 
held whether measured in terms of prevalence (the number of cases in 
treatment) or incidence the (number of new cases coming into treatment). 
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Miles (1981) has argued that the relationship between rates of mental illness 
and social class is mediated by the social processes by which people 
become defined as mentally ill. People from the lower end of the social scale 
are the most likely to become defined as mentally ill and encounter most 
difficulty in returning to normal social roles. It can be argued that, given 
psychiatric problems of equal severity, people from poor backgrounds are 
more likely than those in better circumstances to be admitted to a mental 
hospital. At the same time, labelling theorists argue that the psychiatric label, 
like other stigmatising labels, is most likely to be applied to those who are 
powerless to resist it. Therefore, the concentration of mental illness in the 
lower classes may be in large part a consequence of the greater chance of 
such people becoming defined as mentally ill. Hollingshead and Redlich 
(1968) found that psychotherapy and psychoanalysis were given almost 
exclusively to middle class patients. Psychiatrists tended to choose higher 
class, well-educated people for this treatment, assuming that lower class 
people lack the aptitude to participate effectively. 
In the UK today, the National Health Service, although theoretically equally 
available to all, is accessed more effectively by the middle classes because 
they are more informed, have more contacts and demand better services. 
They are also able to pay for private care and treatment and so avoid 
treatment in NHS mental hospitals. There are many reasons why the 
association between lower socio-economic class and treated mental illness 
may be over-emphasized: for example, some middle class people with 
psychiatric problems may receive help, but still not appear in official statistics; 
lower class patients may stay longer in hospital because psychiatric staff are 
more willing to discharge patients to comfortable than to materially deprived 
homes (Miles 1987). 
Gender 
The disadvantageous situation of women in terms of social contacts, prestige 
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and power has been well-researched. It has been argued that modern 
industrial societies impose great stresses on women and that consequently 
their problems in living have been translated into mental illnesses. This is 
seen in women's higher rates of mental disorders, and in particular 
depressive disorders. According to the critiques developed by Miles (1987), 
Usher (1991), Russell (1995), and Showalter (1987), the psychiatric services 
are contributing to the oppression experienced by women in our patriarchal 
society. Within the area of mental disorders, Miles (1991) has argued that 
women are literally driven mad by oppressive social structures, and that they 
are more likely to be labelled neurotic or mad by professionals and lay 
people, due to the widely held stereotype of the neurotic complaining woman, 
and because of women's lack of power to reject the application of such 
labels. 
Women throughout history have been shut up in madhouses as well as royal 
towers by their fathers and husbands (see Figure 1). Feminist interest in 
female insanity has now gone beyond artists and writers and beyond seeing 
the madwoman as a victim. Chesler (1972) argues that the women confined 
to American madhouses were failed, but heroic, rebels against the constraints 
of a narrow femininity. Showalter (1985) sees forms of 'insanity' in women as 
an unconscious form of feminist protest and an attack on patriarchal values. 
By the middle of the nineteenth century women predominated among the 
institutionalized insane. Showalter (1985) described a study by a John 
Thurnam, medical superintendent of the York Retreat, which indicated that 
male asylum patients outnumbered females in 1845 by about 30%. However, 
within a few years and by the time of the 1890 Lunacy Act, the predominance 
of females had spread to include all classes and types of institutions. The only 
remaining institutions with a majority of male patients were asylums for the 
criminally insane, military hospitals, and 'idiot schools'. Outside the asylums, 
women were also the primary clients at surgical clinics, water-cure- 
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establishments, and rest cure homes. Therefore, by the end of the nineteenth 
century, women had taken the lead as psychiatric patients, a lead they have 
retained ever since. 
As the number of women increased in the asylums, so the number of women 
caring for the insane as madhouse proprietors declined. Women as 
madhouse proprietors had been providing care primarily for female patients 
in small private madhouses. These services provided by women were in 
much demand; they were preferred to the services offered in the large 
asylums. Thus Mary Lamb, who killed her mother, was taken by her brother 
Charles to a private madhouse run by a woman; and Isabella Thackeray who 
had developed suicidal tendencies after the birth of her third child was taken 
by her husband, William Thackeray, to a house run by a woman in 
Camberwell where she remained until her death. By 1859, however, with the 
constant protesting of male doctors that they were the only people qualified 
to treat the insane, women were discouraged from becoming madhouse 
keepers. At the same time, the madhouses and asylums were increasingly 
populated by women, but supervised by men. 
Treatment of 'mad' women throughout much of the nineteenth century was 
designed to control the reproductive system. For example, Tilt (1851) argued 
that menstruation was so disruptive to the female brain it should be retarded 
for as long as possible. Delayed menstruation, he insisted, gave women a 
vigourous constitution, and soundness of judgement. Smith (1848), 
recommended a course of injections of ice water into the rectum, introduction 
of ice into the vagina and leeching of the labia and the cervix, while Brown 
(1866) used the surgical practice of clitoridectomy. As a member of the 
Obstetrical Society he offered the view that insanity was caused by 
masturbation, so that surgical removal of the clitoris, by helping women to 
govern themselves, could halt insanity. As Brown became more confident he 
went beyond clitoridectomy to the removal of the labia. 
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Some have argued that this approach to treating insanity in women strongly 
suggests male psychiatrists' fears of female sexuality, because a 
considerable part of the psychiatrists' defining symptoms of insanity in 
women had to do with what they saw as uncontrolled sexuality (Showalter 
1987). Clitoridectomy has a symbolic meaning; this was the surgical 
enforcement of an ideology that restricts female sexuality to reproduction, 
and removes women's sexual pleasure, because it is this autonomous sexual 
pleasure that was defined as the symptom, perhaps the essence, of female 
insanity. 
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Figure 1 	 How to get rid of the wife! The introduction to a lunatic 
asylum. 
Source: Masters, 1977. 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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Within the asylums, treatment and management was carried out through the 
control, and moral management, of women's minds, instead of through the 
surgical knife. This moral management regulated behaviour through the 
physical design and domestic routines of the asylum. The regime 
emphasized the ladylike values of silence, decorum, taste, service, piety and 
gratitude. The sexes were always kept separate and women were more 
closely and carefully watched than men. This careful watching of females was 
not only because of their behaviour, but also to protect them from rape and 
seduction. Hill (1870) argued that there were many reported instances of 
women being with child by the keepers and by male patients. The work which 
women were required to do reinforced the conventional sex role behaviours 
of cleaning, laundry, sewing and cooking. In asylums such as Bethlem, 
females were involved in every conceivable kind of domestic activity, thus 
ensuring the maintenance of the discipline of femininity. 
The asylum, therefore, subjected women to male authority, and in this respect 
was not unlike the processes within the family. Rebellion, however, did occur, 
as many women insisted on self-expression. Granville (1877) regarded female 
lunatics as always chattering about their grievances, and he recommended 
that the women be set to work so they would be too busy to talk. These 
deviations from the ladylike behaviours required were severely punished. At 
Bethlem, women patients were put in solitary confinement, sedated, given 
cold baths or secluded in padded cells. Showalter (1987) has pointed out that 
the excessive confinement of women which replicated the treatment of 
women outside the asylum, may have contributed to women's excitability and 
restlessness. Women had few opportunities for physical exercise, because 
the asylum system provided only genteel, improving and passive activities for 
them. 
In the twentieth century, the oppression which women encounter in their daily 
lives supports a view of their mental illness as a social product. From this 
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perspective, it is the sexism within society rather than of psychiatry as such 
that explains women's mental disturbance. Psychiatry reflects sexism as a 
part of the broader society. 
Psychiatric statistics available on treated mental patients show a 
predominance of women. The data come from hospital admissions statistics 
and from General Practices. Women, it appears, are much more likely than 
men to come under scrutiny of the expert eye of psychiatrists (Russo 1990). 
Grove (1979) contributes to the debate by observing that women dominate 
only in particular categories of madness, namely depression, eating 
disorders, anxiety and phobias. With schizophrenia, it has been claimed that 
there is no gender difference in psychosis (Rosenthal 1977); but Grove has 
suggested that women are more likely than men to be diagnosed as 
schizophrenic, because women's deviant behaviours are more likely to fit 
within the diagnostic category of schizophrenia. 
The figures in Table 1 are taken from Department of Health (1986) Mental 
Health Statistics, The figures illustrate the dominance of women as patients in 
the mental health services. 
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Table 1. 
Mental Illness Hospitals and Units - England: All Admissions By 
Diagnostic Group 1986, 1982-6: Number and Rates per 100,000 
population. 
Diagnosed Group Rates per 100,000 population 
for 1986. 
Males 	 Females 
All diagnoses 83,865 113,386 
Schizophrenia, paranoia 15,271 14,148 
Affective psychoses 8,107 16,526 
Senile/presenile dementia 7,624 13,234 
Alcoholic psychoses 509 266 
Other psychoses 
(including drug psychoses) 7,445 10,537 
Neurotic disorders 4,978 10,291 
Alcohol dependence syndrome 8,301 3,508 
Non-dependent abuse of alcohol 2,095 1,204 
Drug dependency 1,382 806 
Non-dependent abuse of drugs 614 278 
Personality and behaviour 
disorders 6,531 7,667 
Mental retardation 305 284 
Depressive disorders not 
elsewhere classified 11,740 23,469 
Other psychiatric conditions 287 346 
Mental illness - diagnosis 
not stated 65 48 
Other conditions and 
undiagnosed cases 8,601 10,774 
From Mental Illness Tables A2.2 and A2.3 (Mental Health Statistics for England, 1986, 
Booklet 1). 
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Men are more likely to be diagnosed as suffering from mental illnesses 
associated with irresponsibility, anti-social conduct or drug or alcohol abuse 
(Russo and Sobel 1981). 
Table 2 gives more recent information for psychiatric hospital admissions in 
England, and shows that the number of women exceeds the number of men 
for all durations of stay except for those of 15 years. 
Table 2. 
All episodes by duration of stay and sex 1991-2, number and rates per 
100,000 population, England. 
Duration of stay Males Females 
All durations 110,480 118,350 
Under 1 month 68,000 72,000 
1 month 21,480 31,540 
3 months 8,540 10,430 
1 year 1,560 1,860 
2 years 1,210 1,610 
5 years 200 420 
10 years 70 110 
15 years 420 380 
Source: Department of Health 1995, Mental Health in England. 
Proponents of the view that women's predominance in mental health statistics 
follows from aspects of their oppressed social position include Smart (1976), 
Oakley (1981), and Orbach (1986), and this view is supported by the work of 
Brown and Harris (1978). Brown and Harris highlight the importance for 
mental instability of such factors as long-term difficulties in housing, the 
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impact of unemployment and a lack of confiding relationships. They locate 
the manifestations of clinical depression in a social, rather than in a purely 
biological, space, and in so doing they highlight the significance of domestic 
interrelations in the genesis of mental illness. 
An argument put forward by Chesler (1972) is that what is deemed as 
madness is tied to the performance of sex roles. What is considered 
madness, whether in men or women, is the acting out of the devalued female 
role or the partial rejection of one's sex-role stereotype. However, Chesler 
proposes an asymmetry in the situation of men and women, which arises 
from the cultural devaluation of the feminine role. Women are liable to be 
viewed as being mentally ill if they act in feminine or in masculine ways, while 
men are only likely to be viewed as mentally ill if they act in feminine ways. 
Consequently, there is a double standard of mental health for men and 
women; whether women conform to the female standard or depart from it, 
they tend to be defined as disturbed. 
While the arguments of the anti-psychiatrists may be an essential part of the 
feminist analysis of insanity, care must be taken. As Ussher (1991) observes, 
the anti-psychiatry dissenters were never deliberately or consciously pro-
feminist, and their theories considered women only by default. Ussher cites 
the example of work done by both Laing (1959) and Cooper (1973), where 
the issue of gender was not a central part of the analysis. In such works, 
women's lives are described by, and from, a male perspective, and women 
and their families are judged within a framework where traditional gender 
roles are not questioned. In fact, differences from these traditional roles are 
seen as evidence of pathology. 
The dominance of women as psychiatric patients may be due to some 
conditions, such as eating disorders and depression, being seen as 
predominantly female problems. Ussher (1991) argues that the women who 
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are likely to be diagnosed as mentally ill are those who are married, those 
with children, those who are unemployed, and those who are poor. 
Definitions of madness are based on value judgements and prescriptions of 
normality which support existing patriarchal power structures (Daly 1979). 
Showalter (1987:5) has suggested that women's socialization prepares them 
for the mask of madness, the 'desperate communication of the powerless'. In 
this situation, according to Showalter, women who have no legitimate outlet 
for the feelings of frustration, anger and misery consequent on the experience 
of living in a patriarchal society, may fall into the psychiatric patient trap. 
Once labelled as disturbed, women are likely to be given drugs, to be at risk 
of sexual exploitation by their therapists and to be confined to an institution 
which denies them many rights (Chesler 1972) (see Figures 2,3,4,5). 
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Figure 2 	 Woman in West Riding Lunatic Asylum manifesting 'Intense 
Vanity'. 
Source: Showalter, 1985 
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Figure 3 	 A Victorian `Ophelia' in Surrey Asylum. 
Source: Showalter 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
Figure 4 
	 An alcoholic woman. 
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Source: Showalter, 1985 
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Figure 5 	 A melancholic asylum patient 
Source: Showalter, 198
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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In looking at the issues and debates around women and madness, the 
question must be asked - what about men? Men, too, are 'mad', but often 
men's madness takes a different form in our society. If a comparison is made 
of the statistics on psychiatric admission and female depression with the 
statistics on prison populations and male violence and criminality, the scales 
are more evenly balanced. Men may be 'mad' but they are likely to be 
positioned as 'bad'. While women are pathologized, men are positioned within 
the criminal discourse resulting in the sexes being regulated differently. 
Ethnicity 
The social control functions of psychiatry extend to the differential treatment 
of black Asian and African people and other ethnic minorities (Littlewood and 
Cross 1990; Littlewood and Lipsedge 1988; Fernando 1991). Psychiatry has 
been accused of racism because of its failure to identify the mental health 
needs of blacks (African Caribbean), and because of its powers of 
containment and surveillance over the affairs of black families (Fernando 
1988; Francis 1988). 
As the study of insanity grew in western culture, it carried with it ethnic 
prejudices present in western societies. In the middle of the eighteenth 
century, Rousseau's concept of the 'noble savage' offered the view that 
'savages' who lacked the civilizing influence of western culture were free of 
mental disorder. Writers and medical men such as Tuke (1858), Maudsley 
(1867, 1879) and Pritchard (1835), agreed with Rousseau. Lewis (1965) has 
pointed to another view in Europe in the nineteenth century, which was that 
non-Europeans were mentally degenerate because they lacked western 
culture. In the United States at about this time, psychiatrists were arguing for 
the retention of slavery (Thomas and Sillen 1972). They used the sixth United 
States census of 1846 to justify a claim that the black person was relatively 
free of madness in a state of slavery, but became prone to mental disorder 
once he/she was set free. The underlying view here was that the inherent 
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inferiority of the African justified slavery. The history of racism in psychology 
and psychiatry is as old as the disciplines themselves. Herbert Spencer saw 
'primitive races' as having minds like those of the children of 'civilized races'. 
Francis Galton (1869), the founder of eugenics, considered that a large 
number of black people were half-witted, while Pearson (1901) saw the 
extermination of such races as an inevitable part of the evolutionary process. 
The application of western psychiatry internationally raises several questions. 
At one level, there are the issues of employing western ways of thinking about 
behaviour and illness, irrespective of culture. At another level, there are the 
biases and perspectives which arise from racism. Such a situation is likely to 
result in the medicalisation of the effects of stress arising from racial and 
social problems, a process which obscures inherent racism and the social 
control function of western psychiatry. 
In the UK, it could be argued that psychiatric care is available to all within a 
National Health Service which is supposed to deliver health care to all 
residents irrespective of social class or race/ethnicity. Yet there are major 
discrepancies by class and ethnicity (Townsend and Davidson 1982; Brown 
1984). The question of racial bias in psychiatry must be seen in the context of 
racism as an endemic part of western culture, where psychiatry is but one of 
the many relevant institutions, using 'institution' in the broadest sociological 
sense. Within the UK, according to Brown (1984), racist practices are 
condoned yet seldom acknowledged. Discriminatory practices in British 
psychiatry are not only maintained by psychiatrists, but also by all other 
professionals who share in the care of the insane, and particularly by the 
caretakers, who are the 'eyes' and 'ears' of the other professionals, as they 
are with the person deemed to be insane throughout the twenty four hour 
day. 
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A key process in the diagnosis of mental illness is clinical evaluation. 
Information about a person's medical history, personality and current mental 
state is obtain by interviewing him or her. The clinical evaluation is regarded 
by psychiatrists as composed of objective facts, but according to Fernando 
(1991), it often constitutes a highly selective account which results in the 
psychiatrist influencing the content of the information collected. Fernando 
(1991) cites the example of an Asian patient, who is aware of the negative 
value attached to Asian marriage customs and is therefore reticent about 
telling a doctor or social worker about his/her marriage. Such concealment is 
usually interpreted as secretiveness and deviousness on the part of the 
'patient' rather than as following from the social construction of the clinical 
interview/evaluation process. In the taking of a patient's medical and personal 
history, there is likely to be an emphasis on particular aspects of the 
information given which flows from the beliefs and value judgements of the 
psychiatrist or social worker. A psychiatrist who does not appreciate the 
context of racial discrimination is likely to be unaware of the pressures 
impinging on black people, and so may misinterpret their lifestyles and 
behaviours, relying on racist prejudices. In other words, the psychiatric 
diagnosis process, with its taken-for-granted notion of objectivity, may result 
in the practitioners of the discipline being unable to recognize that the 
evaluations they make are far from objective. 
Studies in the United Kingdom show that a disproportionately excessive 
number of black people are being diagnosed as schizophrenic. Littlewood 
and Lipsedge (1988) demonstrate that Afro Caribbeans are less likely than 
white people to seek psychiatric treatment, and when they do they are 
seldom offered hospital admission, but if they are admitted, they are more 
likely to be diagnosed as schizophrenic. Psychotherapy is rarely an option; 
electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) and high doses of medication are more 
likely. According to McGovern and Cope (1987), there is a high admission 
rate for African Caribbeans under the Mental Health Act 1983, and an over 
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representation in secure units and special hospitals. The pressure group 
MIND (1987) also reports a disproportionate number of African Caribbeans in 
Britain's mental hospitals. 
The diagnosis of schizophrenia is given more frequently to people from 
immigrant groups when compared to native born people (Bagley 1971), and 
particularly so for people originating in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean (Dean 
et al. 1976). The incidence of schizophrenia among the African Caribbean 
population in Nottingham is estimated to be 12 to 13 times higher than that in 
the general population for the age groups 16-29 and 30-44 (Harrison et al. 
1988). Littlewood and Lipsedge (1988) found that first admission figures for 
British born African Caribbean men in London were 7 times the white rate, 
and for African Caribbean women they were 13 times higher that the white 
admission rate. They also argue that it is not the original ' immigrant' groups 
but the British African Caribbean, who have high rates of admission for 
schizophrenic breakdown. 
What then are the reasons for the excessive diagnosis of schizophrenia 
among black people? Simon et al. (1973) in the United States compared the 
diagnoses given by hospital psychiatrists and research psychiatrists and 
concluded that the diagnostic differences found between blacks and whites 
were reflections of hospital psychiatrists' diagnostic habits. In the UK, 
Littlewood and Lipsedge (1981) suggest that atypical syndromes among 
black people may be misdiagnosed as schizophrenia. An expression by a 
black person of anger about, and rejection of, white people and their social 
structures - usually referred to as 'protest psychosis' - may be a significant 
element in misdiagnosis (Bromberg and Simon 1968). Work by Loring and 
Powell (1988) suggests that blacks and whites tend to be seen differentially, 
even if they exhibit the same behaviour. 
There is also evidence of high rates of depression and psychosomatic 
79 
illnesses among African Caribbeans compared to whites (Burke 1984). An 
argument put forward by Knowles (1991) is that the mental health services 
available to Britain's black population are grossly inadequate, and that this 
situation may be considered as evidence of racism. All this raises questions 
about the mental health services available to the African Caribbean 
population and the manner in which these services are delivered. There are 
important issues about the admission of African Caribbeans to hospital at a 
time when mental health care has moved to the community, and questions 
about the interface between psychiatry and the law. Since most admissions 
are now voluntary, the use of legal compulsion on African Caribbeans must 
be examined. Here the evidence suggests that there are higher rates of 
compulsory admission under the Mental Health Act 1983 for African 
Caribbean males both as offender and non-offender patients. MIND (1987) 
suspects that there is a greater use of Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 
1983 than shows up in the official figures, because the police have the power 
of temporary detention over those whom they otherwise have no power to 
arrest. 
The area of treatment provides evidence of the differential treatment regimes 
offered to black people. For the United States, Rosenthal and Frank (1958) 
reported that black people showed a high drop out rate from psychotherapy 
when compared to white Americans. Yomamoto et al. (1968) argue that black 
people are less often taken on for psychotherapy, more often given minimal 
support and are more likely to end treatment by self-discharge or discharge 
by the therapist. Further studies by Yomamoto et al. (1967) suggested that 
the differences between black and white people in the use of psychotherapy 
are due to the ethnocentricity of white therapists. In the UK, Littlewood and 
Cross (1990) found that stereotyped attitudes led to assumptions that ECT is 
suitable for non-depressive reactions in black people, and that intramuscular 
medications are also more useful for black people. Shaikh (1985) observed 
an excess of ECT among Asians who received the diagnosis of schizophrenia 
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as compared to the indigenous population. According to Glover and Malcolm 
(1988), black men born in the West Indies are more likely to be given depot 
injection of tranquillisers when compared to British born white men. 
All these situations which maintain a racist psychiatry may be taken for 
granted by professionals who offer services to black people deemed to be 
mentally ill. As already noted, caretakers are the main professionals who 
manage care over the twenty four hour period. Relevant here (though less 
often studied) is the organisation of the ward environment, and relationships 
between the caretakers and black people. Caretakers may contribute to a 
racist psychiatry by the ways in which they collect and report observations, 
and the ethos they support in the ward environment and in community mental 
health facilities. Caretakers are also involved in all aspects of the mental 
health services, from diagnosis and assessment through to treatment and 
after care. Although they stand in a less powerful position than psychiatrists, 
they may share broadly the same theoretical frameworks and may use these 
to influence and control black people deemed to be insane. Any criticism of 
psychiatry and psychiatrists may therefore extend to the role of caretakers. 
Caretakers are now faced with a multiethnic/multiracial population. This must 
be addressed if they are to provide effective care. With the employment of 
black caretakers from Asia, Africa and the West Indies, it is easy to assume 
that ethnic/racial issues will be addressed. However, black caretakers are not 
necessarily committed to these issues, and their contribution in making 
explicit culturally specific needs may be low. It has been argued that black 
professionals are marginalized in being treated as experts on ethnic issues, 
rather than as equal professionals (Stubbs 1985). As black caretakers are 
more likely to be employed as assistants within institutions, they have less 
professional power, and the few who do have this may find it difficult to voice 
their critiques. 
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Psychiatry needs to rethink its conceptualisations and its understandings of 
ethnic differences in order to avoid collusion with stereotypes about African 
Caribbeans which are popular in the wider society. In order to deal with this, 
there may need to be recognition on the part of psychiatry that it is a less 
precise form of knowledge than it pretends to be, and an openness to the 
kind of democratic process which is able to take on board the views of mental 
health service users and their families. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CARETAKERS AND CARETAKING 
The focus of the investigation described in this thesis is those who have been 
involved with the care of the insane over the whole period from 1890 to 1990. 
The relevant occupational groups range from the caretakers who worked as 
attendants in the asylums for the insane from the 1850s on, and today's 
registered mental nurses. This chapter looks in more detail at the nature and 
history of caretaking. Its central task is to theorize in a historical context about 
the meaning of the caretaking role for those who work with the insane, and to 
examine the nature of caring and the principles structuring caretaking work. 
The chapter argues that, although the men and women who have worked 
with the insane have been referred to in a variety of ways, essentially their 
work has been that of caretaking. 
The chapter draws on a broad literature relevant to caring and reflects on the 
historical roles and functions of caretakers since the nineteenth century. 
Central to the argument developed is the assumption that the concept of 
'caretaker' embodies roles, functions and responsibilities which go beyond 
the medical model of doctor-provided care. Caretaking work involves the 
provision of twenty four hour surveillance of the insane, which means that 
caretakers are present throughout the day and night. Caretakers are thus 
central to social control and other care and treatment processes; their work 
embraces all the activities involved in providing care in association with the 
rules and regulations of institutions, medical prescriptions and any ethical 
issues signified by such activities. Caretaking work also includes all those 
roles and responsibilities associated with protecting society from the insane, 
and including some resulting in the incarceration of the insane. 
In the twentieth century, the title of workers with the insane changed from 
'attendant' to 'mental nurse'. With this change, which followed developments 
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in science, medicine, the practice of psychiatrists and social perceptions of 
the insane, came a new emphasis on medical and nursing models in the 
treatment and care of the insane. Attendants, by becoming mental nurses, 
derived significant benefits from being a part of the larger profession of 
nursing, and by taking on the scientific and the medical model in the 
provision of care. But there were also drawbacks. Many of the previous 
caretaking roles became redundant, and others were stifled in their 
development paths. However, it is probably true to say that today the 
caretakers of the insane are more closely associated with the ideology of pre-
twentieth century attendants than with the ideology of nursing. While nursing 
follows the medical model in seeing the insane as sick and in need of medical 
treatment, caretakers recognize the insane person's need for guidance and at 
the same time carry our their social control and their therapeutic functions. 
Using the title 'nurse' to describe such workers is a way of denying their social 
control functions. But the occupational and professional dilemmas common 
to both the work of nurses and of caretakers do also have to be seen in the 
general context of de-skilling and occupational subordination to medicine 
(Freidson 1970). 
The nature of caring 
According to Mayeroff (1971), caring is helping someone grow towards self-
actualization, and it is grounded in the worth which the one caring 
experiences in the other. Gadow (1989) defines caring as supporting an 
individual's interpretation of his/her own reality; caring means participating 
with the individual in understanding the particular meaning which his/her 
experience of health, illness, suffering or dying has for that individual. 
Noddings (1984) argues that caring is based in receptivity, with the carer 
feeling with other who is receiving the care. The caring role of caretakers is a 
moral ideal, and the starting point for a range of caring actions which include: 
a positive regard for others; support of others through communication and 
empowerment; and enhancing individuals by preserving their dignity. 
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The caring relationship involves power, and such power is expressed in many 
ways. In Buber's (1970) work, mutuality and reciprocity prevail in caring 
relationships. For caring to occur, the caretaker and other must be attuned to 
one another. Caretakers strive for a relationship which decreases vulnerability 
and reduces the exercise of unilateral power, so that the insane person can 
decide with the caretaker what the relationship is. There are a number of 
alternatives. The relationship can be that of child and parent; child and adult; 
patient, client, counsellor, friend or colleague. This is contrasted with other 
ways of caring where the caretaker has ultimate authority and exercises 
definitive power. In such situations, there is no mutuality or reciprocity. 
Any of these relationships may be a temporary situation which depends on 
the needs of the individual and the insight of the caretaker. For example, at 
times caretakers may be aware of the need to use a social control 
relationship when the insane person appears to be a danger to 
himself/herself or the public, but be flexible enough to offer a more equal and 
therapeutic role when the situation changes. Within the caring relationship, 
the caretaker needs to be aware of the potential for the exercise of power, 
which can be expressed in various ways. 
Two distinctive approaches to defining the nature of caring are the 'covenant 
agreement' approach and the 'web of connections' approach. In developing 
the concept of caretaker, the argument must attend both to the practice of 
caretaking and the nature of relationships with the insane person. Looking at 
nurse-patient relationships, Cooper (1989) suggests a covenant relationship 
where the nurse is in an in-between relationship involving the patient, the 
doctor and the managers of the institution. This in-between stance is 
contrasted with Gilligan's (1982) suggestion that the patient-nurse relationship 
is one of a web of connections - a dialogue, rather than a in-between 
covenant relationship. Gilligan sees a web of relationship as inclusive rather 
than exclusive, while a covenant in-between relationship is one which 
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excludes. A web of connections involves, according to Gilligan, seeing and 
responding sensitively to needs. This approach to caring draws on the 
feminist position which sees people and life events as interdependent, with 
connections sustained by activities of care based on respect, mutuality, 
reciprocity and attachment rather than on a contract agreement. Gilligan 
argues that the feminist ethic is inclusive rather that exclusive. The care-
receiver knows about his/her needs and is an expert on what he or she does 
actually experience; the care-giver probably knows what the care-receiver is 
likely to experience due to the illness and the nature of care available. 
Dialogue is the key to the giving and receiving of care which fosters the 
wellbeing of both the giver and the receiver of care. 
For the caretaker, the covenant relationship in which there is a contractual 
agreement to work co-operatively, would in some situations be impossible to 
achieve. For example in situations where the insane person is unco-operative, 
the caretaker would continue to give care in the absence of any covenant 
agreement on the insane's person's side. Even if there is agreement, there 
could be moral questions. Further, in a situation in which caretakers work 
with service-users who are illegal drug users, if it is agreed that the service-
user would be better off staying in hospital and be supplied with drugs, this 
covenant agreement would be seen as a moral one from their perspective. 
Such a covenant agreement would, however, be morally wrong, as it neglects 
the argument that what the caretaker offers has to be regulated by law, 
medicine, the institution and professional rules. Caretakers agree to work 
according to a professional code of practice when they enter the occupation, 
and this means caring for both service-users who cooperate and those who 
do not. From this point of view, the nature of caretaker practice suggests that 
a covenant agreement relationship would encompass all caretaker-service 
relationships. 
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That a covenant relationship has limitations does not mean it is analytically 
useless. In the area of teamwork the covenant agreement asks for full 
participation between all those workers providing care to the insane. It is in 
this respect that the covenant agreement is productive for caretakers who can 
see that their care is most effectively provided when they are a part of the 
wider caring team. Caretakers are involved in delivering care with both 
approaches - the covenant and web of connections approaches - at different 
times, with different insane persons in different situations. The web of 
connections encompasses the total activities of caretakers with covenant 
agreements being used as or when required. 
Principles governing caretaker practice 
In practice the work of caretakers exemplifies certain values. The main ones 
are the relief of misery and the promotion of wellbeing. Within this value 
framework, caretakers have historically been concerned with respect for 
persons, the right to liberty and the right to know the truth. 
(a) Respect for persons 
The concerns which caretakers have in seeing through their roles and 
functions while maintaining respect for the insane person are compounded 
by philosophic and ethical implications of the concepts ' persons' and 
'respect'. 
'Person' is the status which is granted to human beings. Kant approached 
the construct ' person' through the concept of reason. He suggested that a 
person is a rational being who is capable of reasoning from the particular to 
the general, and possesses the ability to apply these rules consistently to the 
self and others. This definition creates dilemmas for caretakers working with 
the insane, as the individuals they care for may not fulfil these conditions 
consistently. If a person deemed to be insane is thought not capable of 
rational thought or reasoning, why should he/she be respected? But 
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caretakers still need to ascribe the status of 'person' to the individual deemed 
to be insane and irrational because the capacity to communicate and be 
communicated with remains, although this may be limited or inconsistent. 
'Respect' implies a feeling of fellow humanity which is maintained without 
bias. The question here is whether caretakers can have a disinterested 
concern for the welfare of others, and to what extent they are able to ensure 
that free choice is open to the insane. Maintaining 'respect' conflicts with 
interventions in which the insane person's inability to make choices is 
assumed. This is most clearly seen in psychiatric certification and protective 
custody. If caretakers caring for people who are suicidal or self-mutilating 
leave such people to their own desires, they may blame themselves for failing 
to limit the person's freedom for his/her own protection. On the other hand, if 
the person's freedom is restricted, the opposite problem arises, and 
caretakers face the dilemma associated with exercising control over another 
person's life. The concept of 'responsibility' is relevant here. Caretakers 
consider a person responsible for his/her actions and answerable for them. 
However, in the case of insanity the concept is problematic. For example the 
McNaughten (1855) ruling exempts a person from the responsibility of 
murder, if it can be proved that he/she was suffering from a disease of the 
mind resulting in him/her not knowing the nature and quality of the act or that 
he/she was doing wrong. 
(b) The right to liberty 
The classic statement of the principle of liberty is Mill (1962). Mill's view was 
that the individual's liberty should only be interfered with in self-protection; 
that to interfere with someone's liberty for his/her own good is not a sufficient 
reason. Mill's self-protection means a person may be forbidden certain 
actions only if it can be shown that his/her actions will affect the liberty of 
others. According to this view, it would be possible, for example, to argue 
that in certain circumstances people have a right to be unhealthy. However, in 
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legal terms certain unhealthy situations are condemned, for example 
infectious diseases, because individuals in this state are likely to harm others. 
The application of these principles to the work of caretakers is that caretakers 
need to be mindful that individuals deemed to be insane may defend their 
liberty by claiming a right to be unhealthy. Since the area of insanity and the 
criteria for what is or is not insanity are contested, caretakers need to be 
aware of the danger of labelling as insanity behaviour which is different from 
that accepted by most people in a given social group. The person asserting 
his/her right to be mentally unhealthy in such a situation is asserting the right 
to mind his/her own business. However, if the insane person is a danger to 
others and himself/herself, he/she can be certified. The restrictions brought 
on by certification which limit liberty must be proportionate to the limitations 
in personhood rather than simply on the basis that the caretaker knows 
better. 
(c) The right to know the truth 
For caretakers, problems of truthfulness are particularly tested in the area of 
informed consent, where the person deemed to be insane is expected to 
consent to treatment without understanding the implications. The issue of 
informed consent is compounded by those mental states which interfere with 
comprehension. In such circumstances, the caretaker must determine 
whether or not the person can process the information given and so 
appreciate the nature and consequence of what he/she is consenting to. The 
dilemma for the caretaker is, under what circumstances should the insane 
person lose the right to give informed consent? Do the non-committed insane 
ever lose this right? Should the committed insane person have the power to 
decide his/her treatment? Should caretakers assume that treatment can be 
given to any insane person who has already lost his/her basic right - the right 
to liberty - because he/she is regarded as too disordered and is committed? 
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The early history of caretaking 
The main caretaking work germane to the development of the concept of 
'caretaker' is that of attendants and psychiatric nurses or mental nurses. 
The earliest charitable institutions in England were the houses of hospitality. 
For example, in about the year 1148, St. Bartholomew's, Smithfield, was the 
resort of the sick pilgrims suffering from epilepsy, fevers, dropsy, and 
insanity. The chronicle of St.Bartholomew's shows that in the twelfth century 
the insane were received along with the deaf, dumb, blind and palsied, and 
were cared for by the master, usually a priest. He was supposed to be a 
compassionate priest of good life, and was required to visit the infirm and to 
console them and to confer upon them the sacraments of the church. 
In the leper houses the master himself might be a leper managing the affairs 
of the institution and supervising workers called 'leper guardians' and 'leper 
wardens'. In some houses, a monk dependent upon a monastery was the 
superintendent. These houses or hospitals were heavily staffed by the 
ecclesiastics who also collected alms to help with their upkeep. Within these 
institutions were women and men who worked as domestics, laundry 
workers, cooks and servants, but who also provided care for the inmates. In 
some houses bedridden inmates were cared for by workers called 'brethren' 
and 'sisters'. In the almshouse, the master or warden was also known as 
'custos', 'keeper' or 'rector'. Usually this was a priest or occasionally a lay 
person. 
When the separation between the insane and those with diseased bodies 
occurred is unknown, but the first hospital to become a refuge for the insane 
was the Bethlem Hospital at Bishopsgate in London. The house of Bethlehem 
was originally founded as a convent by Simon Fitzmary, a citizen of London, 
who, by deedpoll dated the year 1247, granted unto the church of St. Mary of 
Bethlehem, all his lands in the parish of St. Botolph without Bishopsgate. 
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There is no satisfactory information as to the manner or the period of 
conversion of the convent into a hospital. The earliest record of the reception 
of lunatics into Bethlem is the record of the visit to the hospital of the Royal 
Commission in 1403. The earliest Bethlem workers were the brethrens and 
sisters and later the basketmen, gallery maids and beadles. These caretakers 
were followed by the early equivalent of today's mental nurse, the keeper and 
the attendant (O'Donoghue 1914). 
From the early eighteenth century to the late nineteenth century the most 
numerous facilities for the insane were the private madhouses. These 
madhouses were run as businesses, and they were occupied by self-
financing and pauper lunatics. Until the building of the county asylums in 
1845, pauper lunatics were housed in workhouses, bridewells and institutions 
such as the Bethlem Hospital (Porter 1987). These institutions had a variety of 
persons in charge; doctors, clergymen, quack doctors and attendants. A 
number of proprietors are known to have been attendants. Giving evidence 
before the 1852 Select Committee, Gillett Wakefield claimed to have been a 
keeper at Bethlem and Exeter Asylum before he kept his own private 
madhouse. Isaac Taylor, who in 1839 was taken into partnership by Henry 
Mannering to run Grove Hall in Yorkshire, was in sole charge of the 
establishment. It was common for experienced attendants to be resident 
superintendents of private licensed madhouses. In the metropolitan areas 
throughout the country, female proprietors were numerous; about one in four 
houses was licensed to a woman. In many instances these women were the 
widows or daughters of former proprietors. The transfer of licences to 
relatives was permitted by law, but it caused concern at the time, because it 
was clearly the policy of the Commissioners of Lunacy to promote the 
medical control of facilities for the insane as opposed to control by lay men 
and women - the attendants (Walk 1961; Hunter and Macalpine and Hunter 
1963). 
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The Medico-Psychological Association was the professional organization of 
the doctors who worked with the insane. It later became the Royal Medico-
Psychological Association and is now the Royal College of Psychiatrists. The 
Association provided a forum for all professional discussions about how and 
who should manage, and treat, the insane. It also provided for education, 
training, examination and the issuing of certificates to doctors and attendants. 
It enabled doctors to speak with one voice and to make demands on 
Parliament to ensure that they had the legal right to treat the insane. Sir 
J.C.Bucknill (1857), a leading doctor and president of the Medico-
Psychological Association, argued in The Journal of Mental Science that if 
insanity requires medical treatment, then ladies cannot legally or properly 
treat such persons, and that laymen and ladies granted licenses to run 
madhouses were simply being granted permission to speculate and make 
profits. What was happening at this stage was a fight for the lucrative 'trade in 
lunacy'. The medical men who owned and ran most of the madhouses 
wanted to outlaw the lay attendants, both men and women. The doctors 
stated clearly that the treatment they provided in their madhouses was 
superior. They characterized the attendants as ignorant, illiterate and of low 
integrity. In 1829 Burrows argued that in madhouses managed by attendants 
only custody is offered, while in those madhouses managed by doctors the 
insane could expect safe custody and cure. These views were given as 
evidence to the 1928 Select Committee of the House of Lords. There were 
many examples of lay persons who kept well-conducted houses, and others 
of mismanagement by doctors (Jones 1955). For example, a Dr James 
Pownall who became the proprietor of a licensed house, Northfield House in 
Wiltshire, in 1853, was the following year reported to the Commissioners in 
Lunacy by one of the visitors as being unfit to be in charge of the 
establishment after he had struck and shot an inmate. 
Questions were raised in Parliament concerning the laws for regulating the 
granting of licenses for keeping madhouses. The Commissioners of Lunacy 
92 
recognized the inadequacy of the prevailing system, and developed 
procedures for questioning applicants. The questions were designed to 
explore the applicant's experience, especially his/her medical expertise. By 
1860 the official policy as stated by the Commissioners was not to issue new 
licenses other than to medical men or persons of 'high' character and 
reputation. This resulted in medical men owning a number of houses, but 
residing in none of them. Instead they delegated managerial and day-to-day 
treatments and care to the attendants. 
Walk (1961) has drawn attention to the praiseworthy work of attendants such 
as Sam Roberts, William Couper's attendant at Nathaniel Cotton's house in 
St. Albans. Walk argues that Sam Roberts, a private madhouse attendant, 
replaced custodial duties by more psychotherapeutic activities; he later went 
on to own his own private madhouse. According to Jones (1955), the 
qualities required of attendants were subject to much debate. Formal 
instruction was given in 1843 by Sir Alexander Morrison at the Surrey Asylum. 
The Commissioners of Lunacy attempted to set up a Central Register of 
Attendants in 1853, which required that the Commissioners had to be notified 
of all dismissals for misconduct. They stated in 1855 that attendants should 
combine in their character and disposition firmness and gentleness and that 
they should be able to direct and promote the employment and recreation of 
the inmates. There were, however, different attitudes as to what the 
attendant's role should be in the private madhouses, where most of the 
inmates were from the upper classes, and in facilities for most pauper 
lunatics. In the private madhouses the attendant was regarded as a personal 
servant. It was thought that attendants should not appear other than as 
respectable domestics, nor should they be allowed to address themselves to 
the residents other than with respect and consideration. Thus in 1900 the 
proprietors of Ticehurst Madhouse stated that they selected officers and 
servants or mess-waiters as attendants, because, in addition to having 
acquired a sense of discipline and duty, they started with the advantage of 
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knowing how to speak to gentlemen. In these private madhouses mechanical 
restraint was replaced by increased personal attendance on the residents. In 
pauper establishments, however, this was rarely possible; the ratio of inmates 
to attendants was very high. This situation, combined with the frequent staff 
changes that took place, and the recruitment of attendants who lacked 
experience, contributed to defects and abuse within both private madhouses 
and in facilities for pauper lunatics. 
Caretaking activities at the Bethlem 
The archives of the Bethlem Royal Hospital provide information which 
exemplifies the organisation, role and function of caretakers up to and 
including 1890. The relevant archival sources include: The Bethlem Hospital 
Reports (1924), and The Rules relating to the Attendants in the Bethlem 
Hospital with the Duties of the Several Officers (1954). 
During this period, the caretakers for the insane were the attendants. In the 
late nineteenth century there is mention of the attendants as the new category 
of worker replacing the keeper. Around this time there also seems to have 
been some improvement in conditions at Bethlem. Inmates who were chained 
were not chained up in dark cellars, they had no bolts and bars on their 
doors, their rooms had long airy windows and there were opportunities for 
exercise. Cleanliness was a priority, with six attendants assisted by inmates 
doing the cleaning. The care ideology of the attendants was moral treatment 
and non-restraint. The principle of moral restraint was that put forward by 
Tuke (1813) in his work at the Retreat in York. Tuke was optimistic about 
insanity; he argued that the distraction of the inmate's mind was a result of 
his/her blind surrender to desires and an incapacity to control passions. 
Therefore insanity could be corrected by a regime to establish self-discipline. 
Tuke sought to reproduce in the Retreat the intimacy of family relations, with 
the insane as dependent children and himself as an authoritarian patriarch. 
Force was to be used only as a last resort. The main aim of moral treatment 
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was towards assisting the insane to control himself/herself, the theory being 
that a less coercive form of control would better lead to the internalisation of 
the principle of self-control. 
Conolly (1856) argued that the pursuit of moral principles depended on the 
qualities of those caring for the inmates to a much greater degree than with 
bleedings and purges. The principle of non-restraint was to exclude all hurtful 
excitement from a brain already disposed to excitement; it was said that the 
physician who understood the non-restraint system knew that the attendants 
were his most essential instruments. Economy required that responsibility be 
delegated to attendants under the system of moral treatment and non-
restraint; attendants played a dominant role because there were never 
sufficient doctors to supervise every aspect of treatment. According to 
Foucault (1961), the asylum was a complicated machine ensuring that the 
insane were confronted by reason, and that the attendant's actions were 
closely observed. Thus the asylum became a disciplinary force against staff 
as well as inmates. 
At the Bethlem, as at other asylums, there were very detailed rules and 
regulations which governed the functions of attendants. An example of such 
rules was the Duties of Attendants and Servants. These rules were recorded 
in rule books which were given to attendants on being employed (see 
appendix 1). The rules clearly show how the attendants' life throughout the 
working week was regulated. The emphasis of their work was on cleanliness, 
the occupation of the inmates and the locking and unlocking of various 
rooms and buildings. Their work activities included the washing, shaving and 
dressing of the inmates, the examination of inmates for bruises, soreness or 
any skin discolouration, and the reporting to the medical officer any inmate 
who became sick. For each day of the week there were particular activities; 
for example, chapel on Sundays, laundry on Mondays and baths on 
Saturdays. If an attendant went out for an evening he/she would have to be 
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back no later than 10 pm. 
It is clear that in the rules and regulations of the Bethlem Hospital, discipline 
is the first and most important duty of the attendants. This discipline, which 
was closely associated with surveillance, was highlighted in two aspects of 
the attendants' work. Firstly, discipline and surveillance were imposed on the 
attendant, who in turn imposed similar discipline and surveillance on the 
inmates (see Figure 6). Control, restraint and surveillance were evident in the 
physical construction of the institutions. This type of architecture was 
advocated by Jeremy Bentham, who referred to it as the 'Panopticon' or the 
'inspection house'. A design such as this facilitated constant surveillance and 
inspection by permitting an overview of corridors, workrooms and cells by a 
single person or by three persons at most. This provided for effective 
surveillance at a minimum cost. Bentham saw his plan as a gesture of 
liberalization for the insane, as chains and other physical restraints were 
supplanted by a more efficient restraint through architecture (Doerner 1981). 
Secondly, the attendants were expected to set an example through their 
behaviour by demonstrating industry, order, cleanliness and obedience. 
Much of the disciplining of the inmates was carried out by utilizing the 
inmates' labour. While some attendants cared for debilitating inmates or 
surveyed inmates taking exercises, others spent much of their time 
supervising inmates' work. From the rules and regulations, it can be seen that 
order and security were the major concerns of the managers of Bethlem (see 
Figure 7). The attendant's role and function revolved around cleanliness, 
dress, distribution of food, exercise in the open air, occupation, general 
quietness, good conduct and amusement. Little is mentioned about moral 
treatment, and security occupied most of the rules and regulations, 
particularly with regard to the care of keys, tools and cutlery. 
the insane. 	
Source: Donnelly, 1983 
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Figure 6 	 Plan of an intended London Asylum for the care and cure of 
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Figure 7 	 The men's ward in Bethlem in 1860. 
Source: Masters, 1977 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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The training and practice of attendants 
In 1891 Burdette noted that attempts should not be made to get ladies and 
gentlemen, that is, people with a 'gentle' upbringing to work as attendants, 
because they would be unable to perform the duties required of an attendant 
as they would be out of sympathy with the tastes of the inmates. For Conolly 
(1847) the ideal recruit was a member of the 'respectable', rather than the 
'rough', section of the working class. However, he argued that because pay 
and prospects were not sufficiently attractive and in practice strength was 
often prized above benevolence, there was a tendency for attendants to be 
recruited from the ' rough' classes of society. 
W.A.F. Browne (1837) at the Chirchton Royal Hospital in his book What 
Asylums Were, Are and Ought to be had called for some system of 
instruction for attendants. However, it was not until between 1842 and 1844 
that Sir Alexander Morrison developed and gave the first known set of 
lectures to attendants at the Surrey asylum. This was followed in 1854 by a 
course of 30 lectures developed and given to attendants and doctors by 
Browne at the Chirchton Royal Hospital. In 1871, Henry Maudsley proposed 
that the Medico-Psychological Association should set up a registry of good 
attendants, but he did not attempt to link this with any form of training. It is 
remarkable that Florence Nightingale took no interest in the training of 
attendants. It was not until 1899 that the Medico-Psychological Association 
started to manage the contents of the training curriculum and to grant 
certificates. The development of training enabled attendants to establish 
themselves as carers of the insane. This gave them mobility and enhanced 
their promotion prospects. 
Throughout this period training was managed mainly by doctors. The 
Bethlem Minutes of 1892 make reference to lectures to attendants, and a 
male charge attendant is commended for making a series of large diagrams 
of the human body. This was the first recorded instance in the Bethlem of 
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attendants taking part into their own training. Courses at this time extended 
over two years, and included exercises under the head and charge 
attendants, with clinical instruction by the medical staff and lectures taking 
place on the wards. Examination papers were set centrally by the Medico-
Psychological Association, with the conduct of the examination and the 
marking of papers left to the institution's medical superintendent and an 
external assessor. The Medico-Psychological Association published a training 
handbook in 1885. This handbook detailed what was required in the training 
of attendants. It is clear from the content of the handbook that the 
approaches to non-restraint and moral treatment were less emphasized, and 
instead the development of a scientific understanding and treatment of the 
insane was given priority. This situation was further consolidated with the 
sovereignty of the doctor in institutions for the insane, and the emergence of 
the caretaker as the doctor's assistant. 
It was at this time that attendants started to be called mental nurses. The 
actual title of the training handbook was Handbook For Mental Nurses: 
Handbook For Attendants on the Insane. The members of the Medico-
Psychological Association who contributed substantially to the publication of 
the handbook were all doctors working in asylums: A. Campbell-Clark, C. 
Mclvor-Campbell, A.R Turnbull and A.F. Urquart. The preface of the 
handbook goes as follows: 
'This handbook has been prepared in the hope of helping 
attendants on the insane to a due understanding of the work in 
which they are engaged. It is sought to give them such simple 
notions of body and mind in health and disease, such 
instructions for the management of those maladies with which 
they are usually brought in contact, and such rules for their 
guidance in matters of every day experience as will enable them 
to do their work with greater intelligence and watchfulness. It is 
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designed that these instructions should aid attendants to carry 
out the orders of the physicians; but it is to be distinctly 
understood that in no case is anything contained in this book to 
over-ride the special rules of an institution, or special orders in 
regard to any individual case.' 
The handbook contained five chapters; CHAPTER I, The Body - its General 
Functions and Disorders; CHAPTER II, The Nursing of the Sick; CHAPTER III, 
The Mind and its Disorders; CHAPTER IV, The Care of the Insane; and 
CHAPTER V, The General Duties of Attendants. Chapter IV contains the 
following care guideline: 'It is important to attend carefully to the bodily health 
of patients. All the insane must be regarded as patients requiring special care 
and management. In managing the mental condition, the arrangement of an 
asylum, its discipline and daily routine are intended to: promote recovery, and 
to secure that the patients shall be kept under observation. Patients must 
never be thoughtlessly ridiculed. The attendant must correct insane habits, 
promote good habits, maintain regular occupation and amusement. 
Attendants must carry out their duties with firmness, kindness, tact, 
persuasion and self control.' 
Along with the certification from the Medico-Psychological Association, 
successful candidates also received certificates in first aid and massage from 
the St. John's Ambulance Association. Caretakers were now seen as doctors' 
assistants, and most of the practical autonomy they had had in providing care 
for the insane had disappeared (Hunter 1956; Walk 1961). 
By 1891, the Medico-Psychological Association had acquired the prefix 
'Royal'. It extended the training of attendants to three years. At this time, there 
were many mental nurses involved in training, but control over the content of 
the training remained with the doctors. The syllabus was dominated by the 
basic sciences - anatomy, physiology and neurology - and only reached any 
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consideration of the care of the mentally ill after almost every other subject 
had been exhausted. This tendency grew, despite criticism from some 
members of the Royal Medical-Psychological Association and some mental 
nurses. At this time the attendants, supported by some of the members of the 
Royal Medico-Psychological Association, started the Asylum Workers' 
Association with the aim of promoting the interests and status of attendants 
and others engaged in mental nursing. This Association provided a forum for 
attendants to air their views and to work together. It was from this beginning 
that the national Asylum Workers' Union developed. The mental nurses 
expressed their opposition through their union to the training being controlled 
by doctors, incurring the displeasure of the members of the Royal Medico-
Psychological Association. The main point of contention was the attendants' 
move towards self-determination. These developments coincided with the 
development of the General Nursing Council examinations for general nurses, 
with state registration becoming law in 1919. Despite the leadership given by 
mental nurses in developing training, examination, certification and 
registration before general nursing, the various Bills for state registration 
ignored the claims of the mental nurse for registration. When in 1919 the state 
registration act was passed, provision was made for mental nurses in the 
supplementary part of the register, and in 1920 the General Nurses Council 
resolved to accept the Royal Medico-Psychological Association certificate as 
evidence of training. 
Hunter (1956) argued that the training of the mental nurse was parallel to the 
training of mental hospital doctors, but with the transition from asylum to 
mental hospital there was increased pressure for these institutions to be more 
like general hospitals. Throughout these changes the training of the mental 
nurse was adjusted to follow closely the training of general nurses, and by 
1923 the General Nursing Council and not the Royal Medico-Psychological 
Association was responsible for the training of the mental nurse. 
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The work and function of caretakers changed when they became mental 
nurses and were no longer called attendants. At the same time, psychiatry, 
perhaps jealous of the therapeutic and treatment advances of general 
medicine, became more interested in physical treatments. The role of 
caretakers and their function as attendants emphasized non-restraint and 
moral treatment; as nurses the emphasis was placed on physical treatments 
and chemical restraint. What took place was a fundamental change in the 
nature of caretakers' work due to the rise of physical methods of treatment. 
The caretakers of the twentieth century started out as mental nurses; they 
then became psychiatric nurses, and now they are referred to as mental 
health nurses or mental health workers. Their training remained completely 
within the medical model until the 1982 syllabus, which re-emphasized the 
interpersonal aspects lost when the occupational title of caretakers changed 
from 'attendant' to 'mental nurse'. With the current Project 2000 training 
initiatives, training for all branches of nursing shares a common foundation, 
and a specialist pathway leads to mental health qualification. The modern role 
and function of caretakers now embraces both institutional and community 
care. They have regained some of the professional autonomy which was lost 
when doctors became dominant in the affairs of the mentally ill, and some of 
them are now questioning the chemical and institutional constraints placed 
on their role and function. They are trying to recapture through the disciplines 
of psychiatry, sociology, psychology, philosophy and counselling some of the 
humane approaches to care which were started by the attendants. 
Before 1854, caretakers could and did effectively run madhouses in a way 
which emphasized care. The care offered omitted mechanical and chemical 
restraints, and emphasized respect for the individual. By 1857 the medical 
establishment was making a bid for the right to control and medicalize the 
insane. Caretakers found themselves working as assistants to doctors and 
having to pursue roles which fitted asylums and madhouses organized along 
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the same lines as general hospitals. Their work now consisted of following 
and maintaining rules and regulations which stipulated the need for 
surveillance, discipline and cleanliness. 
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CHAPTER 7 
MENTAL HEALTH LEGISLATION 
Mental health legislation in England and Wales is concerned with two basic 
questions: how should patients and staff be regulated, and how should staff 
be regulated in the provision of treatment and care? This chapter addresses 
the changes which took place between 1890 and 1983 in mental health 
legislation. It examines the social context of mental health law and the details 
of the 1890, 1930, 1959 and the 1983 legislation; and how these acts 
provided for the administration of the mental health services, admissions 
systems, the treatment and care offered, and discharge processes. 
In order to understand how mental health law works, it is necessary to 
analyse it in its social context. The mental health legislation which deals with 
compulsory admission and treatment is a means of overt social control. It 
strengthens the social control function of the psychiatrist by ensuring that 
psychiatry can successfully accomplish its social control role and function. 
On the other hand, mental health law may also encourage non-compulsory 
care. The law can also provide for safeguards against the abuse of 
compulsory powers and other infringements of rights and liberties. Thus, 
mental health legislation can in practice be a means of defending the rights of 
the oppressed as well as being an instrument of injustice (Cavadino 1987). 
Early lunacy reform 
In the eighteenth century the insane were locked up in madhouses, in the 
nineteenth/century, lunatics were consigned to asylums, and in the twentieth, 
the mentally ill are cared for in hospitals and in the community (Jones 1955). 
The insane first received mention as a separate group in the community in 
1744. Lunacy reform was not an isolated event; it was associated with penal 
law and reform, factory law and reform in education and public health. It 
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sprang from a new and growing conception of the community's responsibility 
for the wellbeing of its members. The patterns of reform followed more or less 
a familiar pattern. First came a sense of public unease with existing 
conditions. Changes were then instituted by influential local individuals and by 
philanthropists. These situations attracted the attention of members of 
Parliament, who pressed for the establishment of select committees. The 
reports of such select committees then usually resulted in a new law being 
put to Parliament. 
The Vagrancy Acts of 1713 and 1744 provided for the detention of those who 
might be dangerous, and the Madhouse Act of 1774 ensured minimum 
standards of care in private madhouses. Attempts to improve the conditions 
in which the insane were kept resulted in the County Asylum Act of 1808. 
From 1808 to 1890 more than twenty Acts of Parliament dealing with the care 
of the insane were passed. 
The insane who were involved in minor crimes up to the early nineteenth 
century were housed in the county goal or bridewell. Criminal insanity as 
such was not recognized before 1800 and insane persons who committed 
crimes were held responsible for their actions and sent to prison. The 
Criminal Lunatics Act of 1800 introduced for the first time the conditions under 
which a person might be detained as a criminal lunatic. The Act was hastily 
passed within a few weeks of the trial of James Hadfield, who made an 
attempt on the life of King George the 111, and followed another similar case, 
that of Margaret Nicholson who also threatened the King's life. 
With the category of criminally insane established, the problem of where to 
accommodate such persons was recognized. Most found themselves either 
in a Bridewell, a gaol, a house of correction or Bethlem. After the introduction 
of the county asylums, some criminal lunatics were sent there, although most 
remained in a penal institution. Between 1800 and 1840, there were many 
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celebrated cases: for example, Bellingham who shot Spencer Perceval in the 
lobby of the House of Commons; Edward Oxford who shot Queen Victoria on 
Constitution Hill; and Daniel McNaughton who shot Edward Drummond, Sir 
Robert Peel the then Prime Minister's secretary (Jones 1955). These cases 
resulted in the Criminal Lunatics Act of 1838 which amended the 1800 Act by 
drawing a distinction between lunatics who actually committed a crime and 
those who were thought to be about to commit a crime because of a 
deranged mind. The case of Daniel McNaughton resulted in the McNaughtcn 
Rules of 1843 which are still in force today. The McNaughton Rules outline the 
four principles that: 
'A criminal is punishable if he knows that what he did was contrary to the law, 
notwithstanding the insane delusion'; 'If the accused person is deluded, his 
culpability must be judged as if the delusion was in fact true, if he supposes 
that a man intends to kill him, and kills that man, believing his actions to be 
one of self-defence, he is exempt from punishment: but if he believes only 
that the man has damaged his reputation, and kills him, the accused is 
punishable by law as if he were sane'; 'The decision as to the prisoner's sanity 
or otherwise must be made by the jury, since it involves the determination of 
the truth of the facts disposed to, which it is for the jury to decide: and the 
questions are not mere questions upon a matter of science, in which case 
such evidence is admissible'; 'The onus of proving insanity rests with the 
defence - that is to say, the accused person is presumed sane until it is 
proved that he is not'; and 'The prisoner must be proved to have been insane 
at the time when the crime was committed. It is at least theoretically possible 
for a person perviously certified insane to bear full responsibility for a crime 
committed in a lucid interval' (Jones 1955:212). 
All these Acts which addressed the care of the criminally disordered person 
were drawn up and executed in the context of a profoundly class-based 
understanding of society. The category of insane persons who possessed 
107 
estates and wealth came within the ordinary Lunacy Acts, but, as noted 
above, they occupied the special category of Chancery Lunatics. The 
provisions for Chancery Lunatics had their origins in the Praerogativa Regis of 
Edward 11 which stated that: 'The king shall provide, when any happen to fail 
of his wit, as there are many having lucid intervals. that their lands and 
tenements shall be safely kept without waste or destruction, and that they and 
their households shall live and be maintained completely from the issues of 
the same; and the residue beyond their reasonable sustenance shall be kept 
to their use to be delivered unto them when they recover their right mind; so 
that such lands and tenements shall in no wise within the time aforesaid be 
aliened...' (Jones 1955:221). 
Tuke argued in 1882 that the procedures and provisions for Chancery 
Lunatics provided protection for the property but not for the person, and that 
by the eighteenth century relatives would petition the Lord Chancellor to 
enquire into the condition of an alleged lunatic in order to prevent him/her 
from wasting a fortune (see Figure 8). If the Lord Chancellor found that the 
suspicions were true then the property was passed into the protection of the 
crown. The majority of Chancery Lunatics were housed in private madhouses 
where they lived under better conditions than the criminal lunatics consigned 
to houses of correction, Bridewells or gaols. Some categories of both 
Chancery Lunatics and Criminal Lunatics were sent to Bethlem. These 
arrangements continued until plans were drawn up for the building of 
Broadmoor which would serve as a specialist establishment combining the 
medical facilities of an asylum with the precautions against escape or 
violence to be found in a prison. 
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Figure 8 	 Relatives visiting an uncle in an asylum in 1851. 
'How about altering your will now, Uncle?' 
Source: Masters, 1977 
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The 1890 Lunacy Act 
1890 saw the Lunacy Act on the statutes. The Act was considerably longer 
and more detailed than previous attempts at lunacy legislation. According to 
Jones (1955), the Act bears the heavy impress of the legal mind. Its primary 
object was the prevention of wrongful detention by the imposition of legal 
controls. This philosophy of legalism in the treatment of the insane can be 
understood by looking at the general political context and the state of 
psychiatry at the time. The dominant political ethic supported individualism 
and liberty, and saw adult citizens as rational individuals with free will who 
were entitled to the legal protection of their civil freedoms (Unsworth 1987). At 
the same time, the asylum system had increased in size and numbers, but 
was failing to deliver its curative promise and was developing more as a 
custodial institution requiring legal regulation. Within such a setting, the 
caretakers who looked after the insane were seen as maintaining harsh 
regimes which included mechanical, chemical and dietary restraints. 
The development of this piece of legislation for the control of the insane 
occurred in a climate which had become increasingly critical of the services 
available for the insane. In 1877 The Lancet sponsored a fact-finding 
commission on 'The Care and Cure of the Insane', under the direction of Dr. 
Mortimer Grenville. Dr Grenville visited a number of public and private 
asylums in London and the home counties. His report stressed that asylums 
and madhouses were regressing from the standards set in 1845. the 
standards of relevance here related to the suggestions for the improved care 
of the insane for which the parliamentary reformers in 1827 were arguing, 
along with the humanitarian changes of the 1845 Lunatics Act. The 
parliamentary reformers wanted the sexes to be separated, dormitories to be 
properly ventilated, courtyards to be airy and dry and baths with hot and cold 
water to be provided. On the physical care of the patients, they wanted to 
know what steps were taken to ensure personal cleanliness, how often the 
patients had baths and the amount of exercise they got. On occupation, they 
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wanted to know how much manual work was done by the patients, and how 
this was balanced against occupation in the arts, the sciences and literature. 
On the moral treatment of patients, they wanted to know that patients were 
being encouraged to demonstrate self-restraint and self-respect. Staff were at 
all times expected to be kind and supportive to the patients (Jones 1972:106- 
7). 
The main changes required by the 1845 Lunatics Act were social and 
humanitarian. The Act asked for the blurring of the distinction between mental 
and physical disorders; the protection of the insane against illegal detention, 
and the involvement of social work and social care workers. One of the main 
achievements was in the area of illegal detention. The Lunatics' Friend Society 
was founded in 1845 by Luke James Hansard, the son of the original printer 
to the House of Commons. Along with Lord Ashley and his group of 
parliamentary reformers, they petitioned parliament and achieved the 
protection of the British subject from unjust confinement on grounds of 
mental derangement (Jones 1972). 
Dr Grenville's fact-finding commission mentioned examples of good practice, 
such as medical officers visiting wards unexpectedly by day and night, but 
added that everywhere there was evidence of attendants maltreating and 
abusing patients when the medical officers' backs were turned. He further 
commented that lack of a personal touch and of money were the real evils of 
the system. He recommended a radical change of attitude to the insane. 
Despite the various commissions and reports of the period, there was little 
support for humane treatment (The Times Law Reports 1884). In a leading 
article The Times commended in 1877 that, 'If lunacy increased as at present, 
the insane will be in the majority, and freeing themselves will put the sane in 
asylums' (The Times 5.4.1877). In 1883 a Lunacy Bill was introduced to 
Parliament by the Earl of Silborne. This did not go far because of the lack of 
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support at the time. In 1884, Lord Milton argued in Parliament that the state of 
the lunacy law was unsatisfactory and constituted a serious danger to the 
liberty of subjects. He emphasized that a person could be confined in an 
asylum by anybody, on the statement of anybody, and that it was shocking 
that such a state of affairs should exist. Members of Parliament were at this 
time seeking more legal control over the insane. Lord Shaftesbury, the 
chairman of the Lunacy Commission, argued that some revision was 
required, but that there should be no increase in legal formalities. When 
Shaftesbury died in 1885, the way was open for the introduction of the 
measures he had so long opposed. On January 31 1887 two Bills were 
introduced, but it was not until March 1890 that the Bill was passed and 
placed on the Statute Books (Hansard 1888, 1889, 1890). 
The 1890 Lunacy Act is divided into five sections: Administration, Admissions, 
Care and Treatment, Discharge and Miscellaneous Provisions. 
(a) Administration 
The Lord Chancellor was to be the ultimate authority. He was responsible for 
the appointment of the Lunacy Commissioners who sent their reports to him. 
He appointed the Chancery visitors and could intervene directly in the affairs 
of any single patient. The local authority, through the county borough council, 
was responsible for the public asylums and the private madhouses. These 
authorities were responsible for building and maintaining the asylums and 
appointing visiting committees. 
(b) Admissions 
The Act provided for four methods of admission to either an asylum or a 
licensed madhouse. Admission by a reception order or petition could be 
obtained in private cases but not for pauper lunatics, where a relative or other 
person had to petition a Justice of the Peace with two medical certificates. 
The petitioner had to be over twenty-one years of age, have seen the person 
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during the past fourteen days and had to undertake to visit the person, either 
personally or by proxy, in the receiving facility every six months. Admission by 
an urgent order was for those private cases where there was no time for a 
lengthy procedure of certification. This procedure involved a relative's petition 
and one medical certificate; a magistrate's order was not necessary. 
Reception into a facility had to take place within seven days or the person had 
to be discharged. Admission by summary reception order was the method of 
admission for pauper lunatics. Petitions were made by the Poor Law Relieving 
Officer or the police. These people were responsible for notifying the Justice 
of the Peace who had to issue a justice's order. Two medical certificates were 
also required. Admission by inquisition was applied only to Chancery 
Lunatics, the category of insane people who were wealthy and possessed 
estates which were placed under statutory supervision. Here the Judge in 
lunacy could direct the Master in lunacy to examine an alleged lunatic and if 
he considered him/her to be of unsound mind a certificate to this effect was 
issued. A person would then be appointed to administer the estate, and the 
lunatic would be admitted into an asylum or confined singly. If the alleged 
lunatic wished he/she could contest the issue of his/her sanity by requesting 
a trial by jury. 
There were detailed regulations to prevent collusion between the parties 
responsible for the processes of certification, including between petitioner 
and doctor, doctor and doctor, and doctor and the manager of the facility to 
which the person was sent. The duration of an order was one year. It was 
then renewable after periods of two years, three years and five years and 
successive periods of five years on the report of the medical officers of the 
facility to the Lunacy Commissioner. 
(c) Care and treatment 
This section of the 1890 Lunacy Act had three parts: Reports and Visitation; 
Mechanical Restraint; and Correspondence. 
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The Reports and Visitation section ensured that all public and private 
madhouses were visited at least once each year, and that reports were sent 
to the Lord Chancellor to be laid before Parliament. Mechanical restraint by 
the use of instruments and appliances was only to be used for the purposes 
of surgical or medical treatment, or to prevent the patient injuring 
himself/herself or his/her fellow patients. A medical certificate was necessary 
for each instance of restraint and a report book had to be kept; all such 
records were sent to the Commissioners in Lunacy once every quarter. The 
use of mechanical restraint and instruments made the asylum keeper's job 
much easier. Restraints were applied to the melancholic, the maniac or the 
violent patient. Suicidal patients did not have to be watched, and night 
attendance was avoided by strapping patents in their beds. Alongside these 
mechanical restraints was the use of water, air and electricity as cures for 
insanity (See Figures 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16). All letters written by all patients, 
whether private or pauper, to the Lord Chancellor, a Judge in Lunacy, a 
Secretary of State, a Lunacy Commissioner or a Chancey Visitor, were to be 
forwarded unopened. 
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Figure 9 	 Mechanical restraints used at the Hanwell Asylum. 
Source: Showalter, 1984. 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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Figure 10 	 Manacles and gloves for the more violent. 
Source: Masters, 1977 
For the more violent: gloves ... 	 and manacles. 
(Royal Bethlem Archives) 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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Figure 11 
	 A sketch of Norris in his iron cage in the Bethlem. This 
picture was mass-produced in the form of cheap engravings and used to 
great effect by the reformers. 
Source: Scull, 1981. 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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Figure 12 The Rush tranquilliser chair. Contrived by Rush in 
Pennsylvania Hospital to cure madness. It binds and confined all the 
parts of the body and keeps the trunk erect, thus lessening the flow of 
blood to the brain. Was seen as a sedative to the tongue and temper as 
well as the blood vessels. Used for durations of up to four hours. 
Source: Scull, 1981 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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Figure 13 Gyrating chair similar to the one used by Benjamin Rush to 
increase the blood supply to the head. 
Source: Alexander and Selesnick, 1967. 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
119 
Figure 14 	 Rotary motion machine for treatment of the insane. 
Source: Skultans, 1979. 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
120 
Figure 15 The douche: a method for calming violent lunatics, 
nineteenth century. 
Source: Skultans, 1979. 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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Figure 16 	 Electro convulsive therapy treatment. 
Source: Showalter, 1985. 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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(d) Discharge 
A patient might be granted absence on trial or full discharge. Any patient 
escaping from an institution might be recaptured within fourteen days, but 
after the expiry of that period, he or she could not be returned to the asylum 
unless fresh proceedings for certification were completed. 
(e) Miscellaneous provisions 
This section of the 1890 Act covered two areas: single lunatics and penalties 
for obstructing a Commissioner. The Act provided for the inspection of the 
accommodation and care of single patients confined in their own homes. It 
made it possible for Commissioners to visit and to receive medical reports on 
the patient's mental and physical condition. Should the Commissioner feel 
that the patient was not being cared for adequately, this information was to be 
passed on to the Lord Chancellor who had the powers to secure the patient's 
transfer to an asylum. Penalties for obstructing a Commissioner in the course 
of his duties or helping a patient escape ranged from fines to imprisonment. 
The 1930 Mental Treatment Bill 
While the Lunacy Act of 1890 represented the legal view of mental illness, the 
Mental Treatment Act 1930 proposed that there should be a reduction in the 
emphasis on civil legislation for the mentally ill. Instead, the emphasis was on 
the reduction of legal formalities in the interest of early and successful 
treatment of psychiatric disorders. This Act provided for voluntary treatment, 
the establishment of psychiatric out-patient clinics and observation wards, 
and the abolition of out-dated terminology such as 'pauper' and 'Poor Law'. 
The concept of 'asylum' was replaced by that of 'mental hospital' and 'insane' 
and 'lunatic' were replaced by the alternatives of ' patient' and ' persons of 
unsound mind'. 
Authority for administering the Act was vested in the Minister of Health, who 
appointed commissioners to the Board of Control. The Board of Control's 
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task was to supervise the visitation of asylums and private madhouses, and 
report to the Ministry of Health. The Act established three categories of 
patients; voluntary, temporary and certified. Voluntary patients were any 
individuals who wished of their own free will to undergo mental treatment. 
They could make a written application to the person in charge of any 
establishment approved by the Board of Control, and could be received as a 
patient without the need for a reception order. For persons under sixteen, the 
parent or guardian could make such an application. The application would 
have to be supported by a recommendation from a practitioner approved by 
the Ministry of Health or the local authority. A voluntary patient could 
discharge himself/herself by giving seventy-two hours notice. Such voluntary 
patients could lose their voluntary status if it was deemed that they had 
become incapable of making decisions about his/her treatment. Then it would 
be necessary to discharge them and institute a certification process. 
Temporary patients were defined as people suffering from mental illness who 
could benefit from treatment, but were unable to express their willingness or 
unwillingness to receive such treatment. The intention here was to keep the 
patients in hospital when it was thought that a short period of time would be 
enough to produce an improvement in their mental condition. Temporary 
patients could only be admitted with petitions from a near relative and two 
medical certificates. If a patient regained his/her volition, he/she could 
become a voluntary patient or be discharged within twenty-eight days. The 
initial duration for a temporary order was six months, and this could be 
extended to two further periods of three months with the permission of the 
Board of Control. The procedure for certified patients was established under 
the 1890 Lunacy Act and the Mental Treatment Act did not change this. 
The 1930 Act was seen as contributing to public health, mental hygiene, 
national efficiency and social reconstruction, and at the same time to reduce 
legalism and follow the principles of informalization and voluntarism in the 
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care of the mentally ill (Unsworth 1987). The move towards voluntarism, and a 
therapeutic hospital community, saw caretakers involved in such activities as 
welcoming into the ward environment the Red Cross and county libraries. 
Women patients were allowed to use hospital facilities to cut their hair and 
improve their dress. The therapeutic value of such activities started to be 
widely recognized. Caretakers were also involved in making meals and 
mealtimes a social activity aimed at re-socializing the patient. In almost all 
hospitals, caretakers provided programmes of entertainment activities 
covering the whole year. There were cinema shows, and sports such as 
cricket, football and hockey. Most hospitals had regular dance classes and 
held dances for both male and female patients. These dances significantly 
marked another change in the twentieth century care of the mentally ill: the 
beginning of a breakdown in the old rigid system of segregating the sexes. In 
a typical nineteenth century mental hospital, the male side was headed by a 
male caretaker, an attendant, or a nurse, and the female side by a female 
caretaker, a matron. Each side was staffed by staff of the same sex. The 
segregation of the sexes could be considered as placing limitations on the 
therapeutic environment caretakers were trying to foster, as male and female 
patients were prevented from learning how to live together. On the other 
hand, without adequate supervision, with sex desegregation, there was a 
danger that women patients might be exploited by other patients or by 
caretakers, and there were also problems around issues of confidentiality and 
privacy. 
The 1930 Act also marked a change in the ward system, from closed to open 
wards. The ideology of voluntarism indicated that more doors should be open 
with some patients free to come and go independently. The introduction of 
the open door policy aroused tensions in some older caretakers who felt they 
were losing their control over patients. As the open door policy became more 
acceptable to the caretakers, they found their roles extending away from the 
hospital to the supervision of patients in the grounds of the hospital and with 
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patients out for short breaks. and weekends. The system of locked wards 
continued alongside these changes, and the image of caretakers with their 
keys jangling remains a feature of mental health facilities today. 
Training courses were by now well-organized. Doctors were required to gain 
a diploma in psychological medicine, and this qualification is still required 
today. For the caretakers, social work and occupational therapy courses were 
developed. 
The 1959 Mental Health Act 
On October 22, 1953, the appointment was announced of a Royal 
Commission 'On The Laws Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency'. 
From this time on there was a tremendous increase in the public's interest in 
mental illness problems. This coincided with clinical and social progress in 
the care and treatment of the mentally ill. 
The terms of reference of the Royal Commission on Mental Illness and Mental 
Deficiency were: 'To enquire into the existing law and administrative 
machinery governing the certification, detention, care, discharge and 
supervision of persons who are alleged to be suffering from mental illness or 
mental defect, other than the criminally insane, and the extent to which 
voluntary care and treatment should be extended' (Royal Commission on 
Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency 1957). 
When the Royal Commission presented its report to Parliament, its 
recommendations led to the 1959 Mental Health Act. Arguments about the 
need for new legislation was part of a general movement towards a more 
interventionist state. The 1947-51 labour government passed a series of 
measures, including abolishing the Poor Law and replacing piecemeal 
welfare structures with the more comprehensive, rationally organized and 
freely available services of the welfare state. A new Mental Health Act was 
126 
needed to develop state psychiatry as the mental health counterpart of the 
National Health Service Act of 1946, the National Insurance Act of 1946 and 
the National Assistance Act of 1948. Taken together, this legislation was 
designed to provide for a national minimum of social, physical and economic 
wellbeing. The 1959 Mental Health Act was therefore an integral part of the 
architecture of the welfare state. 
The Act repealed all previous lunacy, mental treatment and mental deficiency 
legislation, and provided a single code for all types of mental disorder. The 
sections of the Act which introduced new thinking into mental health 
legislation were: Definitions, Administration, Mental Health Review Tribunals, 
Admission to Hospital, Guardianship, Criminal Patients and the Management 
of Property. 
(a) Definitions 
Mental disorder was defined as mental illness, arrested or incomplete 
development of mind, psychopathic disorder and any other disorder or 
disability of mind. 
(b) Administration 
Administration was vested in the Ministry of Health by the terms of the 
National Health Service Act of 1946. The Act dissolved the Board of Control 
and established the Mental Health Review Tribunal. Local administration was 
assigned to local authorities, which were responsible for the provision of 
facilities for the mentally ill; all residential accommodation; centres of training 
and occupation; the appointment of mental health welfare officers; and 
ensuring the guardianship rules of the Act. The local authorities were the 
registration and regulation bodies for mental nursing homes. Mental welfare 
officers employed by the local authority were given powers of entry and 
inspection. They could apply to a magistrate for a warrant to search for and 
remove a person believed to be suffering from mental disorder. They could 
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make application for a person to be admitted to hospital or to guardianship. 
(c) Mental Health Review Tribunals 
Mental Health Review Tribunals replaced the Board of Control. One tribunal 
was established for each Regional Hospital Board Area. These reviewed 
individual cases of compulsory detention at the request of patients, their 
relatives or the Ministry of Health. Each Tribunal consisted of legal members, 
medical members and members who had knowledge of administration and 
the social services. Legal members had to chair all Tribunal sittings. 
(d) Admissions 
Under the Act, patients could be admitted to any hospital or mental nursing 
home without formalities of any kind and without liability to detention. Children 
over sixteen could be admitted for treatment without the consent of their 
parents or guardians. 
Three kinds of compulsory admission were established: admission for 
observation, admission for treatment and emergency admissions. An 
observation order was of twenty-eight days' duration. It had to be made on 
the written recommendation of two medical practitioners, who stated that the 
patient was either suffering from mental disorder and/or he/she ought to be 
detained in the interest of his/her own health and safety or that of other 
persons. A treatment order was similarly signed by two medical practitioners, 
one from the hospital and the other appointed by the local authority. The 
duration of the order was for periods of one year, and thereafter for two years. 
The grounds for treatment admissions were that the patient must be suffering 
from a mental illness which warranted detention for treatment in the interest of 
his/her own health and safety and that of others. An emergency order 
application had to be made by a mental welfare officer or a nearest relative 
backed by a medical recommendation, and it lasted for three days. 
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(e) Care and treatment 
According to the Act, patients must not be ill-treated or wilfully neglected by 
managers or staff of hospitals or nursing homes. They had to be protected 
against unlawful sexual intercourse. No restrictions should be placed on the 
correspondence of patients informally admitted. The correspondence of 
patients compulsorily detained could be supervised by the responsible 
medical officer. Letters addressed to the Minister of Health, any member of 
Parliament, or member of a Mental Health Review Tribunal had to be 
forwarded in all cases without intervention by the responsible medical officer. 
Any medical practitioner appointed by the patient or a nearest relative could 
visit to examine the patient in private, to advise whether an application should 
be made to the Mental Health Review Tribunal or whether the nearest relative 
could apply for discharge. The Regional Health Authority and the local 
authority could send visitors, either medical or lay, to have private interviews 
with patients. The responsible medical officer could grant any patient leave of 
absence for up to six months. 
(f) Discharge 
The discharge provisions of the Act allowed patients to be discharged by 
managers, the responsible medical officer, or by the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal. Any patient on a treatment order could be discharged by his/her 
nearest relative. The nearest relative was required to give the hospital or 
nursing home seventy-two hours notice. Such a discharge could take place if 
the responsible medical officer did not certify that he/she would be likely to 
act in a dangerous manner to himself/herself or others. 
(g) Guardianship 
A patient could be received into guardianship if he/she was suffering from a 
mental illness which threatened his/her own health and safety or that of 
others. The person named as guardian could be either a local authority or 
any other person, although the order has to be agreed by the local authority. 
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The 1959 Mental Health Act presented an anti-legalistic approach to mental 
health care. Judicial intervention through the role of magistrates prior to 
commitment was dispensed with, and decision-making power was 
transferred to medical practitioners. The Act saw the introduction of the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal with jurisdiction to review the application of 
compulsory admission. Application to a tribunal was restricted in the civil 
context to patients received into guardianship. This facility was not extended 
to patients admitted for observation. The Mental health Review Tribunal 
allowed compulsorily detained patients and their representatives to appeal 
against their detention and treatment. The Tribunal could decide if the patient 
should be discharged from hospital. 
The intention of the Act was to free all but a few patients from compulsory 
admission and treatment. A patient could be detained only after efforts to get 
him/her to enter hospital voluntarily had failed. The Act was a tightrope 
between the freedom and the liberty of the individual. According to Blom-
Cooper (1975), it gave too much power to the medical profession and to 
Mental Health Review Tribunals. The Act has led to many criticisms and 
suggestions for reform. The National Association for Mental Health (MIND) 
and the National Council for Civil Liberties (now Liberty) became increasingly 
involved in issues of the rights of the mentally ill. MIND's critique of the way 
the Act works was spearheaded by Larry Gostin, the organization's fulltime 
Welfare Rights Officer. MIND has campaigned along with professional bodies 
and has engaged in consultations with the Department of Health and Social 
Security, as well as participating in intense Parliamentary activity. 
Gostin (1975) argued that community care is to be preferred to confinement 
in hospitals, and no-one should be admitted to a treatment facility unless it 
has been determined that the facility is the least restrictive setting necessary 
for that person. He also expressed concern that the 1959 Act made little 
distinction between the rights of patients admitted informally and those 
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admitted compulsorily. Informally admitted patients in practice often 
experienced the same legal restrictions as compulsorily admitted patients, in 
terms of court access, voting, obtaining a driving licence, sending and 
receiving post and receiving and using money. Gostin's critique included the 
procedures for detaining patients compulsorily; Section 29 which allowed a 
three day emergency admission for observation was, he argued, subject to 
misuse. He also suggested that GPs and social workers had difficulty 
assessing psychiatric and psychological states, so that it was questionable 
whether their decisions could be guaranteed not to infringe a person's liberty. 
Section 136 of the Act was inadequate as it allowed a police officer to decide 
if someone was mentally ill, and required emergency compulsory treatment. 
But the main concern was that most people who entered a mental hospital 
against their will were given no opportunity to present their case to a Mental 
Health Review Tribunal. Many who might be entitled to apply to a Mental 
Health Review Tribunal did not exercise this right, Where patients did apply 
for a hearing, there was often a considerable delay before a hearing was 
convened. 
The MIND campaign against the workings of the Act aimed to strengthen the 
patient's legal protection. The campaign took place against a general social 
background in which there was mounting criticism of the bureaucratization of 
the Welfare State, which was perceived as stigmatizing and oppressive. The 
way was now open for legal expertise to be placed at the disposal of clients 
of the mental health services. This took the form of legal advice, and 
representation before Mental Health Review Tribunals and in the courts. MIND 
was a party to those changes, re-orienting its energies towards a more active 
political role, which culminated in the support of patients' rights, in domestic 
courts and in the European Court of Human Rights. 
A new form of legalism emerged as the underlying philosophy of mental 
health legislation. The old legalism embodied in the 1890 Lunacy Act was 
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rooted in repression and a concern for public order. This legalism resulted in 
the incarceration of the mentally disordered in isolated disciplinary 
institutions. By contrast, the new legalism reframed psychiatric services in 
their broader social, moral, legal and political context, rather than seeing 
them simply in medical terms. Greater legalism in psychiatric detention and 
treatment was an attempt to encourage patients to accept greater 
responsibility in decisions affecting their lives, and to improve their status as 
citizens. 
The 1983 Mental Health Act 
The 1983 Mental Health Act consolidated the 1959 Act and the Amendment 
Act of 1982. In the civil context it introduced stricter criteria for compulsory 
admissions, and a more judicial approach to procedures for reviewing 
admissions; it strengthened patients' rights to resist unwarranted treatments, 
offered formal procedures to protect the rights of informal patients, reduced 
restrictions on patients' civil freedoms, and installed an independent 
advocacy structure to monitor the delivery of mental health services. 
In Section 1 of the Act, mental disorder is defined as consisting of mental 
illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder 
and any other disorder or disability of mind. The category 'mental disorder' is 
not defined further. It is specifically said that its definition and usage is a 
matter for clinical judgement, although in practice the category clearly 
includes the functional and organic psychoses, schizophrenia, depression, 
mania, dementia and the severe neuroses. 
Section 2 is concerned with admission for assessment. Under this Section a 
person can be taken compulsorily to hospital and be detained there for a 
twenty eight day assessment period. An application must be completed by 
either a nearest relative or an Approved Social Worker. There must also be 
two medical recommendations. One of the recommendations must be made 
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by a doctor who knows the person. The grounds for admission are that the 
person is suffering from a mental disorder which warrants detention, and that 
he/she ought to be detained for his/her health and safety or the protection of 
other people. This Section cannot be renewed, and the person must be 
discharged before or on the twenty eighth day, or detained informally, or 
compulsorily under Section 3. 
Section 3 provides for admission for treatment. This is the long-term 
treatment Section. Patients can be detained for six months in the first 
instance. A patient can be discharged during the six months, or the detention 
can be renewed for a further six months. An application must be completed 
either by an Approved Social Worker or by a nearest relative. Two medical 
recommendations must be submitted, and one must be by a doctor who 
knows the patient. The criteria for detention are the health and safety of the 
patient, the protection of others, and that the patient must be suffering from a 
mental illness which is treatable, with the proposed treatment being likely to 
alleviate or prevent any deterioration of the patient's condition. 
Section 4 deals with emergency admissions for assessment. It provides a 
means of compulsory admission for seventy-two hours in an emergency, 
when it is not possible to obtain the two doctors needed for Sections 2 or 3. 
An application is required from an Approved Social Worker or the nearest 
relative. The patient can be discharged within seventy-two hours or a Section 
2 or 3 can be used to detain the patient. The Approved Social Worker be 
trained to provide the specialist assessments required. 
Section 5 is concerned with the holding powers of doctors and nurses. The 
doctor in charge of the treatment of an informal in-patient can detain the 
patient for seventy-two hours, to allow time for a compulsory Section to be 
imposed. There is also a new power for Registered Mental Nurses to detain a 
patient for up to six hours. For the first time the role of the nurse as gaoler is 
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formalized, thus accentuating the custodial aspect of the nurse-patient 
relationship. 
Most kinds of treatments can be given to any patient with his/her consent. 
This is similar for compulsory patients. Compulsory treatments, however, 
except in emergencies, can only be imposed on an unwilling patient in 
accordance with a treatment plan approved by a psychiatrist appointed by 
the Mental Health Act Commissioners. Civil patients can appeal to the Mental 
Health Review Tribunal which has the power to overrule the responsible 
medical officer and discharge the patient. Patients are granted automatic 
tribunal hearings without having to appeal. The operations of the Act are 
overseen by a watchdog body, the Mental Health Act Commissioners. The 
Commissioners' remit is to protect the rights of detained patients. They can 
receive complaints, and monitor the use of the Act, and are responsible for 
providing a code of practice which gives guidance to professionals in respect 
of informal and compulsory admissions for treatment. Hospital managers are 
required to give full details to patients and their relatives about the patient's 
status and rights in hospital. 
Social uncertainty, legalism and mental health legislation 
Opportunities to make substantive changes in mental health legislation have 
occurred infrequently in the history of the caretaking of the insane. The 1890 
Lunacy Act confirmed and established the principle of legalism, whereby 
admission to mental hospitals and treatment in those hospitals was governed 
at all times by statute and controlled by the Board of Control. The 1930 
Mental Treatment Act allowed some patients to enter hospital voluntarily 
without certification. The 1959 Mental Health Act saw the dominance of the 
medical view of mental disorder and a further reduction of the role of lawyers 
and the courts. The 1983 Mental Health Act has softened the medical view, 
provided for a new legalism, and has gone some way to address more overtly 
the rights of users. 
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In some ways, therefore, mental health legislation has come full circle from 
the old legalism of 1890 to the new legalism of 1983. It could be argued that 
this historical continuity reflects an underlying uncertainty about how society 
should respond to the challenges posed by mental disorder. The rule of law 
expressed through mental health legislation serves as a fl amework for 




LEGISLATION, CARETAKING AND RIGHTS 
This chapter takes a closer look at Parliamentary and public debates about 
mental health during the passage of mental health legislation in 1930, 1959 
and 1983 in order to throw more light on a number of key issues in the history 
of caretaking work. These issues include conceptions of ' madness', ' insanity' 
and mental illness', the conditions around confinement in asylums and 
hospitals, the types of treatments available and recommended, the provision 
of community care, hospital provision and the rights of patients and their 
relatives, doctors, mental nurses, social workers and other professionals. 
The social control of insanity 
Forms of mediation and intervention relevant to the mentally ill are connected 
directly to cultural decisions, social policies and legislation. Underlying the 
Mental Health Acts of 1930, 1959 and 1983 is a strong sense of a cultural 
need to control insanity and mental illness by calling on the authority of 
magistrates, the police, doctors and other health and welfare professionals. 
Concerns as to who was mentally ill and what should be done about such 
individuals were expressed in terms of the need to alter or modify certain 
psychological and physical states. Mental distress was recognized as a social 
problem which posed a threat to conventional standards of rationality and 
irrationality. Methods were needed to contain it, along with resources to 
intervene and control. The distribution of such resources depended on power 
relations and the attitudes of politicians and professionals. Governments were 
interested in maintaining the social order. Health and welfare professionals 
were also bound by vested occupational interests. 
As noted in Chapter 7, the 1890 Lunacy Act provided for four types of 
admissions which were all compulsory and involved doctors and magistrates. 
The Act concerned itself mainly with safeguarding the liberty of the citizen as 
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a patient. It did not concern itself with treatments apart from basic physical 
intervention. Individuals had to pay for hospitalization. The very poor were 
financed by their local authority, which could mean at times being sent to a 
remote hospital which was cheaper than one nearer the patient's home 
(Jones 1960). 
Press discussions in this period portray the insane person as someone to be 
feared and pitied simultaneously. Lunatic asylums were perceived as 
frightening places in which people were locked up for good. The general view 
was that insanity was caused by hereditary factors; this view resulted in 
stigmatization for the patient and his/her family (Ramon 1985). There was, 
however, one pioneering development which demonstrated a less legalistic 
approach to providing treatment. This was the Maudsley Hospital which 
opened in 1915 as a hospital able to take patients without certification 
(Johnson 1952). The Times described plans for the Maudsley in the following 
terms: 
'We are glad to be able to place before our readers some details 
of a scheme which has just been formulated by a committee of 
experts, acting on behalf of the London County Council, for 
establishing a new hospital in the metropolis for the treatment of 
the insane, and a hospital moreover, which is intended to be 
something more than a mere place of refuge for the treatment of 
individual cases of lunacy, the object in view being to make it 
also supply, what has long been a great want in medical 
science, the provision of a school for the scientific study of 
insanity with a thoroughly experienced staff of visiting 
physicians. The system under which lunatic asylums have 
hitherto been conducted is one which has tended more to 
administrative efficiency than to scientific study, and it is obvious 
that if a hospital could be founded in London for the study of 
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insanity as a disease as well as for the cure of its patients a 
great benefit would be secured to the whole civilized world. 
Happily the committee have gone about their work in a 
thoroughly business-like spirit. They have not confined 
themselves to theoretical dreaming, but have applied 
themselves to practical details. 
They estimate the cost of erecting a hospital with 100 beds at 
£32,000, and consider that the annual expenditure for the 
maintenance of the institution, the fees of visiting staff, the 
interest on capital (including that expended on the purchase of 
a site), and so on would not exceed a sum of between £8,000 
and £10,000'. (The Times 27.1.1890:13c). 
Other press reports at the time took up the issues of scientific developments 
in the treatment and cure of the insane; growing concern about the use of 
mechanical restraint in caretaking work; and the development of bodies 
which questioned existing provisions for lunatics. For example, on the 
question of mechanical restraints, the following appeared in The Times in 
May 1890: 
'The Lunacy Act 1890. The local Government Board have 
forwarded to Boards of Guardians copies of a regulation which 
has been made by the Commissioners in Lunacy, under the 
Lunacy Act 1890, as to the use of mechanical means for the 
restraint of lunatics. The regulation states that the intention of 
section 40 (6) of the Act obviously is to discourage the 
employment of mechanical restraint in the treatment of the 
insane, except incases of manifest and urgent necessity, an 
object which the Lunacy Commissioners has always 
endeavoured to promote. It is with great reluctance, therefore, 
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that the Commissioners approach the performance of the duty 
imposed on them by the legislature of determining the 
instruments and appliances of restraint, and their discharge of 
the duty must not be construed as implying any greater 
countenance by them of this mode of treatment than they have 
hitherto given to it. They recognizes that cases will occur in 
which it is necessary for the safety of the patient or of others, or 
is beneficial to the patient, that mechanical restraint should be 
applied; but they hold that the application of it should be 
restricted within the narrowest limits possible, that the restraint 
should be applied by means the most humane that can be 
contrived, should not be long continued without intermission, 
and should be dispensed with immediately it has effected the 
purpose for which it is employed. The Commissioners direct 
that at each visit of the Commissioners or a Commissioner to an 
asylum, hospital, or licensed house, or to a single patient, all 
instruments and mechanical appliances which may have been 
employed in the application of bodily restraint to a lunatic since 
the last preceding visit of Commissioners or a Commissioner be 
produced to the visiting Commissioners or Commissioner by 
the superintendent, resident medical officer, or resident licensee 
or the person having charge of the single patient' . (The Times 
3.5.1890:8f). 
A few days later, The Times highlighted moves towards lunacy reform: 
'Lunacy Law Reform. A conference of ladies and gentlemen was 
held under the auspices of the Lunacy law Reform Association 
at Mr. George Russell's residence, 18 Wilton Street, yesterday. 
The object of the conference was to consider the effect of the 
Lunacy Acts Amendment Act, which came into operation on the 
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1st inst. The conference especially desired to draw public 
attention to several points which it regarded as of supreme 
importance. The conference unanimously agreed that reformers 
should aim at the gradual extinction of all private asylums kept 
for gain and the substitution for them of paying wards in public 
asylums on the model of St. Thomas's Home connected with St 
Thomas's Hospital. It was also agreed that the Lunacy 
Commission should be abolished as hopelessly effete, and its 
functions transferred to local representative bodies'. (The Times 
8.5.1890:12b). 
Against this background, Parliament appointed a Royal Commission on 
Lunacy and Mental Disorder on July 25, 1924. The Commission's terms of 
reference were wide: they were to enquire into: 'The existing law and 
administrative machinery in England and Wales in connection with the 
certification detention and care of persons who are, or who are alleged to be 
of unsound mind, and also into the extent to which provision is or should be 
made for the treatment without verification of persons suffering from mental 
disorder'. 
Debates at the time of the 1930 Mental Treatment Bill 
The 1930 Mental Treatment Bill was initiated in the House of Lords in 
November 1928 by Earl Russell. In the Commons the Bill was introduced on 
December 23, 1929, by the Rt. Hon. Arthur Greenwood. In the second 
reading of the Bill, recorded in Hansard (Hansard 235:958-1010) a number of 
concerns were apparent. The Minister of Health, Mr. Greenwood said: 
'There is emphasized the view that there should be early 
treatment, and that mental disease should be viewed much the 
same way as we now view physical disease...If we accept the 
view of mental disease, not as a visitation of Providence, not as 
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something indecent, about which we ought not to talk in public 
but as something in the same category as other forms of human 
ailment, then it becomes quite clear that the community ought 
to organize its resources to enable us to carry out preventive 
measures and early treatment' . (Hansard 235:958). 
Mr. Leif Jones pointed out that: 
'The duty is laid upon every local authority to provide and 
maintain suitable accommodation for temporary patients. Will 
not that mean that every local authority will have to make 
provision for a new class of patients, and will not that involve a 
very considerable expense to local authorities?' (Hansard 
235:965). 
And Mr. Stephen replied that: 
'There will be additional expense, and is there not going to be 
some additional provision made by the National Exchequer in 
order to relieve the local authorities to some extent?' . (Hansard 
235:966). 
These Parliamentarians were reflecting prevailing changes in medical thinking 
about the nature of mental illness. At this time the legalistic and moral 
approach was giving way to the clinical-somatic approach. Mental illness was 
seen as a disease with physical causes; therefore, it could be treated and 
cured like any other physical disease. Because it was a disease, it was to be 
treated by doctors. According to Ramon (1985), this approach emphasized 
diagnosis of the disease and treating it rather than attempting to understand 
the whole person and his or her environment. The large Victorian asylums 
suited this approach. Psychiatry was used to contain people, despite 
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recognition of its weak knowledge base in intervention techniques. Now 
psychiatry was saying that these illnesses could be diagnosed and cured 
(Scull 1979). Much of this new assertion in psychiatry came from the work of 
Wagner-Jauregg, the Austrian neurologist who received a Nobel Prize in 1927 
for his work on the use of induced fevers in treating mental illness. The major 
implication of Wagner-Jauregg's work was that mental illness could have a 
single physical cause which medical research could locate and control (Sim 
1969). These developments appealed to doctors, lay persons and nurses, as 
they offered a neat explanation and gave prestige to general medicine 
(Ramon 1985). It could be argued that those outside medicine found the new 
medical explanations acceptable, because they had no alternative systematic 
theories to put forward. Mr. Greenwood pointed out that: 
'Today if the medical practitioner is made defendant in a case 
for wrongful certification the onus of proof rests upon him to 
show that he has acted in good faith and with reasonable care. I 
think it is clear that we cannot completely remove responsibility 
from medical men. After all he has made a decision and, 
therefore, whilst we must keep upon him a certain measure of 
responsibility it is important on the other hand that he should 
have reasonable protection against cases which might be 
brought and which might mean his financial or professional ruin, 
even if the case did not go against him'. (Hansard 235:969). 
This concern was shared by both doctors and politicians; it symbolizes the 
status and equality which psychiatrists wanted with other doctors. The 
protection which the psychiatrists wanted was that no civil or criminal 
proceedings could be brought against them in any court in respect of their 
work with patients without the leave of the High Court. Further, that High 
Court should not be allowed to give leave unless it was satisfied that there 
were substantial grounds, and the doctor had acted in bad faith. This device 
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was seen as protecting the autonomy of clinical-professional judgement, with 
the assumption being that professional knowledge offered an improvement 
on the commonsense view, although this might not be accepted by everyone. 
A further important point was the Poor Law aspect. Members of Parliament 
were concerned that mental illness should be removed as a category within 
the framework of the Poor Law, so that the mentally ill would no longer be 
stigmatized in this way. Dr Morris-Jones offered that: 
'It gives the poor something of the chance of the wealthy for the first time in 
regard to lunacy. it changes the word "pauper" into "rate-aided patient"; and it 
substitutes for the words "lunatic asylum" the words "rate-aided mental 
hospital" (Hansard 235:987). 
In the same debate, Dr Ethel Bentham pointed out that: 
'Another reason is that seven-eights of the people who are certified 
have to go through the Poor Law, and there is a horror of the way in 
which they are treated, although I do not believe they are badly treated 
intentionally, but the circumstances surrounding their reception are 
such that it is no wonder people do almost anything at avoid disclosing 
insanity' (Hansard 235:988). 
The question was raised as to whether magistrates or doctors should be 
involved in the admissions process. Dr Morris-Jones said: 
'This clause abolishes for the first time in this country, the 
judiciary, as it were, in dealing with mental patients. My own 
view is that the intervention of a magistrate in this sort of case is 
unnecessary and may even be harmful'. (Hansard 235:985). 
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There was a broad consensus that only doctors should be party to the 
admission process. Magistrates were thought of as lacking the relevant 
knowledge, and suffering from the disadvantage that they would stamp the 
stigma of criminal procedures on hospital admission. This preference for the 
professional's judgement over that of the lay person was a move away form 
the tradition of regarding magistrates as the main safeguard of the lay 
person. It was possible because psychiatrists were at the time explaining 
insanity in terms of physical disease, which made them the only professionals 
capable of diagnosing, treating and curing insanity. 
In the Parliamentary debates of the time, Members wanted to see the 
temporary and voluntary admission of patients, with certification only being 
used when absolutely necessary. Temporary patients were deemed to be 
persons suffering from a mental illness, and likely to benefit from temporary 
admission, but incapable of expressing themselves as willing or unwilling to 
receive such treatment. The intention was to provide for cases such as 
problems after childbirth and alcoholism, where relief of the associated 
physical condition might be expected to produce an improvement in the 
mental condition in a short period of time. Voluntary patients were any people 
wishing of their own accord to submit themselves to admission to a mental 
hospital, nursing home or observation ward in a general hospital. Early 
hospitalization was seen as necessary if the mentally ill was to benefit from 
the system. Mr. Greenwood put it in the following terms: 
'The cases we keep particularly in mind are the cases of the 
man whose mind has been temporarily broken by overwork, the 
cases of women in childhood who suffers from puerperal mania, 
and cases where with proper treatment fairly early recovery 
might be expected. Think of the woman after confinement 
whose mind becomes temporarily unhinged and who is 
branded with the stigma not only of the Poor Law but 
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certification' (Hansard 235:961). 
There was a tendency to blame the Board of Control for mishandling the 
mentally ill and their relatives and causing public mistrust in the profession. 
There was a feeling that the Board or Control was too remote; even doctors 
could not gain easy access to it. Dr Ethel Bentham said: 
'The third thing which makes people so nervous of disclosing 
insanity in the family is the mysterious and awful Board of 
Control. I may say that I have been for 13 years a general 
practitioner and have acted as a justice under these Acts ever 
since women magistrates were first appointed, and so I have 
had considerable knowledge. When in the interest of a patient, I 
have had to go to the Board of Control, I have found it human -
when you could get at it. But it is a mysterious board. People do 
not know of its name or how to get at it'. (Hansard 235:991). 
A complementary view was expressed by Sir D. Newton: 
'It seems to me that the powers of the Board of Control are too 
far reaching. The duties of the Board of Control are to protect 
the liberty of the subject and to say whether in the public 
interest a man should be detained. It should not be the duty of 
the Board of Control to interfere with local government, and 
possibly to override the wishes of the elected local government 
representatives' (Hansard 235:993). 
Concerning the protection of the patients, Members suggested that patients 
needed protection first against themselves, and also in many cases against 
their relatives. As Dr Ethel Bentham illustrated the point: 
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'I knew a case, a good many years ago now, of a man who had 
been discharged from a lunatic asylum. On the second morning 
after his discharge a lady calling on him went into his house. It 
was in one of those northern towns where the doors are always 
on the latch, and she walked in just in time to prevent him 
cutting his throat. She had the presence of mind to say, "not 
there man, not there; come over to the sink. Think what a mess 
you will make!" That saved him. Only two days before that man 
had been discharged from an asylum, supposed to be cured. In 
many cases the people who look the best are possibly those 
least able to be trusted by themselves' . (Hansard 235:989-990). 
Dr Bentham was a magistrate as well as a doctor, yet she was critical of 
doctors and the available knowledge on mental illness diagnosis and 
treatment, and suggested that magistrates, because of their class 
background, might not be able to communicate effectively with all classes of 
patients. 
On February 18 1930 an article appeared in the Times which outlined the 
main provisions of the second reading of the Mental Treatment Bill. This Bill 
provided details of the reception of voluntary patients, the establishment of 
outpatient clinics and the prohibition of marriage among patients classified as 
mentally defective (The Times 18.2.1930:8d). Concerning the reception of 
voluntary patients, reports in The Times (19.9.1930) pointed out that for the 
first time the new Act authorized the reception of voluntary patients into public 
mental hospitals, and defined the conditions under which they could be 
treated. Attention was drawn to the provision for temporary treatment of 
patients on the recommendation of two medical practitioners without the 
intervention of any judicial authority; it was noted that this provision marked a 
striking advance in the assimilation of the treatment of mental illness to that of 
physical illness; voluntary patients were not limited to being treated in public 
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mental hospitals, but could be treated in any institution or hospital. The report 
suggested that patients could benefit from being treated in both non-teaching 
and teaching hospitals large enough to have wards for patients suffering from 
nervous and mental disorder. Further, the report claimed that in the case of 
teaching hospitals, such an arrangement would be of special value, not only 
from the point of view of the patient, but in the interests of medical education 
and research. With regard to outpatient clinics, local authorities were now 
empowered to provide these and to make suitable arrangements for aftercare 
and to undertake research. 
The issue relating to the prohibition of marriage was related mainly to mental 
defectives and not the mentally ill. Here the report stated that: 
'...the prevention of marriage between mental defectives would 
be a preventive measure of great social utility. Not only would it 
draw public attention to the unwisdom of allowing defectives to 
marry but it would place local authorities in a far stronger 
position by enabling them to insist on proper precautions being 
taken by the persons to whom defectives are licensed and by 
their parents and guardians'. (The Times 19.9.1930:12d). 
A few months earlier, in July, The Times dealt with the new roles and 
responsibilities which the 1930 Mental Treatment Bill would place on local 
authorities in a report of a conference held in London of representatives of 
local authorities. The issues highlighted related to the changes brought in by 
the Act for the reception of voluntary patients, which the delegates agreed 
would mean a more humanitarian and scientific approach, geared to enabling 
curative measures to be adopted in the initial stages of mental disturbance. 
They also saw the establishment of outpatient clinics as long overdue, but 
expressed concerns as to how local authorities would be able to meet the 
costs of these. Mr.I.G. Brooks, the Conference chairman, said that: 
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'... there was no need for apprehension that the voluntary patients were 
going to cost local authorities a lot of money. The great bulk of the 
patients they were going to treat on a voluntary basis would, under the 
old dispensation have become certifiable. It was more economical to 
get the patient first and treat the case when it was still hopeful'. 
(The Times 23.7.1930:9c). 
In August 1930 The Times carried a brief report about a committee 
appointed by the Board of Control. The Board had taken over from the 
Commissioners on Lunacy the monitoring of the system of care provision for 
the mentally disturbed, and had set up a committee with the following terms 
of reference: 'To consider and advise what principles should be observed in 
the approval by the Board of Control the medical practitioners for the 
purposes of Section 1,(3) and 5,(3) of the Mental Treatment Bill' (The Times 
21.8.1930:7d). Section 1 of the Act dealt with the power to receive voluntary 
patients and subsection 3 with the medical recommendation in the case of 
persons under the age of 16. Section 5 dealt with temporary treatment 
without certification, and subsection 3 with medical recommendation. 
A letter to the Editor of The Times noted that all of this signified the start of a 
new era in the treatment of the mentally ill: 
'... the Mental Treatment Act... registers, so to speak, the birth of 
a new attitude of public opinion on the treatment of the mentally 
afflicted...The significance of the new epoch consists in the fact 
that the Mental Treatment Act, without abandoning certain legal 
safeguards still considered necessary for the protection of 
liberty, makes effective provisions for mental disorders on the 
basis of relegating legal certification to the position of the last 
rather than the first step in arrangements for the medical care of 
afflicted persons' . (The Times 22.9.1930:8b). 
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This letter went on to note that this development coincided with the provisions 
of the Local Government Act which put the whole administrative machinery 
for the ascertainment, prevention, and treatment of all forms of disease into 
the hands of local authorities, practically without limit or restraint. Lunacy was 
part of the total scheme. The net result was that, 'The Medical Officer of 
Health's department will become a continuously operative laboratory of 
investigation into the sources of disease, bodily and mental'. 
These reports brought to public attention a number of important points. The 
main ones were: the new roles and financial costs for local authorities in 
making outpatient clinic provision; the emphasis in the new Mental Treatment 
Bill on the scientific study of lunacy, the provision of humane treatment and 
the search for cures; the possibility for voluntary admission of patients; the 
removal of magistrates from the admission process, and the use of two 
doctors' recommendations for all admissions; and the admission of lunatics 
to teaching hospitals. 
In the eyes of Members of Parliament, doctors dominated the professional 
scene, but some Members were also concerned about the conditions of 
mental nurses' work. The nurses were the largest workforce in the asylum 
system. They worked under difficult conditions, and these featured in the 
Parliamentary debates both as aspects of their work of the generally poor 
environment provided for the mentally ill (Hansard 232:1644 and 232:980). On 
the whole, according to Ramon (1985), the nurses tended to accept the 
doctors' views and saw themselves as auxiliaries to the doctors. Their social 
control function was taken for granted by both the hospital administration and 
the mental nurses themselves. 
Only a minority of Members participated in these debates. Most of these were 
on the political left. The politicians opted for the strengthening of the 
dominance of clinical-somatic psychiatry, rejected the role of magistrates, 
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questioned the power of the Board of Control, extended voluntary admission 
and required local authorities to provide more services for the mentally ill. 
Debates at the time of the 1959 Mental Health Act 
On October 22 1953 Parliament announced a Royal Commission on the Law 
Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency; the aim was to look into the 
processes of certification and detention of persons in mental hospitals. The 
terms of reference of the Commission were as follows: 
'To enquire, as regards England and Wales, into the existing law 
and administrative machinery governing the certification, 
detention, care (other than hospital care or treatment under the 
National health Service Acts 1946-52), absence on trial or 
licence, discharge and supervision of persons who are alleged 
to be suffering from mental illness or mental defect, other that 
Broadmoor patients; to consider, as regards England and 
Wales, the extent to which it is now, should be made, statutory 
possible for such persons to be treated as voluntary patients, 
without certification; and to make recommendations' (Royal 
Commission on Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency 1957). 
The evidence of this Royal Commission laid the foundations of the Bill which 
was debated in Parliament in 1958 and 1959. The Queen's speech in October 
1958 stated that: 
'Effect will be given to many of the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission on mental illness: and the provision of a new 
Bill will replace the existing law on mental health in England and 
Wales' (Queen's Speech Hansard 594:6). 
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The 1959 Mental health Act came within the framework of the National health 
Services Act of 1946. It repealed the 1890 and 1930 Acts. The severely 
subnormal and the mentally ill were both provided for in this Act. The Report 
of the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental 
Deficiency stated that the Mental Treatment Act was far less coercive than the 
Mental Deficiency Acts. The Commission argued that the Mental Deficiency 
Acts resulted in a high reliance on compulsory treatment. The National 
Society for Lunacy Reform and the National Council for Civil Liberties 
supported the Commission's views. In the light of these comments, the 
Government decided to cater for these two conditions in one Bill. The use of a 
single Act for both the severely subnormal and the mentally ill involved the 
belief that the two conditions, though medically and socially different, could 
be treated as one in law. Psychopathic patients were recognized as a 
separate category for the first time, and the question of defining this group 
was left to the medical profession. The Board of Control was abolished, and a 
new body to which appeals could the made was established as the Mental 
Health Review Tribunal. Community care and guardianship were introduced 
to offer support to the people who were discharged from hospital and to 
relieve the pressure on beds. 
By the end of the 1940s it was generally known that psychiatric hospitals were 
overcrowded, with inadequate recreational facilities and staff. In 1954 The 
Lancet carried an editorial which was concerned with the suggestion that 
mental nurses should be paid 'danger money' because the difficulties which 
they faced were caused by the conditions of the hospitals. Mental hospitals 
lacked sufficient staff - both nurses and doctors. There were no established 
posts for doctors; for nurses there were established posts, but there was a 
shortage of new recruits, and new entrants were leaving before completing 
their training Other factors contributing to the shortage of mental nurses were 
low wages, and the low status of the work generally and in relation to general 
nursing. Mental nurses were dissatisfied with the non-co-operative nature of 
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their relationships with doctors, the hierarchial structure of nursing and 
hospital organization and the menial tasks which they had to perform. 
Training was another area of concern. Out of a period of three years training, 
fifteen months were devoted to general nursing and the relationships between 
the tutors and the senior mental nurses on the wards were strained (Nursing 
Mirror 1954:12 & 354-452). Some argued that the technical skills employed 
by mental nurses in the giving of ECT should go some way to demonstrate 
their knowledge and status (Nursing Mirror 1957:xiii-xi). The high percentage 
of male mental nurses resulted in a high proportion of mental nurses 
belonging to a trade union, and this probably confirmed the arguments of the 
general nurses that mental nurses were not professionals. General nurses 
saw mental nurses as doing domestic jobs, performing work which, apart 
from ECT, required few technical skills, and belonging to trade unions which 
were not perceived as professional associations (Ramon 1985). 
Mental nurses were, however, taking on more of the jargon used by doctors 
and psychiatrists, and were seen by some as professionals working as part of 
a team. Their position reflected the growing division within mental nursing, 
between those who saw themselves as doctors' assistants and those who 
saw themselves as social therapists. With the former view went a 
concentration on physical treatments, and uncritical acceptance of mental 
hospital rules and the passivity and dependence of patients. The view of 
mental nurses as social therapists saw them as key figures in the rebuilding 
of relationships between patients and the social world. Such nurses were 
mindful of the associated physical condition of patients and the physical 
treatments available, but were willing to give up the traditional professional 
distance between patients and themselves, and sought to encourage patients 
to change their attitudes to themselves and the social world. 
The Parliamentary debates of the time recognized that there had been 
changes in psychiatric treatment and practice, and these practices they saw 
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as improvements. The Minister of Health, the Hon. Derek Walker-Smith, in his 
opening speech at the second reading of the Mental Health Bill on January 
26, 1959, expressed it thus: 
'The legislation which we now repeal marks, of course, a great 
advance... Research in many fields has a bearing on psychiatry. 
From psychology and the work of pioneers like Freud there has 
come a better understanding of how the mind works and why 
people behave as they do...ln the hospital, the use of physical 
treatments such as insulin, Electro-Convulsive therapy, 
leucotomy and drugs have made hitherto withdrawn patients 
accessible to rehabilitation through treatments such as group 
therapy, organized occupation, and the 'open door' principle. 
Complementary with this advance, and in no small degree due 
to it, there has been a parallel and most welcome advance in 
the public attitude to mental disorder. The position today is this. 
Our code of law and procedure, mainly fashioned for an earlier 
day, is out of phase with our advance in medical skill and public 
understanding' (Hansard 598:707). 
Any new treatment which freed patients from chains and solitary confinement 
was welcomed. The new drugs and ECT which started to be used extensively 
after the 1930s were accepted as generally a good development. Clare (1976) 
has pointed out that electricity has a long history of being associated with the 
treatment of the insane. Such developments placed doctors in a very 
dominant position in the mental hospital, where there were few critiques of 
the new treatments. At the same time, the caretakers' role and function 
changed to emphasize more their functions as doctors' assistants. Individuals 
such as Dr Johnson raised in the House the issue of the harmful effects of 
ECT and psychosurgery, but such queries were not generally treated 
seriously (Hansard 594:820). 
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It is also clear from Parliamentary debates at the time that most MPs saw 
voluntary admission as a major achievement. Compulsory admissions would 
only be used for a residual category of cases in the interest of society and in 
the interest of the patients themselves. MPs saw this situation as carrying a 
greater measure of citizen rights and also personal dignity, and resulting in 
less stigmatization for both patients and their relatives (Hansard 573:85). 
Barton (1959) argued that the favourable assumption of voluntary/informal 
admissions might have another side to it: that people went into hospital 
through persuasion by relatives and professionals rather that because of their 
own wishes, and that they might sometimes stay in hospital because of a lack 
of alternatives and a hostile social environment, rather that because they 
found their hospital treatment helpful. Parliament was concerned that people 
were being hospitalized as a result of misapplied diagnoses and misjudgment 
by professionals. One example was the Thornton case. Mrs Thornton was a 
middle-aged woman with a history of marital difficulties and a keen believer in 
spiritualism. At one point, she was referred by her General Practitioner for a 
psychiatric evaluation because of what seemed to be paranoid fears and 
complaints about her husband. The psychiatrist suggested that she was in 
need of a solicitor's advice to sort out her marital problems. Later she 
complained about a murder attempt by her husband and was compulsorily 
admitted to a psychiatric hospital and diagnosed as suffering from paranoid 
hallucinations. When the case was examined further, her complaints were 
found to be real. Her husband had attempted to push her over a bridge, and 
was stopped by a local policeman. Mrs Thornton was then examined and her 
discharge was recommended. This case was used by MPs as an example of 
the many people who were unnecessarily in hospital and the lack of concern 
over the harm done to such people. The House was informed by Dr Johnson 
and Mr Dodds of allegations of professional misjudgments and misconduct 
which patients had submitted in writing to them (Hansard 605:932). Dr 
Broughton said: 
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'Another case which I wish to quote is that of a woman of thirty 
who had a great deal of domestic worry and trouble causing her 
to be depressed. She had neglected herself, eating little, 
drinking too much and loosing a great deal of weight. She 
became stuporous and resisted all attention. She was certified 
and brought into a mental hospital. On examination she was 
found to be suffering from pneumonia. She died within two days 
and the post-mortem examination showed a massive low-grade 
pneumonia. Her mental condition had been due to her general 
debility and toxaemia from pneumonia' . (Hansard 573:79). 
The majority of MPs rejected the possibility that this state of affairs reflected 
badly on professional practice. Even the likelihood of a mistaken diagnosis 
was dismissed. Mr Sorensen, for example, said: 
'I admit that there is a possibility of error, but as a result of 
twenty-one years' close association with one and some contact 
with three mental hospitals and of membership of a mental 
hospital committee, every fortnight visiting the wards and the 
patients, talking to doctors and relatives, and after a great deal 
of discussion with mental patients today and having met those 
who have been in hospital and are now discharged, all I can say 
is that any idea that there is gross ill-treatment or unnecessary 
detention of vast numbers of patients is quite untrue. The 
sooner we make that clear, the better for the sake of the 
patients themselves and their relatives'. (Hansard 573:89). 
Members were inclined to blame the lack of resources, poor accommodation, 
staff shortages, overcrowding, inadequate staff training and the shortcomings 
of the Board of Control. As Dr Johnson said: 
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'Rightly or wrongly, it is the custom for criticism of our health 
and welfare services at present to be expressed in somewhat 
muted tones. Therefore, it is natural and proper that when we 
come to the recommendations of the Commission for the 
abolition of the Board of Control...l, on the other hand, will be 
sending no orchids to the obsequies of the Board of Control. It 
has outlived its usefulness in the manner which has already 
been stated by my right Hon. friend the Member for Thrisk and 
Malton (Mr.Turton)' .(Hansard 573:89). 
Some MPs attacked the government for allocating too few resources to the 
psychiatric services. 'Cinderella of the NHS' was the term employed to 
describe the situation in which resources were inequitably allocated (Hansard 
573:81). Dr Broughton described the situation thus: 
'Hon. and right Hon. Members speaking today have put their 
fingers in the various bad spots, drawing the attention of the 
Minister - if indeed it needed to be drawn, as I think he is already 
aware of it - to the need for improvements in this field of 
medicine, but I think it is a fact that psychiatry is the Cinderella 
of the health service. It is quite ridiculous that it should be so, 
because half our hospital beds are occupied by patients with 
mental illness and it is probably true to say that as many as 75 
per cent. of patients who go to visit their general practitioner are 
suffering from some form or other of psychosomatic illness'. 
(Hansard 573:81). 
The proposal to establish a Mental Health Review Tribunal was welcomed by 
the House. This tribunal would replace the Board of Control as the body to 
which appeals could be made. As Dr Broughton pointed out, access to the 
tribunal would be possible only after hospitalization: 
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'There is no provision for the patient to be heard or to be seen 
by anyone other than the doctors and the applicant. His sole 
right is that of appeal to the Mental Health Review Tribunal after 
the detention has commenced. This is the greatest weakness of 
the Bill and it is clear that the safeguards are quite inadequate. I 
have attempted to explain to the House why I feel unhappy 
about this part of the Bill, which deals with compulsory 
detention, and I am grateful to you, Sir, and to the House for 
bearing with me while I express at such length my doubts and 
fears'. (Hansard 605:418). 
As noted in the last chapter, Membership of the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal panel included a psychiatrist, a lawyer and a representative of the 
public. This planned composition was not questioned, despite the fact that 
representation of members of the public on such bodies tended to be drawn 
from the employed, able-bodied middle class. Moreover, Tribunals could 
withhold information from patients and could prevent them from attending the 
hearing. Some members felt that patients would not be treated as equal 
participants in the review. Mr Dodds drew the attention to the neglect of 
patients' own perspectives: 
'What astonishes me is the faith which we have in the Mental 
Health Review Tribunals. I have said previously that they are a 
wonderful piece of machinery which, I feel, will do a great job. 
One feature however, has been missing from our debates. It 
seems to me that there has been a lack of knowledge of the 
experience of patients' . (Hansard 650:454). 
Some MPs pressed for more patients' rights and wanted Tribunals to be truly 
independent. Mr. Turion said: 
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'The Mental Health Review Tribunals are an excellent idea, but I 
hope that the Government will not follow the suggestion made 
in paragraph 447 that the clerk to the tribunal should be a 
regional officer of a central department or an officer of a 
regional hospital board. We know quite well that the average 
citizen looks upon a tribunal of any kind very much in the light of 
where its office is. Here we are dealing with an appeal against a 
decision of a medical superintendent in a hospital appointed by 
a regional hospital board. Consequently, the officers of the 
tribunal should not come from the office of the regional hospital 
board'. (Hansard 373:67). 
The overall impression of these debates if that MPs welcomed the Mental 
Health Review Tribunal but left the principles for its implementation very much 
up in the air. 
An important development which took place with the passing of the 1959 
Mental Health Act was the inclusion of 'psychopathic personality' as a 
category added to the diagnostic list of psychiatric disorders. Although there 
was no clear working definition, doctors were expected to be able to male 
this diagnosis. While accepting that the definition of psychopathic personality 
was subjective, Dr Summerskill endorsed Professor Henderson's (1939) 
definition: 
'The fact is that the judgement of who is a psychopath is 
subjective and not objective. It is determined in part by certain 
conventions recognized in the society of the doctor and the 
patient. Perhaps I may give as an example what comes to mind 
as I look at the windows, although I know that in this House one 
is not expected to draw attention to anything which is not in the 
Chamber. The windows above once had a grill in front of them. 
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Let us imagine what might have happened in those days had 
this recommendation been implemented and it was necessary 
to decide what should be the future destiny of an individual who 
might have been arrested. Imagine that a woman who had been 
brought up in a comfortable home had decided, because she 
felt strongly about the suffrage movement, to go out of her 
home, to fight with policemen and to undergo forcible feeding 
again and again. In the light of all this, it might have been 
possible for a psychiatrist, who himself perhaps, had certain 
emotions and certain views on feminism, to say, for a woman 
with that background to do this, there may be a streak of 
subnormality. That is an example of what might happen in the 
past. I might say that many of those women who underwent that 
fearful fight in the suffrage world are now very normal elderly 
ladies whom I occasionally see and who show no signs of 
mental disorder. Nevertheless, to illustrate my point, it might be 
possible that a psychiatrist would say that there might be a 
streak of abnormality in one of these women. If the psychiatrist 
is uncertain whether an individual has a psychopathic 
personality, how will a prison medical officer and a general 
practitioner always be certain of making accurate diagnosis? It 
was in a lecture by Dr. D.K. Henderson, a professor of 
psychiatry at Edinburgh, twenty years ago, that I came across 
what I should have liked to see something like this included in 
the Report. Dr. Henderson describes psychopaths as; those 
individuals who conform to a certain intellectual standard, 
sometimes high, sometimes approaching the realm of defect 
but not yet amounting to it. who, throughout their lives or from a 
comparatively early age, have exhibited disorders of conduct of 
an anti-social or asocial nature, usually of a recurrent or 
episodic type, which, in many instances, have proved difficult to 
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influence by methods of social, penal and medical care. It is for 
this reason that I speak so strongly. My feelings that civil 
liberties should be maintained is such that I would prefer many 
psychopaths to escape rather than that one individual should be 
deprived of his liberty' .(Hansard 573:48-50). 
Dr Summerskill's warning concerning the dangers of identifying non-
conformity with psychopathy was taken up by Baroness Wootton in the 
House of Lords (Hansard 217 Lords 393-395). She objected to the over-
generalization embedded in the term 'psychopathic personality'. Despite 
these protestations both Houses saw the inclusion of the category as a 
positive step in a more humane direction. Thus psychiatrists entering 
psychopathic personality as an official diagnostic classification of mental 
illness showed a example of psychiatry in the service of social control, where 
a potentially disruptive group of people was to be taken care of clinically and 
administratively. 
In January 1959 The Times carried an article which reported the changes 
recommended by the Royal Commission on Mental Illness and Mental 
Deficiency May 1937, and were proposed in the forthcoming Mental Health 
Bill. It went through the ways in which the new Bill would take account of 
advances in medical knowledge, and the changes in the organization of 
social services since the Lunacy Act of 1890, the Mental Deficiency Acts 
between 1913 and 1938 and the Mental Treatment Bill of 1930. It was stated 
as a real advance that the new Bill would replace this legislation with a single 
legal code which would cover both mental illness and mental deficiency (The 
Times 6.1.1959:4c). 
In March, The Times reported that magistrates welcomed the new Bill now 
before Parliament, and that the Council of the Magistrates' Association 
believed that both patients and the public would be better served under the 
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new suggested procedure of two medical recommendations for compulsory 
admission, rather than the prevailing system of medical and magisterial 
certification (The Times 10.3.1959:6c). In April, there appeared a brief note 
reporting that the Minister of Health intended to issue a formal direction 
making it a duty for local authorities to provide mental health services. Lord 
Pakenham protested that the new Bill did not go far enough. He called for the 
insertion of a mandatory and statutory duty on local authorities, and said that 
an adequate allocation of funds must be made to them (The Times 
27.4.1959:15a). This was followed by a report on the frequency of the right of 
access to the Mental health Review Tribunal. It was argued that compulsorily 
admitted patients should have access to the tribunal at least once in every 
two years (The Times 6.5.1959:6f). 
In June The Times carried a report of the debates on the second reading of 
the Bill in the House of Lords. There was general agreement that the new Bill 
would be in keeping with medical and social advances, and that the Bill would 
result in completing the processes of administrative integration of the mental 
health services into the National Health Service (The Times 5.6.1959:6c). 
Later the same month it was reported that the new Mental Health Act would 
clarify the definition and classification of mental disorders. Also reported was 
the debate in the House of Commons about the development of community 
care and the role and responsibilities of local authorities (The Times 
24.6.1959:14a). 
To summarize, these media reports were concerned with five main themes: 
the proposals of the 1959 Mental Health Act which would repeal and replace 
all the Bills since 1890, instituting instead one Bill to cover both mental illness 
and mental deficiency; the need for the 1959 Mental Health Act to state the 
duty of local authorities to provide services; the right of compulsorily admitted 
patients have regular access to the Mental Health Review Tribunal; the 
administrative integration of the mental health services into the National 
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Health Service; and the 1959 Mental Health Act's clarification of the definition 
of mental disorders. 
Debates at the time of the 1983 Mental Health Act 
Between 1959 and 1975 there was one ministerial paper relevant to the 
provision of mental health services (Ministry of Health 1962). This paper, 
entitled Health and Welfare: The development of community care, 
addressed the desirability of community care for psychiatric patients. The 
paper was published at the same time as the work of Goffman (1968) was 
highlighting the impersonal and self-serving machine aspects of institutions. 
According to Goffman, this situation resulted in many long stay patients in 
mental hospitals having two illnesses: the one which caused their admission, 
and one given them by the institution itself. The paper lacked directives for 
the actual practice of community care, however, and there was little 
investment in training and in the provision of sufficient social workers and 
community nurses. In 1975 the white paper, Better Services for the Mentally 
Ill was produced as a part of the plan for restructuring the NHS. At the same 
time there were criticisms of the 1959 Mental Health Act. This Act was by then 
widely seen as attaching moral blame to the individual and punishing him/her 
with the loss of liberty and other rights as a citizen. 
Media discussion and Parliamentary debates were concerned with the 
prospects of the Mental Health Amendment Bill ensuring that fewer mentally 
handicapped people would be locked up in hospital, and enabling the 
mentally handicapped to challenge their detention; the reactions of 
psychiatrists to the proposal that patients should be given more rights, and 
that other professionals should be included in discussions concerning 
treatment; the suggested new treatment rules whereby treatments considered 
to be irreversibly and hazardous would require the psychiatrist to consult with 
two other professionals before administrating such treatments; and the 
difficulties patients have in getting their voices heard, both within and outside 
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mental institutions. 
In January 1982 The Times drew attention to the issue of aiding the mentally 
handicapped by ensuring that fewer of them would be locked up in hospitals. 
The article described Mr Brian Rix, the former actor who runs the charity 
Mencap, as saying, 'We would have liked separate legislation, but we have 
got 85 per cent of what we want'. He further commented that the Amendment 
would enable the mentally handicapped to be able to have their detention 
challenged (The Times 14.1.1982:24d). 
A psychiatrist, Dr John Hamilton, delivered a critical view of the Mental Health 
Amendment Bill in February 1982. Hamilton was reported by The Times as 
arguing that: 
'The Bill now passing through Parliament was intended to give 
patients better rights but paradoxically if enacted as it stands, it 
is likely to lead to poorer treatment and patients will suffer more 
and become prisoners of their illnesses' (The Times 21.2. 
1982:19c). 
In March the topic was the debates on the Amendment Bill concerned with 
decisions for irreversible and hazardous treatment. In response to the 
comments of Lord Winstanley and Lord Hooson, MPs agreed that, instead of 
the practice under the 1959 Mental Health Act where only a psychiatrist 
decided, two lay people as well as a psychiatrist should make decisions in 
cases of irreversible and hazardous treatments (The Times 4.3.1982:2a). 
The medical director of Broadmoor special hospital for mentally abnormal 
offenders, Dr Edgar Udwin, argued that the Mental Health Act Amendment 
Bill's proposal that a second medical opinion should be given when a patient 
refused drug treatment could hinder the patient's treatment. In the same 
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report, MIND commented that the law on the censorship of patients' 
correspondence should be changed to allow for the scrutiny of incoming mail 
only (The Times 23.4.1982:6f). 
Some psychiatrists were opposed to proposals which required them to obtain 
a second opinion before administering drugs to a non-consenting patient 
detained in hospital under the Mental Health Act. According to the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists, 
'... many psychiatrists strongly believe it was too restrictive to 
require a second medical opinion, and that it would cause many 
difficulties in treating patients, especially in the prescribing of 
commonly used drugs which were often given without delay'. 
Mr Christopher Price questioned these views in the light of recent inquiries 
which had criticized the over-use of tranquillizers and the irreversibility of 
some drug treatments. 
(The Times 28.4.1982:2c). 
Some of the media reports referred to actual case-histories. In April 1982, The 
Times discussed an incident in the House of Commons when evidence was 
given to the Standing Committee on the Mental Health Amendment Bill. A 
schizophrenic patient, Mr Figura, was detained under section 26 of the 1959 
Mental Health Act and was brought before the Standing Committee by MIND. 
Mr Figura said that he had been given ECT and medicate without his consent 
after he had complained about the hospital food. He also claimed that no staff 
member or social worker had discussed his treatment with him, and that he 
trusted none of the hospital staff. The then Minister of Health, Mr Kenneth 
Clarke expressed doubts as to whether the patient's evidence should be 
accepted at face value. His comment brought objections from other members 
of the committee who took the view that all witnesses should be treated alike 
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and their evidence not impugned. One member of the committee, a Mr Price, 
expressed the opinion that, '...if Mr. Figura was to be accused of lying then 
the evidence of consultant psychiatrists should be treated in the same way' 
(The Times 30.4.1982:3d). 
The question of who should be appointed to the new Mental Health Act 
Commission came in for some discussion. The Secretary of State for the 
Social Services, Mr Fowler, refused to appoint Larry Gostin, the former legal 
officer of MIND, as a commissioner because Mr, Gostin was seen by Mr 
Fowler as both too innovatory and too much on the side of mental patients 
(The Times 5.7.1983:3e). 
The review of the Mental Health Act 1959 (1975) was based on consultations 
with the different professional and voluntary bodies, in particular MIND. The 
main issues of the review which were emphasized in Parliament were: the 
clarification of admission procedures; procedures for consent to treatment; 
the roles of social workers, nurses and other professionals such as 
psychologists; medical and nursing staff's protection against litigation; the 
development of a truly multidisciplinary service; the establishment of the 
Mental Health Act Commission; guardianship and community care. 
The Secretary of State for Social Services Mr. Norman Fowler said: 
'The Bill is about the rights and interests of the public, the 
patients and the staff who care for those patients. The safety of 
the public is of obvious concern and we shall do everything 
possible to preserve that. Equally, it is important that we provide 
safeguards for those detained patients and the Bill does that by, 
for example, halving the time before a patient's detention in 
hospital has to be reviewed, giving increased access for 
patients to Mental Health Review Tribunals, and by setting up 
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the new Mental Health Act Commission...The Bill also gives 
nurses qualified in caring for the mentally disturbed power to 
hold an informal patient for up to six hours or until the doctor 
arrives if, in their judgement, it is clearly not in the patient's 
interest to leave hospital...The Bill provides for the replacement 
of mental welfare officers by Approved Social Workers, who will 
have to be specially designated and trained in the care of 
mental disorder' .(Hansard 1237:689-691). 
The approaches here reflected the principles that detention should be 
imposed only where it was essential; there should be a proper right of 
appeal; and that detained patients were particularly vulnerable: their confused 
and/or disturbed state meant that it was important for their care and treatment 
to be subjected to safeguards. The House discussed the provisions in the Act 
for persons suspected by the police to be mentally disturbed. The relevant 
provision of the 1959 Act states that: 'If a constable finds in a place to which 
the public have access a person who appears to him to be suffering from 
mental disorder and to be in immediate need of care and control, the 
constable may, if he thinks it necessary to do so in the interests of that 
person or for the protection of other persons remove that person to a place of 
safety' (Mental Health Act 1959:91-92). 
In the House, Mr Davis argued that the detention of persons for 72 hours by a 
police officer under Section 137 should be reduced to six hours, and that 
during this time the person should be interviewed by a psychiatrist and a 
social worker. He reminded the House that the British Medical Association 
had suggested a period of four hours. Mr Ennals replied that the Section 
should remain with the period of detention kept at 72 hours (Hansard 
1254:91-93). Mr Mayhew reminded the House that the National Council for 
Civil Liberties had suggested a reduction from 72 to 24 hours. 
166 
The issue of the police removing persons from a public place to a place of 
safety (usually a mental hospital) raised the question, how can a police officer 
with little or no training in psychiatry detain someone for 72 hours? Surely if 
such a person was brought into a mental hospital by a police officer he/she 
should be interviewed immediately by a psychiatrist and a social worker. 
Being required to wait for up to 72 hours for such an interview appears to be 
a social control function effectively reducing a person's liberty. 
Members of the House, in particular Mr Christopher Price, were concerned 
with the provision of adequate resources to local authorities to make these 
changes possible (Hansard 1237:691). Questions were also asked about 
whether patients would be able to receive legal aid so they could be properly 
represented at tribunals (Hansard 1237:696). Mr Fowler's view was that this 
issue of legal aid would be kept under review. 
Members saw the new role for social workers as not only ensuring a more 
positive contribution to discussions about admissions, but also as providing 
information concerning the social circumstances of patients. Social workers 
were seen as key workers before and immediately after admission. As Mr 
David Ennals put it: 
'A social worker may know a great deal about the background 
of someone admitted to hospital...The social worker may also 
have a professional view about how to deal with the patient's 
problems...There is a strong case for the involvement of the 
social worker...We need the maximum amount of knowledge to 
decide the necessary treatment for each patient. A social worker 
may know the family background, which may help the doctors 
to decide what is best for the patient...The wisdom of the social 
workers can be added to the professional experience of the 
doctor who must decide the treatment' .(Hansard 1254:44). 
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Many of the debates concerned nurses. Issues were raised by Mr Terry 
Davies about the possibility of sexual relations between nurses and patients; 
he reminded the House that the Royal College of Nurses had asked for the 
Act to end the discrimination between male and female nurses. He said: 
'I agree with the Royal College of Nursing that it is indefensible 
in 1982 to discriminate between men and women in this way. I 
suspect that the reason for this apparent discrimination against 
men lies in an old-fashioned attitude to women. It is an offence 
for a male officer to have unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
female patient, but it is not an offence for a female officer to 
have unlawful sexual intercourse with a male patient because it 
is assumed that the man is dominant in such matters. In my 
view, the House should reject such attitudes and assumptions'. 
(Hansard 1254:88-89). 
This amendment was carried; where the 1959 Act stated 'for a man' in respect 
of this section, the new Act stated 'for a person'. 
Mr Stan Thorn cited the situation at Wexham Park Hospital where a 
consultant psychiatrist prescribed a treatment that was unacceptable to the 
patient and to the nursing staff who had to administer it. He expressed the 
view that: 
'Although on occasion the non-medical professions may, on the 
basis of their special expertise, judge that the doctor is mistaken 
and is proposing inappropriate treatment, they have no right in 
law to question his judgement or to intervene to protect the 
patient. It means that patients have no right in law to a multi-
disciplinary approach to their treatment. If a doctor wished to 
ignore the views and skills of the non-medical professions, he 
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may not be following good practice, but he is perfectly entitled 
to do so. The ethical obligation of each professional who deals 
with a patient and the duty of care owed by each professional to 
the patient is subordinate to the doctor's judgement. There is no 
explicit obligation on a doctor to temper his decision... Evidence 
given at disaster inquiries shows that some doctors believe that 
they are entitled to be autocratic and to disregard other 
opinions' . (Hansard 1254:106-107). 
Mr Pitt agreed with the position taken by Mr Thorn and asked for multi-
disciplinary representation to be made stronger in the Bill. Mr Terry Davis also 
agreed with the position taken by Mr Thorn and Mr Pitt and asked for 
consultations to take place with nursing staff and other professionals during 
the decision making process (Hansard 1254:107-108). 
The issue of multi-disciplinary consultations and discussion between doctors 
and other mental health workers such as nurses, occupational therapists and 
social workers was the theme of further debates when the House considered 
the new sections concerned with consent to treatment. While the House 
generally supported the doctor's leadership and power in relation to consent, 
members pointed out that there was nevertheless a need for doctors to 
consult with the wider team. As Mr Kenneth Clarke put it: 
'Everyone in Committee agreed - and the opinion is shared by 
all those who are following the best modern practice in the care 
of the mentally ill outside-that it is good practice for the 
professional team caring for the patient to work together in 
close consultation and co-operation' .(Hansard 1254:110). 
As a result of much of this debate the 1983 Mental Health Act in Sections 56- 
64 details the relationships expected between doctors and the wider mental 
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health care team when treatments with or without consent are being 
considered. The Act recognizes that although the doctor makes the final 
decision and he/she takes the final responsibility, nevertheless he/she should 
discuss the treatment options with other members of the clinical team. If, 
however, a second opinion is required then the independent doctor must 
consult a mental nurse and one other person, not a doctor or a mental nurse, 
usually a social worker, occupational therapist or a psychologist. Here we see 
a clear change in the Act in stating the situations when a mental nurse must 
be consulted. 
The House debated the new six hour holding power of mental nurses. Mr 
Christopher Price expressed fears that with this holding power any patient 
who entered a mental hospital would be in danger of having their civil liberties 
invaded. He argued that the holding power could be used on any patient 
admitted compulsorily or informally, because if such a patient should try to 
leave when technically free to do so a mental nurse could institute the holding 
power (Hansard 1237:727-728). 
The House questioned the protection against litigation given to doctors and 
mental nurses under the 1959 Act, Section 141. Mr Charles Irving said that: 
'It is widely known that where a doctor unlawfully treats a patient 
against his will or a nurse assaults a patient, the patient can 
sometimes be prevented from going to court and receiving as 
fair hearing? This section 141 is perhaps one of the most unjust 
and discriminatory provisions in mental health law. It violates 
one of the most basic human rights - full and fair access to Her 
Majesty's courts of law'. (Hansard 1237:714). 
Mr David Ennals entered the debate by stating clearly that 'Section 141 of the 
1959 Act, requires that a patient shall not bring any proceedings relating to 
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any act done in pursuance of the Mental Health Act without leave of the High 
Court, which must be satisfied that there are substantial grounds for the 
contention that the person to be proceeded against has acted in bad faith or 
without reasonable care' (Hansard 1237:709). 
Although debates and discussions took place around the issue of protection 
against litigation for staff, the 1983 Mental Health Act more or less retained 
this section. This means that there is still a system in which it is difficult for 
patients to get redress in the courts. 
The new body, the Mental Health Act Commission, received both welcoming 
and dismissive arguments in the House. Of it Mr Fowler said that: 
'We also have safeguard of the independent Mental Health Act 
Commission, which I regard as the single most important 
innovation in the Bill. The commission will, in a sense, carry on 
where Parliament leave off. When Parliament has finished 
debating the Bill, the Mental Health Act Commission will take 
over the role of watchdog for detained patients' (Hansard 
1237:693). 
Members who saw the positive side of the Mental Health Act Commission 
viewed it as a body which could focus its attention on the special needs and 
position of informal patients, and particularly compulsorily admitted patients. 
Some Members questioned the powers of the Mental Health Act Commission. 
Mr Michael Meecher said: 
'I wish to ask the Secretary of State about the Mental Health Act 
Commission. Does he agree that there are two substantial 
weakness in the excellent proposal for the commission? First 
the commission will be able to deal with the 93 per cent of 
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patients who enter hospital informally. Secondly, while the 
commission is empowered to investigate the complaints of 
detained patients, it has no power to take any action of it finds 
that a person has been detained unlawfully'. (Hansard 1237:693- 
694). 
Sir Derek Walker-Smith added to this: 
'However, I should like to be assured that before deciding on 
the creation of the new, large and presumably expensive body 
my right Hon. friend has satisfied himself that the performance 
of these tasks cannot be undertaken within existing machinery. 
The commission will be what is sometimes called a quango. I 
am able in the Churchillian phrase in another context without 
difficulty to restrain my enthusiasm within the bounds of 
decorum. The onus of showing the necessity for any quango 
must clearly lie on the person seeking to set it up. I hope that 
my right Hon. friend will be able to show beyond peradventure 
that the onus is discharged in this instance' .(Hansard 
1237:705). 
The House agreed to institute the Mental Health Act Commission as a new 
group of overseers of mental health patient care and treatment. 
There was general agreement that the Bill should address and improve the 
way treatments were carried out, particularly the conditions of consent to 
treatment and how consent to treatment was achieved. As Mr David Ennals 
said: 
'It has been argued that questions of consent to treatment are 
too important to be delegated to doctors alone. I agree. The 
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Government have to some extent recognized that by their 
statement of intent to introduce amendments providing for a 
multi-disciplinary panel to confirm consent in cases of treatment 
giving rise to special concern. The Government having being 
pushed in that direction, I hope that in Committee we can push 
them a little further down the road' . (Hansard 1237:711). 
Mr Charles Irving expressed his opinion that: 
'There are many aspects of the consent provisions in the Bill 
that I applaud. The requirement for a patient's consent, plus a 
multi-disciplinary confirmation of that patient's consent to 
treatment that gives rise to special concern must be welcomed'. 
(Hansard 1254:83). 
Critics of the 1959 Act such as Gostin (1975) had pointed out the need to 
change how consent was sought from patients for different treatments. The 
House appeared to be taking this issue seriously in their consideration of the 
liberty of the subject. 
Mental health services and the political process 
From the discussions in the House at the time of the passing of the 1930 
Mental Treatment Bill, the conclusion can be drawn that Members were not 
really very interested in the plight of the mentally ill. Only a minority of 
members participated in these debates. Generally the politicians viewed 
mental illness as similar to physical illness. The feeling was that if the public 
agreed with this view, the stigma of mental illness would be eliminated, or at 
least minimized. 
The reports in The Times show clearly that the Mental Health Acts were 
designed to produce changes in the way treatment, care and patients' rights 
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are dealt with in the mental health services. There was, however, no 
systematic discussion of any group of health care workers apart from 
doctors. Major concerns in the debates were the encouragement of early 
hospitalization and reducing the public's fear of mental hospitals; the 
voluntary admission of patients; the need for a more humanitarian approach 
to the mentally ill; and an attempt to endorse citizen's rights to ensure that 
these were respected. There was general agreement that the admission, 
treatment and control of the mentally ill should reside with doctors rather than 
with Justices of the Peace or magistrates. Concerns were expressed about 
overcrowding; the quality of food and clothing; the size of mental hospitals; 
the age groups of patients; and the treatment of physical disease in these 
hospitals. 
The 1959 Mental Health Act was debated in the House by a larger group of 
participating Members than the debates on the 1930 Bill. Between 1930 and 
1959 the welfare state and the National Health Service were established. The 
care of the mentally ill became an integral part of the National Health Service. 
MIND was established in 1946 and started to play a strong role in 
campaigning for policy and legislation changes. The House of Commons 
contained not only interested Members but two psychiatrists and three 
doctors. A number of Members were also on hospital boards. The then 
president and vice-president and a future president of MIND were also 
Members of the House at that time, and this fact helped to keep mental health 
on the political agenda. All these factors probably helped to account for the 
increased participation of MPs in debates about the 1959 Bill. 
The members of the House of Commons generally praised the existing 
system when debating the 1930 Mental Treatment Bill. They referred to 
voluntary admissions, which they saw as enabling patients to go in and out of 
mental hospitals of their own volition rather than through coercion. They did 
not consider that people might still be being persuaded to go into mental 
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hospital by relatives and professionals, or that they might stay in such 
institutions because there were no alternatives, or, that if they were in the 
community, they might be subjected to ridicule and hostility. Members 
approved of the treatments for general paralysis, the use of ECT and the new 
psychotropic drugs. They praised the establishment of day hospitals and 
observation wards in general hospitals, and the work of doctors, nurses, 
occupational therapists, social workers and psychologists. 
The 1959 Act provided for the establishment of the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal at the same time as the dissolution of the Board of Control. Members 
saw the Tribunal as a step in the right direction towards achieving more rights 
for patients. The Tribunal replaced the Board of Control as the machinery 
which would ensure the continuation of an appeals process for patients. 
Each Regional Health Authority had its own Mental Health Review Tribunal. 
The members of the Tribunals were appointed by the Lord Chancellor and 
consisted of a psychiatrist, a lawyer and a representative of the public. 
Tribunals had the power to discharge any applicant if they were satisfied that 
the applicant was not suffering from mental illness, psychopathic disorder, 
subnormality or severe subnormality, and was not a danger to himself/herself 
or to the public. 
Many of the issues concerning caretakers that were raised in these debates 
centred on staff shortages and the need for recruitment programmes. 
Members expressed sympathy for the plight of caretakers and were critical of 
the Ministry of Health for not attending more to caretakers' needs. Caretakers 
were recognized as carrying the main burden of the mental hospital services 
and members questioned why this fact had not been translated into improved 
levels of training and pay. 
Members supported the clinical-somatic approach to the treatment of mental 
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illness. This served to increase the control exercised by psychiatrists. 
Because of this, and through the new category of 'psychopathy', it could be 
argued that the definition of mental illness was increasingly used to solve 
difficulties in social control and the social definition of deviant behaviour, while 
tightening organizational and professional control. 
The 1959 Act was seen by the Members of the House as a forward-looking 
Act. However, there were changes in mental health services and practices 
which made it necessary for a review which could lead to changes to suit the 
new approaches. An interdepartmental committee made up of the 
Department of Health and Social Security, the Home Office and the Lord 
Chancellor's Department was set up to consider possible changes. This 
committee received representations from the Royal College of Psychiatrists, 
Health Service Unions, the Royal College of Nursing, MIND, and from 
individuals. The terms of reference of were to review the 1959 Act and to 
make suggestions for change. Central to the review was the issue of under 
what circumstances society should have the right to deprive a mentally 
disordered person of his/her liberty and impose treatment considered to be in 
the interests of both the individual and the general public (DHSS 1975). 
The 1983 Act was further influenced by the Report of the Committee on 
Mentally Abnormal Offenders (The Butler Report 1957). Pressure group 
activities included the MIND initiative in getting the House of Commons 
Standing Committee to question a patient about conditions in the mental 
hospital where he was a patient (The Times 30.4.1982). Another important 
initiative was the MIND Report: A Human Condition: The Mental Health Act 
and Proposals for Reform (Gostin 1975). This report was made available to 
the Department of Health and Social Security special working party set up to 
reform the 1959 Mental Health Act. Other parties interested in the reform of 
the 1959 Mental Health Act included the all party Parliamentary mental health 
group, mental health workers, self-help groups, community action groups 
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and the National Council for Civil Liberties. The role of these pressure groups 
was to ask for a fair deal for mental patients through legislation in order to 
secure a protective framework of rights. 
They felt that a refurbished Mental Health Act could open up new therapeutic 
possibilities, offer some insurance against neglect, reduce the exaggerated 
reliance on professional judgements and provide some hope for the people 
who have traditionally been put away out of sight and out of mind. 
The 1983 Act changed the compulsory admission procedure of the 1959 Act. 
The power and responsibility was retained by doctors with new 
responsibilities given to social workers and hospital managers. Relatives 
retained certain rights to discharge the patient, and new opportunities were 
opened for appeals to a Mental Health Review Tribunal. 
Compulsory detention and the role of the psychiatrist 
Although it was agreed by Members of the House and the professionals that 
patients should always be admitted informally, there was also support for the 
retention of compulsory admission (Hansard 1237:689-691). Compulsory 
admission was recognized as involving deprivation of liberty, restriction of 
individual rights and freedom of action. The 1983 Act, therefore, was 
designed to ensure that the mental state which justifies compulsion was clear, 
and that alternative forms of treatment had been considered. Bluglass (1983) 
has argued that the search for a more clearly specified compulsory admission 
procedure actually resulted in more restrictive practices, with an emphasis on 
treatability. 
The legislation for compulsory admission required that less severe forms of 
mental disorder did not warrant detention, whilst other conditions considered 
to be severe could justifiably result in compulsory admissions. The 1983 Act 
contains phrases such as that the patient's psychiatric condition must be 'of a 
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nature or degree' that harm to self and or others were sufficient to warrant 
compulsory admission. Compulsory admissions required two medical 
recommendations, one by a psychiatrist, and the other by a registered 
medical practitioner, preferably a GP. This admission procedure had to be 
followed for the 28 day order for assessment and for the 6 months order for 
treatment. The need for two recommendations was rooted in the history of 
psychiatry. There have always been fears that a doctor might railroad an 
unsuspecting patient into a private asylum. Therefore, all legislation since the 
nineteenth century retained the practice of two doctors being involved, one to 
act as corrective to the other. However, as Bean (1986) has pointed out, since 
one doctor is the consultant psychiatrist and the other a GP without specialist 
psychiatric knowledge, the status relationship between the two is likely to 
result in decisions about the admission procedure being dominated by the 
opinion of the psychiatrist. 
The question here was at what point a certain degree of severity was 
considered to be less severe or more severe. Questions of interpretation and 
moral issues are involved. The psychiatrist must show that compulsory 
detention is justified. Part of this justification could be that severe mental 
disorder imposes greater physical, psychological and social suffering on the 
patient and intense stress on relatives, friends and the community. It proved 
difficult to clarify the legal and moral issues. But the practice of assessing 
severity, and the moral basis of any judgements made were of considerable 
importance to questions of individual rights. The shortcoming of the Act was 
that it did not state the severity, or the types of behaviour which would 
warrant compulsory admission. 
To justify the need to admit someone compulsorily some psychiatrists, 
according to Bean (1986), argued that if individuals were left untreated they 
were likely to harm themselves or others. Yet when such individuals were 
admitted compulsorily, they could exercise a right of appeal. 
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The role of social workers 
The changes in, and clarification of the doctor's role vis-a-vis compulsory 
admissions occurred in parallel with the changing roles and new 
responsibilities of social workers. Social workers working in mental health 
and having a responsibility for making applications to a mental hospital for 
the admission of a patient must now belong to the category of 'Approved 
Social Worker', which means that social workers have to undergo special 
training. MPs agreed with the changes to the social worker's role and function 
(Hansard 1254:44). The 1983 Act required the Approved Social Worker to 
interview the patient, to advise the psychiatrist of alternatives to 
hospitalization and to prepare a report for the hospital managers. As in the 
1959 Act, the social workers also retained their central role of making 
applications for admission in the absence or reluctance of the nearest 
relative. With these greater expectations, and increased powers and 
responsibility, has come a demand for greater competency. The question is 
also raised about social workers' roles in relation to the protection of patients' 
rights. If a social worker rejected medical opinion for an admission and 
refused to make an application for admission, the doctor could ask the 
nearest relative to make the application instead. If the social worker opposed 
the admission and the patient harmed himself/herself, the social worker could 
be said to be failing in his/her duties. Overall, the new duties of the social 
worker asks for the patient's social situation to be considered and his/her 
rights to be respected. 
The role of caretakers 
The 1983 Act instituted a new role and function for caretakers. It introduced 
the right of caretakers to be able to invoke a holding power for up to six 
hours. The decision to introduce this new power was debated in the House 
and the amendment was passed (Hansard 1237:727-728). In the 
Parliamentary debates few Members appeared to be apprehensive about 
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this. According to Bean (1986), members were more concerned with the need 
to hold, rather than the power in the holding. Section 5 (4) of the 1983 Mental 
Health Act stated that the purpose of the nurses' holding power was to allow 
the detention of a patient already receiving treatment for mental disorder in 
hospital until a doctor was found. The mental nurse could invoke this section 
if it appeared that the patient was suffering from a mental disorder and that it 
was necessary for his/her health and safety, and for the protection of others 
that he/she be restrained from leaving hospital. The mental nurse must record 
this decision in a report and deliver it to the managers of the hospital as soon 
as possible. 
This new holding power cleared up the legal position of the caretaker when 
restraining informal patients or patients whose compulsory detention period 
had ended. It can be argued that the holding power was not necessary, as 
there were always doctors available to detain such patients, and in any case 
common law allowed for a mentally disordered individual to be restrained for 
his/her own health and safety. There were hospitals where doctors were 
readily available, for example London teaching hospitals, but there were also 
institutions where doctors were less numerous, for example hospitals in the 
countryside of Surrey or Kent. There might also be problems about the 
availability of doctors at night. It must be remembered that even during the 
daytime it was the caretakers who were present during the twenty-four hours; 
doctors had to be called. There were other issues about the role of 
caretakers. These included criticisms of caretakers functioning in locked 
wards, having to deal with violent patients and the concerns of social workers 
and MIND that caretakers might sometimes be keeping patients in and 
infringing their rights. As a consequence of these pressures, caretakers 
pressured their unions, in particular COHSE (Confederation of Health Service 
Employees) to represent them in seeking clarification of their role and legal 
position (Martin 1984). By demanding such clarification, it could be argued 
that caretakers were seeking more influence in hospital in relation to which 
patients should and should not be admitted. 
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Protection against litigation for mental health workers 
Members of the House debated extensively the provisions in the 1959 and the 
1983 Mental Health Acts giving protection against litigation to doctors and 
mental nurses (Hansard 1237:714, and Hansard 1237:709). The section in the 
1983 Act which dictated this provision is section 139. This states that no civil 
or criminal proceedings can be brought against any person in any court in 
respect of an act done under the 1983 Act without leave of the High Court or 
the Director of Public Prosecutions, and that for such proceedings to 
proceed, the court must be satisfied that the person proceeded against acted 
in bad faith or without reasonable care. This section, argued MIND (Gostin 
1975), makes it difficult for patients to have a fair public hearing by an 
independent and impartial court. Others, such as Bean (1986), have 
suggested that the State's interest was in wanting the Mental Health Act to be 
operational, so that the co-operation of doctors and others was required, and 
they in turn argued that to do the job properly they needed protection to 
avoid prosecution and the possibility of being sued for honest mistakes. 
Consent to treatment rules 
The 1890 Lunacy Act gave medical superintendents power to administer 
treatments to certified patients without the patient's consent. These powers 
were transferred to the 1930 and 1959 Acts. The 1983 Act changed the 
powers doctors had in executing treatments. This was the first time that 
statutory legislation covered consent to treatment for all patients whether 
admitted informally or formally. To arrive at this new inclusion in Mental Health 
law there were long debates in Parliament (Hansard 1237:7-11 and Hansard 
1254:83). The basic principle concerning consent to treatment was that the 
patient's informed consent is required before certain treatments can be 
administered. If the patient refuses to give consent, treatment may be given 
only if an independent psychiatrist agrees and after he/she has consulted a 
nurse and one professional in the team who knows the patient. The other 
professional can be an occupational therapist or a social worker. The 
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independent second medical opinion must be given by a doctor appointed by 
the Mental Health Act Commission. Medication may be given without the 
patient's consent and without the need of a second opinion for up to 3 
months. After this period, consent or an independent second opinion is 
required. The treatments which required consent and a second opinion were 
ECT, surgical implants and any surgical operation for destroying brain tissue. 
The issue of consent to treatment was a way of r3ducing the control which 
was a major feature of mental hospital life. This control was stressed by the 
doctors, nurses, allied paramedical professionals and administrative staff. By 
seeking consent from patients, the 1983 Act offered an exercise in choice and 
a respect for patients' rights which was never available before. However, the 
other forms of control remained untouched. The patient could not have 
choice over the hospital organization and system, nor could he/she leave the 
hospital. Consent was a valuable freedom, but it co-existed with the loss of 
other freedoms. 
Concern in the House about consent for treatment led to debates and 
questions which examined the multi-disciplinary functioning of professionals 
(Hansard 1254:106-107 Hansard 1254:107-108 Hansard 1254:110). The 1983 
Act recognized that the Responsible Medical Officer had to make the final 
decision concerning admission, treatment and discharge of the patient. But 
the Responsible Medical Officer was required to develop a good working 
relationship with the other members of the team and to consult them in any 
decision making concerning patients. With the abolition of the Board of 
Control following the 1959 Act, the Royal College of Psychiatrists was 
concerned that no independent body was to replace the wide and 
authoritative function of the Board. The College, according to Bluglass (1981), 
continued to recommend the case for a permanent, independent 
commission, to protect the interests of the individual patient and to promote 
high standards of care. The 1983 Act established the Mental Health Act 
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Commission, to provide independent medical opinions for consent to 
treatment and second opinions, to visit and interview patients when 
complaints were being investigated, and to develop a code of good practice. 
The Commission was a special health authority with a critical policy 
committee in London and three regional panels based in Nottingham, London 
and Liverpool. The Commission consisted of a Chairman appointed by the 
Secretary of State, 12 lawyers, 12 nurses, 12 psychologists, 12 Social 
Workers, 12 laypeople and 22 psychiatrists. It was required to present a 
report every two years to both Houses of Parliament. 
The functions of the Mental Health Act Commission included paying attention 
to patients' rights. However, there are limitations in some important respects. 
It has no powers to deal with informal patients, who make up 90% of the 
hospital population. It cannot compel the attendance of witnesses or receive 
information on oath. It cannot provide patients with the right to see their 
medical records. It does not have the power to enforce any codes of practice 
developed, which therefore remain at the level of a set of proposals. 
It is important to note that the Commissioners appointed by the Secretary of 
State were unlikely to be campaigners of patients' rights. The appointed 
individuals were prominent and well-connected people anxious to avoid 
wounding the sensibilities of conservative medical and nursing professions 
(Rassaby and Rassaby 1983). 
Mental health legislation throughout the period 1890 - 1990 reflected the 
views of psychiatrists and members of the Houses of Parliament. The 
psychiatrists saw the legislation as helping them to have control over the 
people they regarded as requiring diagnosis and forms of medical 
intervention. MPs saw themselves as providing a legal framework which 
would ensure that the people deemed to be insane were satisfactorily 
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contained and treated. This legislation also provided for changes in the 
compulsory detention of the insane, the treatments offered, in the roles and 
involvements of social workers, in the rights of patients and in caretakers' 
roles and functions. However, the basic medical domination and social 
control aspects of mental health care remained intact. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CHANGES IN CARETAKERS' ROLES 
The caretakers who form the focus of this study were the attendants and 
nurses who provided care within hospitals for the insane. Before 1890 these 
caretakers were the majority of the work force in the insane asylum. They did 
not have a systematic approach to their work, and they lacked training; the 
care they offered emphasized institutionalization, and their work consisted 
mainly of keeping order by controlling the inmates, and keeping the 
institution clean and the inmates busy. With the emergence of the asylum 
system, caretakers came to be called attendants; they were the medical 
superintendent's servants and their primary duty was to carry out his orders. 
Later female attendants were referred to as nurses, while men continued to 
be called attendants. 
This chapter looks more closely at the roles and responsibilities of caretakers 
over the whole period under study, and at what aspects of their work really 
changed. The nature of the work of caretakers in asylums and mental 
hospitals during the period under study shows clearly that their roles were 
crucial in determining the quality of the treatment and care given to patients. 
The relationship between caretaker and user was, and still is, an unequal one 
with the caretaker in a position to exercise considerable power. 
As the two previous chapters have shown, Government policy, as reflected in 
the mental health legislation of 1890, 1930, 1959 and 1983, included a 
concern with patients' rights. The 1890 Lunacy Act attempted to safeguard 
the liberty of the citizen by instituting procedures for admission, and 
developing the asylum system as a way of encouraging greater legal 
protection for the insane. The 1930 Mental Treatment Bill sought to reduce 
legal formalities in the interest of early treatment. Voluntary admission was 
sought for the majority of patients, with certification only being used when 
185 
deemed to be necessary. The 1959 Mental Health Act was conceived as an 
integral part of the development of the Welfare State and the National Health 
Service. It was an attempt to provide a legal framework for the achievement of 
national psychological wellbeing (Unsworth 1987). This Act saw the 
introduction of the Mental Health Review Tribunal to which patients could 
appeal. It effectively shifted procedures from the legal to a more medically 
dominated approach, with much of the responsibility for the running of the 
system left to doctors. The 1983 Act restored formal legal safeguards by 
imposing stricter criteria for admissions and a more judicial approach to the 
procedures of commitment. It strengthened patients' rights to resist unwanted 
treatments and restrictions on their civil freedoms. While the Act retained the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal, its procedures were sharpened; a new body, 
the Mental Health Act Commission, was developed to monitor patients' rights. 
The asylum system 
The asylum system was brought about by the 1890 Lunacy Act. Under the 
system which pre-dated this, most of the caretakers of the insane were 
agricultural workers employed for their strength, army men who could 
provide discipline and rule keeping, and women who otherwise would work 
as domestic servants. With the introduction of the asylum system, medical 
superintendents looked for different qualities in recruits, such as the ability to 
relate to patients, to be skilled in an occupation and to have had experience 
of the insane, for example people whose parents had worked as attendants 
and so had been brought up in the asylum environment. The ideal recruits 
were men and women of high moral character, a good education, strict 
temperance, kind and respectful manners, cheerfulness and compassion. 
Those superintendents who had been influenced by the Quaker-inspired 
Moral Management Movement saw the attendant as a spiritual guide who 
showed Christian principles in his/her work. 
The majority of asylums were similar to small manufacturing towns where 
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self-sufficiency and keeping the patients occupied were the main duties of the 
staff. The system was run according to the idiosyncrasies of the medical 
superintendent; he laid down what the caretakers did. The attendants' role 
and functions including following the rules and regulations laid down in the 
rule book which were to be enforced on patients, helping to run the asylum 
farm, administering treatments such as cold showers and the 'bath of 
surprise' (getting the patient in a bath without prior warning), occupying 
patients with shoe-making, building, gardening, music, sewing, cooking and 
dancing. 
The asylum system reflected the increase in the power of the state over the 
lives of individuals. Although the rhetoric of the asylums was that they were 
medical institutions, the work of the caretakers involved restraining, seclusion 
and solitary confinement. To enable the caretakers to carry out these control 
functions, muffs, straight-waistcoats, leg locks and coercion were used. But 
the main bulk of the caretakers' work continued to be similar to the work of 
domestic servants: cleaning, polishing, bed making, dressing and serving 
meals to patients; attending to bedridden and paralysed patients. Caretakers 
managed the abused, boisterous, aggressive and violent patients. They 
administered cold dressings, poultices, fermentations, enemas and 
suppositories, packing patients in wet sheets to reduce mania. They 
controlled and administered tobacco, beer/alcohol, tea, snuff, sugar, opium 
and hyoscine (Hunter and Macalpine 1974). 
Working closely with the state in establishing the asylum system was the 
medical profession, keen to exploit this emerging branch of medicine for its 
members. The doctors were aiming to cure and, through the use of the 
disease model, claimed scientific respectability. According to Mitchell (1984), 
this perceived power to cure gave doctors a legitimizing ideology which 
underpinned their power and prestige in the asylums. Jones (1991) argued 
that the asylums reflected Victorian society in miniature, because they were 
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undemocratic, paternalistic and class-conscious. The vast majority of patients 
came from the destitute poor and many superintendents saw the asylum 
primarily as a mean of distributing welfare. Others took the view that the 
institutions were character-reforming organizations with the principal agents 
of reform being the caretakers. 
During this period, voluntary agencies began to play a part in the provision of 
care. The earliest of these was the Mental Aftercare Association, which was 
founded in 1879 (Rooff 1973). The Association's work was mainly concerned 
with residential aftercare, which took the form of placing ex-patients for short 
periods in convalescent homes run by ex-matrons or senior nurses from the 
asylum. 
The Mental Aftercare Association along with the training initiatives of the 
middle nineteenth century contributed to the early development of community 
care. Yellowlees (1955) observed that there were local training courses for 
attendants which stated that trainees should have contact with the families of 
patients, and that they should also go with patients to see their relatives, and 
find out how the disease arose. 
The 1930 Mental Treatment Act and the increase in voluntary admissions 
resulted in a great deal of admissions and discharges. Doors were unlocked, 
restrictions on patients' freedoms were lifted and some of the depersonalizing 
practices were combatted. It was against this mixed background that the first 
formal development took place in extending the mental nurse's role into 
working outside the hospital itself, either in caring for discharged patients, or 
to work with out-patients. The mental nurses who wanted to develop the 
community care approach emphasized the development of the therapeutic 
community/milieu therapy model and placed much less emphasis on physical 
treatments and the need for discipline, control, routine and cleanliness. The 
Community Psychiatric nursing service at Warlingham Park Hospital in 1954 
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was characterised by the nurses working from an office in a mental health 
centre attached to a day hospital. Their working day consisting of visits to 
patients' homes and work places, day and afternoon out-patients clinics, 
running after care groups for long stay patients and organising evening social 
clubs. They also shared in regular case conferences to review the patients' 
progress and their working activities (Hunter 1974). 
Training and treatment 
The changes in state provision for the insane following the 1890 Lunacy Act 
resulted in changes in caretakers' work and function. Training was 
established which covered: the body, and its general functions and disorders; 
the care of the insane and the general duties of attendants; obedience and 
discipline, personal neatness and courtesy to patients; the avoidance of 
ridiculing delusion; the importance of comfort for all in the asylum; care and 
observation of epileptic and suicidal patients; restraint, seclusion and artificial 
feeding; bandaging and treatment of wounds, sores, bruises and burns; 
bathing patients; and the importance of occupation, amusements and 
religious services. Sport was a dominant part of the life of mental hospitals; 
patients, staff and relatives all participated (Jones 1991). 
The training was provided by the medical staff and on occasion by the Head 
Attendant; the Medico-Psychological Association organized the examinations 
and provided the certificates for successful candidates. The book which 
provided for the training was: The Handbook for the Instruction of 
Attendants on the Insane (Clark et al. 1884). 
The handbook represented a shift from the oral tradition to a written one. 
Without doubt it was a significant move in the history of the education and 
training of mental nurses. Nolan (1993) argues that, although the handbook 
contained medical rather than mental nursing knowledge, it gave the work of 
mental nurses credibility, and facilitated some degree of unification of mental 
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nursing practice throughout the country. 
The 1930 Medical Treatment Bill was passed in a climate which stressed the 
need for early treatment and for treating mental disease in much the same 
way as physical disease (Hansard 235:958). There were developments which 
resulted in the successful treatment of conditions such as general paralysis 
by physical somatic means. Many patients were being treated with insulin 
therapy, ECT, psychosurgery and chemotherapy. What this amounted to was 
that the state, doctors, the public and caretakers were all stressing the 
physical causes of mental illness, and the need to take certain necessary 
steps to provide a cure. The new treatments were being carried out by 
caretakers who were both unsure about what they were doing and ill-
informed about possible benefits and hazards (Clark 1964). Caretakers were 
faced with the dilemma of claiming to be engaged in treating curable mental 
illness while they knew very well that most of their patients would not be 
cured, and might never leave the hospital. In reality what patients received 
was custody, not therapy. Caretakers used straight jackets, padded cells and 
forced feeding whilst trying to project an image of carers and healers. Also at 
this time a form of community care was expected, but local authorities did not 
have the resources to meet the increasing community care demands. 
The training changed during the 1930s with Medical Superintendents 
encouraging the study of psychological explanations of mental illness. A new 
textbook, Fisher's Modern Methods of Treatment: A Guide for Nurses was 
published in 1948. The book saw nurses as doctors' assistants, who would 
implement the doctor's treatment regimes, keep patients under observation 
and report their observations to the doctors. It also mentioned the power 
which nurses have in influencing the wellbeing of patients. 
This period saw the emergence of a more therapeutic caretaker. Caretakers 
were learning and developing the skills of psychotherapy and social therapy. 
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The Cassell Hospital, which opened in 1919, provided the on-going education 
of its staff. Here caretakers played a full role as therapists and multi-
disciplinary team members. 
The 1959 Mental Health Act brought changes in the need to expand and 
develop community care. Caretakers were by this time working in the 
community. This initiative began at Warlingham Park Hospital in Surrey. At 
the same time, there was an expanded role for social workers, psychologists 
and occupational therapists within the mental health services. With these 
developments and the increase in the use of psychotropic drugs, new 
questions were emerging as to the role and function of caretakers. Hunter 
(1956) has suggested that the introduction of psychotropic drugs resulted in 
the deskilling of caretakers, while caretakers themselves felt that their 
therapeutic role had been reduced to the giving out of medicines. Studies 
were undertaken to examine the work, role and function of the mental nurse. 
For example, in 1954 the Liverpool Regional Hospital Board looked at the 
nature and status of mental nursing, and the Manchester Hospital Board 
undertook a similar study in 1956. In 1966 Oppenheim and Ereman examined 
the role and training of mental nurses; this was followed by the work of 
Maddox (1957) and John (1961). All these studies reported the complex 
activities involved in mental health work, the shortages of resources for 
caretakers' work, and the difficulties that were being experienced in recruiting 
suitable candidates. Further, they suggested that some aspects of the work of 
mental nurses had only the slenderest claim to be related to patient care. 
The Liverpool study (1954; Macguire 1969; Nolan 1993) found that the 
hospital operated with chronic staff shortages, that students were withdrawing 
from the training, and that staff adhered to the view that skills could not be 
taught, but could only be acquired through practical experience. Most of the 
students were recruited as nursing assistants and then persuaded to train. 
There was no minimum educational qualification required. The study 
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concluded that better selection and an improved training programme both in 
the classroom and in the wards would help to alleviate the chronic shortage 
of staff. 
By 1960 the emphasis had shifted from looking at the role of the mental nurse 
to examining the personalities and attitudes of those engaged in the 
occupation. Menzies (1960) argued that nurses worked within a social system 
which protected them from anxiety. This social system created a detachment 
of the nurse for the patient through rituals and the routinization of self-care 
tasks. 
The development of community psychiatric nursing was followed by the 
training of these new workers. The first course was offered by Chiswick 
College in the early 1970s. These community psychiatric nurses gained 
recognition through the skills which their community training offered them. 
The training saw caretakers enhancing their skills in interpersonal relations, 
group skills, psychotherapy, behaviour therapy, counselling and research. 
The 1983 Mental Health Act provided for a continuation of the development of 
the caretakers' work in the hospital and in the community. Specialist courses 
were now widespread, and ranged from diploma to graduate and post-
graduate qualifications. There were well-established community teams which 
worked in close association with GPs, health visitors and social workers. But 
the 1983 Act changed significantly the role of the caretaker in hospitals, as it 
allowed caretakers to detain an individual for up to six hours. 
Public views and caretakers' work 
The context within which caretakers worked was determined to a large extent 
by the views held by society about insanity. Social attitudes towards people 
with mental disorders have always influenced the quality of care which they 
receive. The inheritance theory held that insanity could be transmitted from 
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generation to generation. The moral degeneracy theory considered that the 
poor possessed badness of character. White (1888) divided the poor into 
three categories: the genuinely unemployed, the feckless and incapable, and 
the wholly degenerate. He felt that there was nothing to do but let them die 
out by leaving them alone. Such views about insanity meant that containment 
and separation was the dominant approach taken to caring for the insane. 
The eugenics movement recommended that measures should be taken to 
detect and isolate people likely to become insane, and that they should be 
segregated and prevented from reproducing. With these theories in mind, 
asylum patients were seen as degenerate, and caretakers had instructions to 
guard against associations between males and females. The miasmic theory, 
which assumed that dirt and putrefaction are the main cause of ill health, led 
asylum superintendents to be preoccupied with hygiene. Caretakers were 
required to concentrate on cleanliness; walls were whitewashed and floors 
were scrubbed several times a day. Caretakers were required to supervise 
bathing and to ensure that patients' bodies were clean and free from lice. The 
contagion or germ theory, which assumed that the vectors for disease were 
humans, resulted in categorization and segregation according to condition so 
as to prevent cross-infection. Patients were subjected to long periods of 
airing in individualized 'airing courts'. The other popular theories were vitamin 
C deficiency and the septic foci theory of insanity. In instances of septic foci 
insanity doctors would remove what they thought was the source of the 
infection and hence the insanity. Patients' teeth, tonsils and parts of their 
alimentary canals were removed in adherence to this theory (Hunter and 
Macalpine 1974). 
Much of the work of the caretakers of the insane was carried out within a 
covenant relationship and within a web of connections (Gilligan 1982). The 
covenant relationship is clearly seen in the rules, regulations and procedures 
which govern caretakers' work in the institutions. If these rules are followed 
rigidly they are likely to result in inclusions and exclusions. The covenant 
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relationship therefore has limitations because it implies an agreement entered 
into by both parties, but both parties - the patient and the caretaker - are not 
equal, and the patient's involvement seems to be merely to trust the nurse 
(Cooper 1989). 
Given the amount of social control which takes place in services for the 
insane, patients often neither trust the nurse nor work co-operatively to foster 
their own well-being. On the other hand, caretakers, it can be argued, offer a 
web of connections, a dialogue relationship which emphasises the patient's 
well-being through fostering hope, listening, enabling self-awareness and 
growth and teaching patients how to self-care. As Gilligan (1982) suggests, 
effective caretaking is more of a possibility in a dialogue relationship. 
The caretakers' role and work changed not only with conceptions of insanity 
but also according to medical superintendents' views of its causes. A problem 
for caretakers then which remains today is whether their role is primarily that 
of a domestic labourer or of a carer. A further enduring conflict is that 
between being an agent of treatment and an agent of control. Caretakers 
have always been involved in maintaining a system that promotes order and 
regularity for its and their own sake rather than for therapeutic objectives. 
Caretakers have been the arbiters of a conflict between the demands of 




CONTEMPORARY CARETAKERS: THEIR REFLECTIONS 
ON THEIR WORK 
This chapter explores the reflections of nine contemporary caretakers 
including those of the researcher on the nature and implications of their work. 
The contemporary caretakers asked to contribute to the investigation 
expressed their willingness to participate because they saw the new legalism 
within the mental health legislation brought in by the 1983 Mental Health Act 
as affecting their ability to give the care and treatment which they saw as 
necessary. The main focus of their reflections was on the dilemma for 
caretakers highlighted in previous chapters between caring, treatment and 
the respecting of the rights of users on the one hand, and being agents of 
social control on the other. 
Evidence from contemporary caretakers through interviewing was an integral 
part of the investigation; its purpose was to provide information from 
caretakers who were exposed to the changes brought about by the 1959 and 
1983 Mental Health Acts. These caretakers were being asked to reflect on 
how they saw their social control functions and how they felt users' rights 
were being catered for at the historical moments of 1959 and 1983 which are 
within the historical period being looked at, 1890 to 1990. By selecting 
caretakers who have experienced the introduction, the workings and the 
critiques of the two mental health legislations, it was thought that their 
comments would illuminate further the issues around care, treatment and 
rights within the mental health services in which they worked. Considering 
that the historical documents and sources used were all written for audiences 
at those particular times. The interviewing of the contemporary caretakers, it 
was hoped, would yield information which related directly to the work at hand 
through oral history. Such an oral history fits well with Mann's (1985) 
argument that it is not necessary always to think of the interview as only the 
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highly standardized sample type. It may be that a particular investigation 
needs to focus on selected people for information. The people interviewed 
would be key participants with useful knowledge whose interviews would 
yield worthwhile information. Mann also suggested that if a historical 
perspective was being looked at, it may well be quite invaluable to interview 
people for their memories of how it was many years ago. In recent years the 
development of oral history has resulted in many interviews with older people 
being tape-recorded for the development of sound archives. An example of 
this work is the taped interviews carried out for the Imperial War Museum in 
London of survivors of the 1914 to 1918 war (Mann 1985). It is that memory of 
how the contemporary caretakers worked with users and addressed the 
social control and the rights issues that the interviews were designed to 
capture. 
The contemporary caretakers were approached by telephone with a brief 
description of the proposed investigation. This was followed by a letter which 
introduced the investigation further, see Appendix (3). They were telephoned 
again to ask for their verbal agreement that they would participate in the 
investigation, and to arrange the dates and times for the interviews. The 
interviews lasted for half an hour and they were tape-recorded, see Appendix 
(2) for the interview schedule. The tape-recording was then transcribed and a 
copy sent to the respective interviewee, who was asked to check to see if the 
transcript was a true reflection of what had been said. The information 
collected from the caretakers was then checked to collect the caretakers' 
views on the following questions: Does mental health legislation facilitate the 
care and treatment of the insane? Does mental health legislation provide for 
the social control of the insane? Does mental health legislation result in 
changes in the work of the caretakers? Are patients' rights a part of mental 
health legislation? 
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Contemporary caretakers in current nursing journals are referred to as 
'psychiatric nurses', although there is no such statutory qualification. The 
statutory training confers the qualification of Registered Mental Nurse (RMN), 
and the 1982 syllabus is labelled the Syllabus of Training for Mental Nurses. 
The new Project 2000 course introduced in the late 1980s uses the title 
'mental health nurse'. These shifts in title, with workers variously accepting 
and denying their allegiance to the medical model, is an important part of the 
history of both the caretaking profession and the cultural treatment of insanity 
and mental illness, but they also serve to confuse and obscure the role and 
functions of the caretakers. 
All the interviewees were chosen because I knew of their work. They included 
representatives from the areas of clinical practice, management, and 
education. They were all trained and registered mental nurses, and were 
working in senior jobs in the mental health services, in hospital, in the 
community and as teachers of mental nurses. To be eligible for these jobs 
they had all had three years' training, had worked for at least two years as a 
staff nurse, and for at least two years as a charge nurse or sister. They had 
experienced being a nurse with responsibilities for delivering care through 
negotiating with doctors and management, and in the teaching of students 
entering training. 
Table 3 shows the age range and the sex of the caretakers interviewed. From 
the age range it is clear that these caretakers would have been working as 
Registered Mental Nurses at the time when the 1959 Mental Health Act was in 
operation, they would have had experience of the care situation when the 
changes of the 1959 Act were being debated, and also of the introduction of 
the 1983 Act. Six women were interviewed and three men, reflecting the fact 
that more women than men deliver care within the mental health services. 
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TABLE 3 
DETAILS OF AGE RANGE AND SEX OF CONTEMPORARY CARETAKERS 
Age 	 Male 	 Female 
30-39 	 1 	 2 
40-49 	 2 	 2 
50-59 	 2 
Total 	 3 	 6 
Based on a total of N=9 interviewees 
Respondent A: A manager of in-service education within a mental 
hospital. 
This respondent saw mental health legislation as protecting the individual 
against abuse while allowing appropriate treatment to take place against his 
or her will, as giving guidelines and support to professionals, as allowing the 
reviewing of patients to occur more systematically and as affording patients 
more access to appeals. While mental health legislation goes some way 
towards protecting the individual from abuse, it does not simply allow staff to 
treat patients against their will. The Mental Health Acts, particularly those of 
1959 and 1983, asked for certain conditions to be met. The 1959 Act required 
that the individual must be detained under the treatment Section (26), and the 
1983 Act required that the consent to treatment rules Sections (57, 58, 59, 60, 
61, 62 and 63) must be enforced. By laying down rules and procedures for 
admission and treatment, mental health legislation does give some degree of 
guidance to staff. The support to staff, however, must be examined in terms 
of the extensive protection from prosecution given to staff in the 1983 Act in 
carrying out their role and functions. This is stated clearly in Section (139) and 
reflects the difficulties patients have to overcome in order to bring a case 
against staff. 
198 
The 1959 Act and the 1983 Act allowed for the review of patients and access 
to appeals. Although the 1983 Act improved these areas, there were still time 
limits which has to be adhered to as to when a review should take place and 
when a patient may appeal. Mental health legislation, in particular the 1983 
Act, has led to 'a straightjacket in one sense, in as much as we are more rule-
orientated rather than having also to rely on what was in a sense good 
practice...I think one sees this in terms of the nurses holding power'. The 
appeals here to the staff's good sense and good practice is the old story of 
staff feeling that they are doing a good job and being taken for granted. There 
were centres of excellence, but given the lack of resources and poor training 
within which some caretakers worked and the catalogue of bad practices 
through the centuries it would be unwise to leave patients totally at the mercy 
of staff. The 1983 Act does ask for more procedures and rules to be followed; 
this is a good thing, as it leaves less to staff prejudices and idiosyncrasies. By 
formalizing nurses' holding power, staff do not have to keep pre-signed 
section (30) forms 'not here but heard of, where old Section (30) forms would 
be kept in the top drawer so that when a patient wanted to leave the signed 
form would be brought out and used'. The rights of the patients were made 
little of; the comment 'people now die with their rights on' and 'professionals 
may be more hesitant to intervene and give necessary treatment, because of 
the restrictions of the legislation', shows this. The assumption could be made 
that staff would rather move in to give what they consider to be necessary 
treatment without following the rules and procedures around consent to 
treatment. 
The respondent felt that caretakers should have uncensored power to do as 
they please with the individual. He had a sense of sympathy with the rights 
patients may lose because of institutional practices such as the restriction 
placed on the individual by the institution, and issues relating to sexism, 
racism and privacy, which are taken-for-granted aspects of institutional life. 
He saw the 1983 Act as effecting changes in the role of caretakers. They were 
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required to see through the already mentioned holding power, to be more 
involved in care and treatment decisions, and to ensure that people were 
informed of their status in hospitals, their rights and the appeals system 
available to them. He highlighted how control could be used according to the 
resources available and the anxieties and fears of the staff. There were 
difficult situations, such as the care of the elderly, where without community 
resources they had to stay in hospital. As regards the care of young West 
Indian men, there was an associated fear of the person being aggressive and 
violent, and so staff would respond with social control through drugs. There 
was recognition that such uses of drugs may be unnecessary. 'So one must 
agree that with hindsight one might not have given medication.' 
There was also recognition of the difficult work which the caretakers did and 
the lack of support available to them. The concept of 'caretaker' was 
appreciated because the concept took on board the possibility of holistic 
care. Emphasis was given to the tension between individual freedom and 
treatment in mental health care. 'I think there is a tension between giving the 
individual as much freedom as possible whilst at the same time making sure 
that he/she have access to appropriate care as soon as possible.' 
Respondent B: A manager of a hospital and a community mental health 
nursing service. 
This respondent saw mental health legislation as protection and control for 
the patient and the caretaker. She viewed such legislation as associated with 
the removal of patients' rights and with the protection of their rights through 
the appeals system. Staff were seen as being responsible for patients who 
cannot make their own decisions, and people who were out of control and 
needed controlling. The respondent thought that, by being professional and 
caring, staff can ensure that patients rights are respected. She did not feel 
that there was much difference between the 1959 and 1983 Acts. However, 
she stated: 'I think the 1959 veered on the side of control rather than on the 
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protection of rights. The protections were still there but the refinement of the 
1983 Act was to add even more protection to what the patient had.' 
There was a strong sense in which this respondent saw staff as control 
agents, with this controlling function as legitimate because staff would be 
acting professionally. Perhaps this use of the concept 'professional' assumed 
that certain codes of conduct and good practices were maintained by staff. 
However, if staff thought that they were responsible, that they had to make 
decisions for patients, they might not be able to cater for the individual needs 
of patients. Linked to this view was the notion that staff knew best and might 
even feel at ease to use any psychological or physical method to control 
patients. While the respondent recognized the appeals system as extending 
protection to the individual, there was a less-than-enthusiastic approach to 
patients' rights. 'If you get hung up on patients' rights you get what always 
sticks in my mind and is described as patients dying in the gutter with their 
rights pinned on their chests.' 
The issues of protection for staff were interpreted as protecting staff so that 
they could carry out their duties in a professional and responsible manner. 
The idea of being professional and responsible meant that staff would be 
acting in the patient's best interest. Of course this is not necessarily so, as 
has been seen in recent enquiries into the mistreatment and abuse of patients 
by staff who claimed to be acting in the patients' interest. 'If you don't protect 
the carers, the carers will not act in the best interest of the patient.' 
The role of the Mental Health Act Commission in the 1983 Act was 
recognized. 'I always think of the Mental Health Act Commission as being my 
conscience.' If the Mental Health Act Commission is the staff's conscience, 
then responsibility and professionalism become empty words because staff 
will be depending on an external body to see that they function in the patients' 
interest. 
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This respondent recognized clearly the role of the Mental Health Act 
Commission in helping to set standards for good practice. However, seeing 
the Mental Health Act as protecting society from the insane person fails to 
appreciate the powers of the agents of control of the insane within society. 
She strongly emphasized controlling the insane and taking away their rights, 
within the context of a parent-child model of relationships between caretakers 
and the insane. The role of caretakers is akin to that of parents who are held 
accountable, to a large degree, for their children's behaviour.'...I think that's 
very much the same for us in the care of the insane because if we are going 
to take away people's rights we've got to replace it.' 
Although the concepts of team and multi-disciplinary working was thought to 
be positive ones, the doctor was definitely seen as the key member of the 
team who has the necessary knowledge and competence to diagnose 
insanity. The dominance of the medical model was seen as the accepted way 
of providing mental health care and treatment. Caretakers are the people who 
got the patients the right treatment. However, with the medical model being 
the dominant approach, any so called 'right' treatment could only be under 
the umbrella of the medical model. 
This respondent felt that the services are not sensitive enough to the needs of 
women and black people. 'But when people talk to me about ethnic minorities 
and working with black people, and what are the problems, I get cross with 
them because I don't notice ethnic minorities and black people and Chinese 
people, and I get cross with them for bringing it up because in my mind I 
don't see black people I see them as my friends, somebody I like or 
somebody I don't like.' There was some recognition here of problems in 
seeing through the treatment and care of black people. But there was also 
some cultural stereotyping, as in the view that West Indians were seen as 
doing something which was normal when they smoked cannabis: 'What right 
do I have to stop them doing what to them is very normal? So that is an 
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infringement of their civil liberties.' 
There was acknowledgement of the aggressive treatments in which some 
caretakers participate, and of the fact that such treatments may not always be 
in the patient's interest: 'I have always been aware of how aggressive carers 
can be perceived because of the really aggressive things we do. We put 
electric shocks in people's heads, we stick needles into them, we hold them 
down, we lock doors to keep them in and we say this is in their best interests, 
but you just imagine if you're at the receiving end.' 
The issues of civil rights were seen as relevant in detaining people and so 
controlling their freedoms, and changing people's behaviours and way of life 
in ways which were considered best for them. 'What I think of I suppose with 
most horror in retrospect is lobotomy... at that period we never had any 
qualms about it.' There was a clear sense that most of these controlling 
activities are done without question. The respondent's explanation was that 
caretakers would see through those activities because they had to survive 
and not get into trouble. They had to follow the rules of the organization, fit 
into the team and not upset people. A major realization here is how much the 
caretakers are themselves controlled. Sexual rights of the elderly and the 
sexuality of patients are of concern. The feeling is that decision-makers in 
mental institutions are unable even to discuss these issues. The result is a 
situation where those rights are denied. 
The concepts of insanity and caretaker were challenged. Insanity indicated 
that people were out of control. Preferred concepts were 'mental illness 
nursing' and 'mental health nursing', which saw people as being suffering, but 
in touch. The respondent argued that the concept of 'caretaker' gave the 
image of someone just looking after people and not involved in counselling 
and developing the individual. As a contemporary caretaker seeing the 
individual as suffering from a mental illness, mental illness and mental health 
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labels were appropriate. However, with the ambiguities in the public's and 
professionals' perceptions of people who behave differently, the words mad, 
lunatic, insane and mentally ill are still available and are used. The concept of 
caretaker was interpreted in its narrowest sense; a definition which extended 
care and involved providing opportunities for the individual to grow would 
have been preferred. While nurturing the individual to take responsibility for 
themselves, the concept would not embrace treating the person as a child. 
Respondent C: A manager of a community psychiatric nursing service. 
This interviewee saw mental health legislation chiefly as giving health 
professionals guidelines about how to detain people in mental hospitals, how 
to provide treatment, and how to prevent people being detained according to 
the whims of relatives. The interviewee reminded the interviewer that it was 
not so long ago that an unmarried mother could find herself being held in a 
mental hospital. 
The 1959 Mental Health Act was considered to provide different sections 
covering the purpose of particular admissions, whereby people were being 
admitted for observation or treatment. The operation of the Act depended a 
great deal on the GPs' and consultant psychiatrists' assessments for 
decisions about admission. 
The 1983 Mental Health Act was seen as extending the admission 
assessment to include social workers. This had resulted in a situation where 
people might not get hospital care or treatment easily enough. 'I think it is 
quite sad that we have to be with them until they probably run in front of a 
bus, or throw their child in the Thames, or what before we can do something 
about it and we know they need treatment.' There was some reticence in 
accepting social workers as apart of the admission assessment team. The 
social worker was seen as preventing people from getting treatment easily. 
Also there was a tendency to see delays in treatment as creating more 
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problems for the patient. Delays in treatment were instituted by the 1983 Act 
to ensure that the treatment was appropriate and that patient consent or a 
second opinion was sought. The involvement of social workers in the 
assessment and admission procedure raised questions about where the 
individual could receive the most appropriate care, as hospitalization might 
not be the most appropriate place. Of course, the new rules introduced by 
the 1983 Act frustrated doctors and caretakers who wanted to get on with 
detention and treatment, because they considered that they knew best. 
However, faulty assessment, diagnosis and treatment could be tragic for the 
person concerned. The Act was simply trying to ensure that the individual's 
rights were respected. It must be remembered that if emergency treatment 
was required, Section (62) allowed doctors and caretakers to enforce it. 
Women were seen as getting a poor deal from the mental health services. 
'They were deemed to be ill and then controlled when really it's a life problem.' 
Concern was also expressed about male doctors seeing women as neurotic, 
when in reality they needed support. Black people, in particular black boys, 
are experiencing pressure from the police who have them admitted as being 
mentally ill; those suffering from a mental illness are usually admitted 
compulsorily: 'Now those people who are indeed suffering from a mental 
illness, they are brought in on a petition while their English counterparts are 
not.' 
This respondent felt disappointed that in the care and treatment of the 
mentally ill caretakers sometimes participate in mechanical and violent 
methods of dealing with people, that massive doses of drugs are used and 
more people with mental illnesses are not being cured. 
Respondent D: A teacher of mental nursing in a hospital training school. 
Mental health legislation was seen as ensuring that people are cared for when 
they cannot take responsibility for themselves, and when staff want patients 
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to comply with what they want them to do. For example, '...people will quite 
often comply in taking medication or being admitted to a ward or whatever, 
knowing that if they don't they will be sectioned.' 
The Mental Health Acts were seen as ensuring that patients' rights were 
upheld. The Acts defined client groups and so affected directly the way in 
which mental nurses work: 
'The 1983 Act was heralded as taking care of the rights of clients 
more seriously, giving clients more civil rights. That was 
certainly the way it was sold to us. I am not sure whether that is 
true.' At the same time the Act gave caretakers the power to 
detain people in hospital: 'I think it is a social control situation, I 
think it affects your ability to have a therapeutic relationship.' 
The argument being presented here was that, while the 1983 Act was talked 
about as ensuring patients' rights, it also included a new section (section 5) 
which gave caretakers the power to detain the patient. Such a detention 
power should only be used by the caretakers if no doctor was available. 
There was an issue of social control by the caretakers here, because if the 
person was not detained compulsorily he/she should be allowed to leave. If 
caretakers can prevent someone exercising this right, there is the possibility 
of people being detained when this is not necessary. On the other hand, if 
this holding power is used constructively someone requiring care could 
receive it. 
The respondent saw the Mental Health Review Tribunals and the Mental 
Health Act Commission as ensuring that patients can appeal against the 
decisions to detain and treat them. There were, however, reservations about 
the working of these bodies: 'It's difficult for anybody to take things to the 
Review Tribunals and then, even when they do, it's their word against the right 
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and power of the psychiatric system, so they were unlikely to succeed. The 
right to complain was more available but whether anything happens because 
of that complaint or any change to anything, well I don't know, probably 
things haven't changed much...The Mental Health Act Commission created 
excitement in that notices were put indicating that they were coming and 
would see people. They were heralded as the great liberator of the mentally 
ill, but one wonders how practice differs or whether it differs.' 
The respondent saw much of the mental health service as a system of social 
control. Examples are, 'In the care of the elderly, the use of sedation and 
night sedation and things like that for ward management'. The mental health 
system was considered as sexist and racist: 'In the inpatient situation there 
were very few black people and I think that, that in itself was significant, it was 
a very specialized ward which was seen as prestigious, you know labels such 
as being "intellectual". There must have been black people who would, you 
know benefit. But I don't know whether they were not referred or once 
referred were not admitted... When I was working in a MIND hostel, at the 
time they were all men in the hostel and the men were requesting and I think 
the people on the management committee thought they should have a 
woman to come and live in the hostel, because it would be nice to have 
somebody pretty around, who could sort of do the washing up...I think I find 
that very frightening; we all know what goes on in the grounds of psychiatric 
institutions, abuse, rape for cigarettes etc.' 
Psychiatry and caretakers were seen by this respondent as participating in a 
'mass abuse of power': 'They just seem to treat the people they are working 
with as just appendages to the ways in which they can display their ego 
strength or booster up themselves'. 
Caretakers are under-estimating people by not thinking of them as 
responsible for their own actions. So they are not given the respect required. 
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Nor are they given accurate feedback about their behaviours. 
Respondent E: A teacher of nursing. 
Mental health legislation was seen as providing care and treatment for very 
distressed people, by allowing people the opportunity to have skilled help. 
The respondent considered the 1983 Act as having more written rights for 
patients compared to the 1959 Act. This was considered a good development 
because patients were given details of their rights which they could refer to; 
this has resulted in staff being more aware of what patients say, and patients 
knowing how and where to institute an appeal. 
The respondent considered that medication is a major area of social control: 
'Who gets medication and when they get medication is still an issue'. Women 
were seen as getting a male-dominated service: 'The other thing is, it's very 
rare for any woman, particularly when it's mental health, to actually express a 
wish to be treated or examined by a woman'. Black patients were felt to be 
invisible in the service where this respondent worked: 'I have this nagging 
suspicion that perhaps we're not offering the service. I can't believe that there 
aren't people within the black community that need psychiatric care. Because 
there are so many cultural differences I have a belief that we might not be 
able to understand their language of distress'. 
Respondent F: A clinical mental nurse specialist in substance abuse. 
This respondent saw mental health legislation as protecting the individual 
from self-harm and from harming others, and as providing a guide for action 
during a crisis. The 1959 Mental Health Act was viewed as rigid and inflexible, 
with no room for the individual to question. Nor was there flexibility within the 
institutions; caretakers themselves were inflexible. The 1983 Act improved on 
this, by offering more flexibility and better appeals procedures, which have 
contributed to more successful appeals. 
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The new powers and responsibilities of caretakers under the 1983 Act were 
seen as a positive move. The ability to detain someone in hospital, the 
respondent offered, 'Would test their clinical and practical judgement'. 
Caretakers were considered to be still not enabling people to have their 
rights. This situation, the respondent felt, was due to caretakers being poorly 
informed about the rights of patients enshrined in the 1983 Act. The 
respondent argued that, if caretakers are not aware of the details of mental 
health legislation and the rights individuals have under the 1983 Act, they can 
hardly enable individuals to demand their rights. 
Language was seen as an aspect of social control, because the language 
doctors and caretakers used to describe a person's behaviour differed greatly 
from how that person might see himself/herself. The respondent viewed this 
as a major rights issue, because how the person saw themselves was not 
taken into account when decisions were being made. This respondent felt 
that women are not taken seriously: 'It's a very distinct way of making sure 
they don't gain power that they are not informed'. This situation was seen as 
similar for black people and lesbians. Yet, 'These words are used at team 
meetings and conferences, and you sit there and think, they said it again, but 
you don't see them take any action. Nobody actually says, "What are you 
going to do"?' 
Respondent G: A teacher of mental nursing teachers. 
This interviewee saw mental health legislation as providing a broad umbrella 
for patients' safety and protection, and also a framework for the delivery of 
care which ensured certain standards, including that caretakers themselves 
were provided with guidelines and some boundaries in which to function. The 
Acts allowed patients to go into hospital of their own volition, knowing that 
after a period of time they were not likely to remain institutionalized without 
some form of review. 
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The Acts from 1890 to 1983 were seen as progressive in relation to patients' 
rights. Patients and relatives were given more information concerning their 
rights in hospital, and the appeals procedures available to them. This 
progression, the respondent considered, can be seen in the terms used to 
describe people with behaviour problems. The concept of the 'insane' person 
has been challenged, as being too narrow a concept, and the preferred 
concept is mental health. However, given the ambiguities concerning mental 
disorders, the concepts 'mad', 'lunatic', 'insane' and 'mentally ill' were still 
used: 'I think mental health is more broader... I worry about the word "insane" 
and the amount of stigma attached to this word'. 
Control issues in the psychiatric services were recognized, but the 
respondent felt that the control which caretakers maintain is a good thing. 
The respondent took for granted that caretakers are always controlling 
individuals in those individuals' best interests. Issues of rights were 
recognized, and, in particular, the Mental Health Review Tribunal was 
mentioned, but this theme was not elaborated. 
Respondent H: A teacher of mental nursing and a counsellor. 
This respondent felt that most of the conditions for patients outlined in mental 
health legislation were not actually offered. 
There was a strong sense that the control and the services offered to the 
mentally ill were socially acceptable; such legislation was seen as making 
mental health care available to all: 'People having access to care and not 
having have to worry about whether they could pay for it all or not'. The view 
was expressed that caretakers being able to lock the door on patients was 
therapeutic, and the open door policy was not necessarily so. 
The 1983 Act was seen as being more in favour of patient's interests, as it 
ensured that their treatments and medications were reviewed every three 
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months, and it also provided for a second opinion through the Mental Health 
Act Commission. But the actual institutions were seen as not giving the 
patients the rights of dignity and respect, because usually the environment 
was dirty, and in need of decoration. While the custodial functions of 
caretakers were re-organized, caretakers were seen as agents of change 
rather than agents of control. They are involved in therapeutic activities and 
only a minority are abusing their role and power: 'A chap that I knew when I 
did my secondment, had come straight out of the Royal Air Force. He had no 
training as no training was needed to be a charge nurse when he started. He 
would eat, take his choice of the patient's food before it was dished up, and 
there was one patient who's behaviour due to his illness was obsessional in 
cleaning up for everyone, and if another patient was incontinent in the 
dormitory then this guy was brought back from his industrial therapy to clean 
up the mess, so exploiting his illness'. 
The respondent talked about the relationship between male and female 
caretakers and between male doctors and female caretakers. Male caretakers 
were seen as macho, very big, wore big boots and had big clanking keys and 
strutted around. Female caretakers were seen as soft and maternal. Male 
doctors were seen as wanting to get their own way, especially when a female 
caretaker was in charge of the ward. 
Concerning black people, the respondent felt that there were problems: 'It 
makes one wonder if they had someone to talk to from their own culture, or 
just being allowed to express what they were expressing they would have 
avoided the need to come into hospital'. 
Respondent I: The author's personal reflections. 
My own background as a Registered Mental Nurse gives me familiarity with 
most of the situations mentioned by the respondents. This familiarity will 
naturally have had some effect on the way in which I collected and interpreted 
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the research data. As Cicourel (1964) argued, interviewing is a method in 
which the activities of the investigator play a crucial role. As a way of 
documenting my own input to the research, I have also attempted to answer 
the interview questions. 
'Between the years 1967 and 1979 I worked as student mental 
nurse, staff mental nurse, charge mental nurse and senior 
charge mental nurse. I wonder sometimes whether I can 
consider the period as a student to be working with the insane, 
because all I can remember doing was carrying out the doctor's 
orders and the organization's rules and regulations. Also, given 
the hierarchy in the mental hospital, I did not question enough, 
or entertain anyone else questioning, what we were doing. 
Since 1979 I have been working in education, where I have 
been involved in some teaching on mental health issues to 
nurses, social workers and health educationalists. 
The mental health legislation to me provided a framework within which 
doctors can diagnose and treat people medically for their illness and 
behaviours. It helps to determine the relationships between patients and 
clients, including with social workers, and doctors and nurses, and all the 
health and welfare workers patients are likely to meet. I thought the legislation 
allowed individuals who needed care and attention to have such care. There 
was a need for such Acts to ensure that the individual received care and 
attention. What I feared was that sometimes this was taken for granted, 
particularly if health and welfare staff were not careful in how they used the 
Acts. I am thinking here of how the Acts could be used vis-a-vis children, the 
elderly, working class patients, women and ethnic minority groups. I think 
there are problems in the way in which the Acts were interpreted by 
caretakers, because their training was limited in this area, yet their 
contribution to the decision-making process could have had dire 
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consequences for patients. The use of the Acts and the degree of compulsion 
which came with them meant that caretakers could hold individuals and insist 
that they take certain treatments or drugs. It can also mean that patients can 
be held against their wishes and so forced to stay in hospital and to receive 
drugs. 
There is a need for caretakers to understand the relevant legislation, because 
they are the persons who will see through the prescriptions of the doctors. It 
is the caretaker who will give and maintain the drugs. It is the caretaker who 
will restrain the person deemed to be mentally ill, and who will report to the 
doctors as to how the person is behaving, and this can result in changes in 
treatment which might affect the individual's rights. It is the caretaker who 
manages all the domestic arrangements on a ward, and so can enhance or 
restrict rights. The caretaker also sets the tone of the ward environment, and 
this can affect the way in which people are cared for and treated. It is 
important not to forget the reports and enquiries into abuses of the mentally 
ill, and even the deaths which were happened under suspicious 
circumstances. For example, the Ely Hospital enquiry 1969 discovered: (1) 
Cruel ill-treatment of four patients by six named members of staff; (2) General 
inhuman and threatening behaviour towards patients by one of the staff 
members; (3) Pilfering of food, clothing and other items belonging to 
patients; (4) Indifference on the part of the chief male nurse to complaints; (5) 
Lack of care by the Physician Superintendent and other members of the 
medical staff. The Farleigh Hospital inquiry in 1971 investigated the ill-
treatment of patients and violence to patients. This enquiry resulted in nine 
nurses being charged with offenses relating to cruelty. Six were acquitted and 
three were found guilty and received sentences of imprisonment. This 
hospital was known for its heavy-handed attitude towards patients. The 
Whittingham Hospital Report in 1972 was initiated when two senior members 
of staff complained directly to the Secretary of State for Social Services with 
allegations of ill-treatment of patients, fraud and maladministration, including 
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the suppression of complaints from student nurses. The enquiry uncovered 
financial irregularities and victimization, and two nurses were convicted of 
theft. Shortly after the police investigations, a nurse assaulted two patients, 
one of whom died. The nurse was convicted of manslaughter and 
imprisoned. 
The 1959 Act protected caretakers from prosecution (section 139) provided 
they had acted in good faith. Staff were expected to provide a safe and 
therapeutic environment. They were responsible for the cleanliness of the 
wards. They saw to it that medicines were given as prescribed. Caretakers 
were responsible to the hospital managers. They had to adhere to the 
procedures and policies of their employing authority. They had to ensure that 
the care they provided was in line with the prescriptions of the psychiatrist. 
They were part of the multidisciplinary team responsible for care and 
treatment. They protected patients from racial or sexual harassment, and 
from being aggressive and or violent to each other. They carried through a 
variety of therapies from group discussion to individual counselling. They 
organized the day so that patients received therapy, rest and entertainment. 
They maintained the rules of the institution, for example not allowing drink or 
drugs on the premises. Caretakers working as community psychiatric nurses 
provided care and treatment in the community. They visited patients in their 
homes and in day hospitals, maintained medicines and gave intramuscular 
long-acting medications. They ran support groups and offered individual 
counselling sessions. They also provided a variety of therapies to individuals 
and groups in the community, such as behaviour therapy and cognitive 
therapy. For patients in hospital caretakers were the planners of the 24 hour 
care and treatment day. Essentially they were responsible for ensuring the 
safety of the patients. 
Concerning patients' rights, caretakers must ensure that the Mental Health 
Act of 1959 is interpreted so that individual rights were not abused. They must 
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be aware of the distinctions between 'formal' and 'informal' patients, and the 
associated rights of the individual admitted informally or formally. For 
example, they had to ensure that patients received their visitors, and that they 
received and could send out their post and that patients' property was safely 
looked after; they were responsible for making sure that patients were not 
abused with medicine by over-enthusiastic doctors or nurses. They acted as 
patients' advocates, and provided a listening ear. They also had to ensure 
that the papers for sectioned patients were properly filled in and that the 
duration of sections was known; that clear guidelines for complaints and 
questions existed; that records and notes of all the activities and happenings 
on the ward were maintained. 
The 1983 Act made the caretaker for the first time able to keep a person in 
hospital. Section (5) allows the mental nurse to keep someone detained 
against his or her will for up to 6 hours until the doctor responsible can make 
a decision with the multidisciplinary team as to whether the person can be 
discharged or not. The 1983 Act spelt out new responsibilities for the 
managers, for example managers were now required to give the patient and 
his/her family full information about his/her status while in hospital. The 
caretaker as advocate for the patient must ensure that these new rules were 
maintained. If there were any complaints or refusal to co-operate on the part 
of the patient, and if the Mental Health Act Commission was called, then the 
caretaker could be asked to be a member of the panel which looked at the 
practices of the institution. 
The 1983 Act reminded caretakers of the rights of patients receiving care and 
treatment. In instances where a second opinion was required, this must be 
truly a second opinion, given by a doctor approved by the Mental Health Act 
Commission. Patients may have access to a legal representative paid for by 
themselves, their relatives or by legal aid. Admission for observation must be 
for observation only, treatment must not be given on an observation order 
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except as a one-off emergency treatment. A treatment order, although 
allowing treatment, must still adhere to the consent and second opinion rules. 
The second opinion rule was available for drug treatment, ECT, for implants 
and for psycho-surgery. Patients and their families must be told how they can 
get in touch with the Mental Health Act Commission and the Mental Health 
Review Tribunal. 
The Community Care Act 1991 makes it explicit that in the future community 
care for the mentally ill must be developed. The Act asks for a tightening up 
of the procedures when a mental patient is discharged from hospital. The 
discharge procedure should ensure that there is a named mental health 
professional assigned to the patient. 
The main social control aspect of caretaking work was concerned with 
medication, privacy, providing care for black people, working class people, 
disabled people, women and gay people. Medication, I felt, was given for 
therapeutic reasons and also to keep patients quiet and cooperative because 
there was usually too few staff to offer therapy to all the patients in a ward. 
Patients usually have little privacy in the wards. Here I am referring both to 
privacy between same sex patients and between males and females. For 
example, in dormitories both social space and privacy were limited. In the 
wards should a male or female patient became overactive and take off his/her 
clothes then the whole ward is available to look at him/her. Black patients do 
not receive a sensitive enough care approach. They usually receive large 
doses of medication and ECT, rather than opportunities to talk through their 
problems. Women patients are similarly not listened to, so their unique 
problems may go unheard. Gay and lesbian patients have difficulty talking 
about their relationships and problems because the staff are constantly trying 
to pressure them to change. Staff also make unpleasant remarks about gay 
and lesbian patients and treat their sexuality either as a joke or as a social 
problem. 
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The emphasis in the training I did, and in the textbooks I read, was on 
listening to patients and establishing relationships to enable the patients to 
make their own independent decisions. However, the work situation was filled 
with administrative tasks and the need to maintain the rules and regulations of 
the institution. I have always felt that there was too little time left to be with, 
and to listen to, patients. Much of my time was spent opening doors, locking 
doors, saying "you can do this" or "you cannot do that" and giving medicines. 
I think in some instances I had to appear to be busy, moving constantly 
throughout the ward, rather that being with the individual patient. In general, 
the expectations I had were only partially fulfilled. I had to be constantly 
balancing the time available to listen to patients against the time used doing 
domestic chores.' 
Discussion of contemporary caretakers' views 
It is evident from the interview data that power and powerlessness are central 
in the provision and use of mental health services. For the caretakers 
providing services, the exercise of professional discretion and judgement 
involves the use of power over fellow citizens who turn to them for help. 
Overall most of the contemporary caretakers expressed the following: mental 
health legislations provided for the care and treatment of the insane; mental 
health legislations were a major social control process for the insane; 
important changes in the role of caretakers were brought about by the 1983 
Mental Health Act. A minority of contemporary caretakers saw mental health 
legislations as protecting individuals from self harm, protecting caretakers 
from liability and contributing to the maintenance of social control. All the 
contemporary caretakers interviewed agreed that mental health legislations 
asks for the rights of patients to be respected. They saw such legislations as 
protecting patients from the potential abuse of their rights and protecting staff 
from litigation when working with patients. Patients' rights were seen as being 
protected through the admission procedures, the consent to treatment rules, 
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the provision of appeals through the Mental Health Review Tribunal and the 
functioning of the Mental Health Act Commissioners. 
While their main observations of mental health legislation were positive, some 
of the respondents felt that the 1983 Act, by emphasizing the rights of 
patients, might in some cases result in patients not receiving treatment early 
enough. They expressed the view that the shift from the medical dominance 
in care and treatment of the 1959 Act, to the more legalistic approach of the 
1983 Act, resulted in difficulties for caretakers. These difficulties they saw as 
being bound up with the administration of legal procedures, particularly those 
associated with the holding powers of caretakers, which some felt was an 
unnecessary development. Perhaps it is difficult for contemporary caretakers 
to recognize and articulate their social control functions. 
Caretakers were seen generally as acting in the best interests of the patients. 
Some respondents, however, felt that faulty assessments and diagnoses did 
occur, and that these sometimes have tragic consequences for patients and 
their relatives. Some felt that the use of the 1983 Act holding power could 
result in patients being detained unnecessarily. Reservations were also 
expressed about appeals to the Mental Health Review Tribunal. These were 
that such appeals were unlikely to succeed, as it was the patient's word 
against the right and power of the psychiatric system. 
It was felt that who received medication, what amount they got and when they 
received it was a main area of caretaker social control. Language was felt to 
be a barrier to effective relationships and the ensuring of rights of patients. 
This was considered to be evident in the medical and technical language of 
caretakers and doctors which described the person very differently from how 
the person saw himself/herself. Caretakers were thought of as withholding 
patients' rights because they were not fully aware of the details of the various 
mental health Acts and the rights enshrined in those Acts. 
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All the respondents expressed an awareness that women, black people and 
people with different sexualities did not receive suitable care and treatment. 
They thought this problem was generally recognized but no constructive 
approach was taken to provide effective care and treatment for these groups. 
Interviewees felt that the expectations which they had when they started 
training were frustrated as they saw much of the work to be custodial, 
mechanical, and task-orientated, and to include violent ways of dealing with 
people. 
The contemporary caretakers' views and much of the evidence found in 
researching this area highlight questions of liberty versus therapy, care and 
treatment within psychiatric services. Since the 1950s, psychiatry has 
received much critical questioning as to rights, liberties and justice. The 
caretakers interviewed recognised that patients sometimes lose merely as a 
result of their admission many of their rights that should accrue to all citizens. 
The rights debate is alive and well with caretakers. They also demonstrated 
their awareness of the subjective nature of psychiatry and of cross-cultural 
variations in concepts of health and illness. The caretakers saw as treatment 
being imposed on patients in varying degrees, forms and quantities. While 
they were critical of treatment regimes, they were mindful of the need to treat 
in order to prevent patients deteriorating, and exposing themselves to danger 
or to being a danger to others. They saw any rights debate which interferes 
with the clinical role as denying patients access to necessary treatments. 
What caretakers did not want is for the mentally ill to be aimlessly walking the 
streets, being decarcerated to accumulate in ghettos, exploited by private 
landlords and dying 'with their rights on'. On the other hand, the caretakers 
felt that the rights approach, while seeking to reduce the powers of medicine, 
appears to be extending the powers of social workers and caretakers. They 
saw themselves as intermediaries between doctors and patients, and 
between family members and doctors, and as general defenders of patients 
against the prejudice of their colleagues and the public. They voiced the 
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difficulties the patients faced but did little in a practical way to alleviate the 
problems. 
It is clearly a substantial task to challenge the power of the medical system 
and the psychiatric profession. The men and women working with the 
mentally ill at the end of the twentieth century represent an educated and 
critical group. All the approaches students learn must now involve users. For 
some caretakers user involvement is an empowering and exciting potential 
for improving services, for others it is a threat to their role. Mental health 
legislation was seen by the contemporary caretakers interviewed as providing 
for care and treatment, maintaining social control within the mental health 




The people who maintained the twenty-four hour care of the insane between 
1890 and 1990 were known as keepers, attendants and mental nurses. These 
changes in their job title reflect the changing roles which they performed 
during the period under study. Many of the changes in their role and functions 
were brought about by developments in mental health legislation. This 
chapter summarizes the overall effects of such legislation on the work of 
caretakers and the rights of the insane, drawing on both the historical and the 
contemporary data collected in the course of the study. 
Mental health legislation, medicine and changes in caretakers' work 
The Lunacy Act of 1890, the Mental Treatment Act of 1930, the Mental Health 
Act 1959 and the Mental Health Act 1983 all brought about policy changes 
which affected the work of caretakers and the rights of the insane. Associated 
with changes in caretakers' roles were shifts in both medical and public 
perceptions of mentally distressed persons. This is most clearly seen in the 
changed labelling of such persons, from 'lunatic', 'mad' and 'insane' in 1890 to 
'mental illness' in 1930 and 1959, and 'mental illness' and 'mental health 
problems' in 1983. 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, a system of institutions had been set 
up to control, care and treat the insane. The caretakers were not a highly 
trained workforce, they were poorly paid and worked under conditions of 
severe discipline and rules and regulations. Their daily work routines were not 
dissimilar from the lives of servants in great country houses; many were 
demobilized soldiers accustomed to giving and taking orders within 
institutional life. On the shoulders of these ill-equipped caretakers fell the 
problems of carrying out difficult tasks in a conflictual context. These conflicts 
related to caretakers' role in providing care and cure, on the one hand, and 
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secure containment, on the other. Other problems for caretakers were 
whether they were domestic labourers or carers, or mainly concerned with 
treatment, control and punishment. 
The Lunacy Act of 1890 required caretakers, then called asylum keepers and 
attendants, to supervise and exercise the insane inmates in accordance with 
the rules and regulations of the asylum. The attendants kept the institution 
clean and tidy, maintained order by controlling the inmates and functioned as 
the medical superintendent's servant. This period saw a shift in public 
thinking about madness, with madness being seen less as a disease related 
to the possession of devils, and more as a physiological state. With this 
thinking came the development of the asylum system to replace the 
haphazard mixture of private madhouses, public workhouses and prisons. At 
this time there was some training for caretakers in some asylums, but this 
varied and depended on the views and beliefs of the medical 
superintendents. 
The asylums did not bring about the promise of cure, but instead became 
establishments which exercised control. There was a strong emphasis on the 
orderly management of caretakers and the insane. The caretakers had to 
abide by the strict rules and regulations of the institution, and the 
idiosyncrasies of the doctors and the superintendents. 
The Mental Treatment Act of 1930 was passed within a climate in which 
politicians viewed mental illness as being similar to physical illnesses. They 
held the belief that such a view would minimize the stigma of mental illness. 
Politicians were also concerned about the need for a more humane approach 
to the mentally ill, and the development of a system which would ensure that 
the individual's rights were respected. In line with this thinking, the politicians 
argued for an Act which would place the treatment, care and control of the 
mentally ill with doctors rather than with magistrates. The policies which were 
222 
developed emphasized that mental illness could be cured, and that 
community care should be established. The shift to community care was 
based on the idea that it was better for people to be treated in their own 
homes, and that this would be cheaper than hospital care. Attempts to cure 
mental illness saw the vigorous use of insulin therapy, ECT, psychosurgery 
and drug therapy. Caretakers were therefore faced with claiming, on the one 
hand, that they were engaged in treating curable illnesses, while, on the 
other, believing that patients were suffering from hereditary conditions which 
had a poor prognosis. In reality, most of the work of caretakers was 
concerned with custody and control, and involved straitjackets, padded cells, 
forced feeding, exercise, farm and industrial work and surveillance. 
The clinical-somatic approach of the 1930s saw mental illness as a disease 
with physical causes. The dominance of this approach was related to 
developments in science and technology and the professionalization of health 
and welfare. In the nineteenth century, medicine was hailed as capable of 
curing a number of physical illnesses; the promise of scientific discovery was 
extended to psychiatry (Scull 1974). 
These changes also brought developments in the training of caretakers. 
Books were published and courses and examinations were developed to 
reflect the changed and changing work and role of caretakers. The training 
conformed to the General Nursing Council's training scheme for general 
nurses. It reflected the new emphasis in the work of caretakers which took on 
a more somatic approach. Caretakers implemented the treatment regimes of 
the doctors, kept patients under observation and reported the patients' 
conditions to the doctors. They were expected to be skilled in the following 
treatments: sedation, relaxation, insulin therapy, pyrotherapy, malaria and 
sulphosin therapy, diet and vitamin therapy, endocrine and drug therapies, 
operative intervention, rehabilitation, psychotherapy, massage and 
hydrotherapy. But along with those mainly physical interventions, caretakers 
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still entertained patients, shared in domestic chores such as polishing the 
floors, and spent long hours with patients in the airing courts. The change in 
caretakers' title from 'attendant' to 'mental nurse' was also completed during 
this period. 
The 1930 Act saw the introduction of the Board of Control which was 
established to consider appeals from patients and to visit asylums, hospitals 
and private madhouses, to enquire into aspects of the running of such 
institutions and the rights of the people incarcerated as being mentally ill. The 
Act introduced the categories of 'voluntary' and 'certified' patient. Voluntary 
patients were admitted of their own volition, and certified patients were 
admitted by the recommendations of two doctors. Voluntary patients not only 
had the right to decide on their admission but could in principle decide on the 
termination of their hospitalization. 
The 1959 Act consolidated all the previous mental health legislation and 
brought in changes which affected the rights of patients and the work of 
caretakers. The Act resulted in a reduction in the numbers of people being 
admitted to mental hospitals. This was achieved through the challenge to 
institutional care, increased pressure to admit people voluntarily and 
increased access to the Mental Health Review Tribunals. Although patients in 
theory had access to tribunals, the delays before cases were reviewed led to 
questions as to whether they were getting a fair deal. Within the area of care 
and treatment, the somatic approach became more dominant, with doctors 
enjoying more control in all aspects of the institution. 
Outpatient clinics were well-established and greater use of occupational 
therapy was evident. Many more psychiatric wards were established in 
general hospitals. Community care became a key word, and this was 
provided as a mixture of domiciliary visits, social clubs for ex-patients and an 
emphasis on early admission and early discharge. Psychopathy as a mental 
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disorder was added to the classification of mental disorders, the formality in 
the admission of voluntary patients was reduced and the Board of Control 
was abolished to make way for the new Mental Health Review Tribunal. 
The Mental Health Review Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the application of 
compulsory powers subsequent to admission, and afforded discharge to the 
Responsible Medical Officer, the hospital managers and the nearest relative. 
Patients could now be admitted to any hospital or mental nursing home 
without formalities. They could be admitted for observation or for treatment. 
Guardianship was introduced, and this meant that patients could remain in 
the community and be supervised by a named local authority worker, usually 
a social worker. The 1959 Act presented a completely anti-legalistic approach 
to insanity, dispensing with all the judicial roles around commitment. 
This period saw an influx of psychologists in mental health care. According to 
Ramon (1985) psychologists started to contribute to soldiers suffering from 
shell-shock during the first world war 1914-1918. However clinical 
psychologists as a group were not employed until 1928, when Ms Baldwin, a 
student of Cyril Burt was employed by the Tavistock Clinic. They mainly 
followed a psychoanalytic approach which emphasized a focus on 
individuals, their unconscious and emotional life and childhood relations with 
parents. This approach saw mental disorders as the result of unresolved 
emotional conflict, and accepted hereditary factors as one basic cause of 
mental illness. 
With the second world war came a boom in psychologists working in child 
guidance clinics, hospitals and outpatient departments. Their work involved 
personality- and intelligence-testing and psychotherapy. The power of 
psychological testing gave psychologists a new role within psychiatry. 
Psychiatrists used the tests to aid their diagnostic and intervention processes. 
At the same time, psychologists were developing their own intervention 
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programmes, such as behaviour therapies which became part of the 
treatment available. 
The 1983 Mental Health Act moved the approaches to care and treatment 
towards a more legal and rights arena, which, while not reducing the clinical-
somatic approach, attempted to increase the civil rights of patients. Social 
workers were now to be more involved in admission procedures. The Mental 
Health Review Tribunal was raquired to respond more rapidly. A new body, 
the Mental Health Act Commission, was established to ensure good practice 
and to make sure that the procedures for consent to treatment and second 
opinion rules were followed. Caretakers were given new powers to detain 
patients in hospital. 
Contemporary caretakers feel that the 1983 Mental Health Act has generally 
led to better protection for the rights of patients. But they also see these 
changes as inhibiting to some degree patients' rights to care and treatment. 
They are concerned about the rights expressed in the 1983 Act and the 
difficulties which are still evident in ensuring that those rights are achieved. 
Caretakers have remained central to the running of hospital wards, and only a 
minority have become involved in community care. The clinical-somatic 
approach to care has resulted in most of the caretakers' functions being 
concentrated on maintaining medication. However, these same changes also 
made possible the development of new caretaker skills such as group work, 
therapeutic community skills, counselling skills and psychotherapy skills. The 
result is that caretakers are once again emphasizing their role in developing 
interpersonal therapeutic relationships with patients. 
Power, social control and caretakers' work 
This study has focused on the job title of caretaker, as a concept which 
embodies the care, custodial and social control functions of people who look 
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after the mentally distressed. The concept emphasizes caring functions which 
goes beyond medical care and treatment. For caretakers, the medical care 
and treatment which they offer is equal to their other functions. Those other 
functions have historically included: the social control of the insane, the 
madman/madwoman or the mentally ill person through the rules and 
regulations of the institutions in which caretakers work; the patience to 
support someone who is mentally distressed; using time productively in the 
wcrk situation to enable people to come to their own decisions and take 
responsibility for themselves; and encouraging people to be open to new 
insights and so to grow. 
The evidence drawn on in this study demonstrates that the provision of 
services for the insane has meant that both the people deemed to be insane 
and that caretakers have been subject to social control within institutions. The 
nature of this control has embraced the social for the caretakers, and the 
social and the medical for the insane. The government, through mental health 
legislation, has sought to maintain the social control aspect of mental health 
care both in institutions and in the community. But this state approach to the 
insane, while providing caring services, has at the same time tended to 
encroach on the civil rights of the individual. 
Drawing on the work of Illich (1976), it could be argued that the insane are 
subjected to social control through the ways in which doctors and caretakers 
exercise power over them. The insane are cast in a passive role; they are 
labelled and treated as inactive subjects. Treatments are carried out by 
doctors and nurses who are involved in power and social control 
relationships with the insane. Following Weber (1949), these power 
relationships mean that some people in relationships are able to pursue 
goals despite the resistance of others. Caretakers were seen by the 
superintendents and the doctors as both obedient servants of the institution 
and servants to the insane, as rule-keepers and rule-enforcers. Caretakers 
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were required to keep to the rule-book or risk dismissal. 
The contemporary caretakers interviewed recognize their treatment and 
social control functions. They see the mental health services as protecting the 
individual from self-abuse, but they are also aware of the abuse of the rights 
of the individual within the these services. They see some of their caring 
activities as involving negotiation with the patient, but the main aim of their 
work is to ensure patient compliance. Social control is an important element 
in the structure of mental institutions, and the legitimation of social control is 
an important part of the process of professionalization. 
The social control functions of caretakers of the insane embrace the social 
control functions of medicine and the medicalization of behaviour. Conrad 
and Schneider (1980) argue that there are some benefits in the social control 
of behaviour through medicine. It provides for a humanitarian approach to the 
control of the insane which is not retributive nor punitive, but ideally 
therapeutic; it increases tolerance and compassion for human problems. 
According to Zola (1975), medicalization results in prestige for 'scientific' 
treatments, particularly if these prove successful. The use of the label 'sick' 
allows for the conditional legitimation of insanity, and leads to a optimistic 
view of outcomes and the possibility of a cure. Medical social control may 
circumvent legal and judicial procedures, and may be applied more 
informally. Conrad (1975), on the other hand, sees social control as removing 
responsibility from the individual; treatments are cloaked in the mantle of 
science and it is wrongly assumed that medical intervention is objective, 
value-free and morally neutral. What medical men and women do is effectively 
mystified and removed from the arena of public debate; insanity and other 
behaviours are defined as a medical problem requiring bodily manipulation; 
social problems are individualized and their causes are seen as lurking in the 
individual rather than in the social system. The net effect is that behaviour 
problems are depoliticized, and political protest is neutralized because it is 
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itself rendered symptomatic of mental illness. 
Susan Sontag (1978) has suggested that illness is used as a metaphor for 
various kinds of social problems. We use its medicalization to detract us from 
looking at the social structures and the social conditions which play a 
significant part in causing and maintaining social problems. 
The rights of the insane and caretakers' work 
Psychiatry depends on the judicial system to confer legitimacy on its activities 
and so give doctors power to control the disruptive individual. The history of 
mental health statutes is that these imposed a duty on authorities to provide 
asylums and enabled legal, medical and lay personnel to scrutinize the 
conditions prevailing in asylums and madhouses. The 1890 Lunacy Act saw 
the Lunacy Commissions' functions expanding to being a legal watch-dog 
and administrative overlord of the admission and treatment of the insane. The 
background for this expanded role came from the popularity of the Moral 
Treatment and Non-Restraint movements and the work of Lord Ashley in 
Parliament. Thus in the rhetoric of the period the Lunacy Commission should 
strive to protect the insane from exploitation, abuse and inhumane treatment. 
The 1890 Act placed emphasis on the frequent and detailed visitation of all 
places in which the insane were confined, with power given to the Lunacy 
Commission to discharge or sanction a probationary release; to ascertain 
that no persons were improperly confined; to release patients no longer 
dangerous to themselves or to others and not likely to benefit from further 
treatment; to maintain an open-door system; to provide occupation and 
amusement; to insist on the submission of monthly reports and on medical 
certificates for each mechanical restraint; to ensure greater rights for the 
insane with regard to their correspondence; and to institute the ruling that any 
person could have an insane person seen by two medical practitioners and 
then discharged with the consent of the Lunacy Commissioners. However, in 
the main the Act was designed to protect private insane persons. Such 
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persons could be confined only if an order was signed by a Magistrate or 
Justice of the Peace specially appointed by the Secretary of State, unless it 
was an emergency, in which case one medical certificate was appropriate, or 
unless the person was found to be insane by inquisition. The Lunacy 
Commissioners were also able to enter and survey charitable and religious 
institutions. 
The period in which the 1890 Lunacy Act was designed saw a great deal of 
activity from three organizations which were prominent in working for the 
reform of mental health legislation. These were the Lunacy Reform 
Association, The lunacy Law Amendment Society and the National 
Association for the Defence of Personal Rights. In 1913 the Lunacy 
Commission was replaced by the Board of Control. The 1930 Mental 
Treatment Bill was passed after extensive debates in Parliament. Members 
argued that patients needed protection against themselves and against their 
relatives. They questioned the power of the Board of Control and the poor 
conditions under which the mentally ill lived in asylums. Members were 
concerned that patients were hospitalized as a result of misjudgment and 
misapplication of diagnosis. The Report of the Royal Commission on Lunacy 
and Mental Disorder chaired by the Rt. Hon. H.P Macmillan proposed that 
civil legislation for the mentally ill should be replaced by medical 
authorization. One factor which contributed to the reversal of the legalism of 
the 1890 Lunacy Act was the increasing prestige of the medical profession. 
Other factors included the development of social work, occupational therapy, 
psychology and the training of attendants. There was concern that the rights 
of the patient must be protected, along with the rights of the public. The 
asylums were now re-christened mental hospitals, the insane were referred to 
as patients, and the drive was towards informalization and voluntarism. 
This period saw the development of clinics for mental disorders associated 
with general hospitals and medical schools. These provided for early 
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treatment, education and research. Patients were admitted informally or 
formally and their admission depended on medical recommendation. The 
initial period of a compulsory order was six months, and this could be 
extended with the permission of the Board of Control. The Board of Control 
visited and reported to the Ministry of Health on the state of hospitals, clinics 
and private madhouses. These changes resulted in caretakers being trained 
in the techniques associated with physical treatments for the mentally 
distressed, such as psychosurgery, ECT and medication. They were a!so 
required to provide programmes to re-socialize patients, to provide for their 
entertainment and to engage patients in worthwhile activities such as tailoring 
and dressmaking. At the same time the developing hospitals were being built 
with large farms which provided occupation for the staff and patients and a 
sense of a self-contained community. 
The 1959 Mental Health Act's main intention was to free all but a few patients 
from compulsory detention and treatment. The Act abolished the Board of 
Control and established the Mental Health Review Tribunal. With the 
introduction of the National Health Service, the Minister of Health became 
responsible for the control and supervision of local authority services, of all 
National Health Service hospitals and clinics and for licensing all hospitals 
outside the National Health Service. The Board of control, although 
responsible for all matters affecting the patients and their rights, had powers 
which were largely advisory. The Royal Commission on the Law relating to 
Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency (1957) favoured the abolition of the 
Board of Control. The 1959 Act brought the Mental Health Review Tribunal, 
which consists of three members - a doctor, a lawyer and a lay member. It 
functions as the body to which certain compulsorily detained patients can 
apply to for discharge. A patient or his/her nearest relative can only apply to 
the Tribunal at certain times. If the patient is detained under Section 26 of the 
1959 Act (admission for treatment) he/she may apply to the tribunal within six 
months starting at the date when the Section came in force. A patient under 
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guardianship may apply within six months of the starting date. If a patient 
under Section 26 is re-classified as suffering from a mental disorder which is 
different from the one specified on the application form, the doctor must 
inform the hospital authorities which must in turn inform the patient and the 
nearest relative; the patient or the nearest relative may then apply to the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal within 28 days of receiving the information. If a 
patient is transferred from guardianship to hospital he/she may apply within 
six months of the transfer. A patient detained under Section 60 can apply 
within six months starting at the date when the Section came in force. Any 
patient detained under Section 65 cannot write directly to the Tribunal, but 
can write to the Home Secretary asking him/her to refer the case. The Home 
Secretary must refer the case within two months of receiving the request. The 
nearest relative can order the discharge of a patient by giving 72 hours notice 
to the hospital managers. If the Responsible Medical Officer overrules on the 
grounds that the patient is dangerous, the nearest relative can apply to the 
Tribunal within 28 days of being overruled. 
Under Section 123 of the Mental Health Act 1959, a Mental Health Review 
Tribunal can direct the discharge of a patient. It must be satisfied that the 
patient is not suffering from mental illness, a psychopathic disorder, 
subnormality or severe subnormality; and that detention is not necessary in 
the interests of the patient's health or safety or the protection of other 
persons. This period saw caretakers as involved more on the level of physical 
treatment and the maintenance of institutional life. At the same time the new 
emphasis on community care brought the development of community 
psychiatric nursing. There was a realization that the structure and 
organization of the hospital has pathological elements, and that a more 
relaxed atmosphere needs to be introduced. Patients were encouraged to 
talk, read and to do things for themselves, while caretakers responded by 
trying to create an institutional climate where interpersonal relations could be 
nurtured (Nolan 1993). 
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The 1983 Mental Health Act consolidated the 1959 Mental Health Act and the 
1982 Amendment Act, and restored to a central place in mental health 
legislation the legal safeguards for patients. The Act's reforming provisions 
were in part due to the contributions of MIND. The Act introduced stricter 
criteria for compulsory admissions with the Approved Social Worker playing a 
key role. It provided more procedures for reviewing commitment, the 
strengthening of patients' rights to resist unwanted treatments, a system to 
protect the rights of nformal patients, the reduction of restrictions on patients, 
and the establishment of a body to monitor practice and patients' rights and 
to assist in new consent to treatment rules. In order to see through these 
initiatives, the Act established a new body, the Mental Health Act 
Commission, and retained the Mental Health Review Tribunal. 
The Mental Health Act Commission was established by the Secretary of State 
and its membership consisted of a chairman and members including doctors, 
lawyers, nurses, psychologists, social workers and academics. The 
Commission took up its duties on September 30, 1983. The Commission's 
functions as laid down by Section 121(2) of the 1983 Act, are: to review the 
care and treatment of detained patients; to appoint medical practitioners to 
give second opinions; to provide for a multidisciplinary review of consent to 
treatment; to draw up a Code of Practice; and to review decisions concerned 
with the censoring of patients' correspondence. 
The Mental Health Review Tribunal which was established under the 1959 
Mental Health Act was retained and strengthened under the 1983 Act. Section 
66 of the 1983 Act identifies the occasions when a patient or his/her nearest 
relative may make application to the Tribunal. Applications may be made 
under the following circumstances (1) a patient admitted to hospital for 
assessment under Section 2 may apply within 14 days of admission; (2) a 
patient admitted to hospital for treatment under Section 3 may apply within 6 
months of admission; (3) a patient received into guardianship under Section 7 
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may apply within 6 months of the date of the order; (4) where a patient's 
diagnosis is re-classified, the patient or his/her nearest relative may apply 
within 28 days of the date when they were informed of the re-classification; (5) 
a patient transferred from guardianship may apply within six months of the 
date of the ti-ansfer; (6) where a nearest relative is restricted from making an 
application for discharge, the nearest relative can apply within 28 days of 
being told that the responsible medical officer has prevented discharge. 
The Tribunal under the 1959 Act had to discharge the patient once the 
decision was reached. Now the Tribunal can delay discharge, suggest a 
transfer to another hospital, re-classify the patient to another form of mental 
disorder or recommend transfer to guardianship (Gostin 1983). Apart from 
the patient or his/her nearest relative applying to the Tribunal, the Home 
Secretary can apply for restricted patients and the Secretary of State for 
Social Services can refer a case at any time. Also the 1983 Act ensures 
automatic review to guard against patients who do not take the opportunity to 
apply. Finally the 1983 Act provides for legal aid for patients wanting to be 
represented before a Tribunal. According to Bean (1986), although the Mental 
Health Review Tribunal has considerable advantages, the composition of the 
Tribunal lacks a social worker and so the decision-making process is different 
from that used for admission procedures. 
Gostin (1983) has argued that the basic strategy for mental health reform is 
the 'ideology of entitlement', which he saw as having three components. 
Firstly, the health and social services for the mentally ill should not be 
dependent on the discretion of politicians, administrators or professionals, 
but be entitlements enabling the courts to be used to ensure that such rights 
were not denied. This would allow for remedies where entitlements created by 
statute through mental health legislations were not being met. It would also 
be a way of enforcing the allocation of resources to the mental health services 
to improve conditions in institutions and for developing services in the 
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community. Secondly, the involvement of non medical personnel in decisions 
about compulsory admissions, the facilitation of automatic and regular review 
of individual patients and the limiting of treatment without consent, and so 
protecting users against abuses of their rights. Thirdly, the maintenance of 
the civil status of the user, for example the right to vote and to have access to 
the courts. Such an entitlement would challenge the entrenched social control 
approach of doctors, caretakers and other professionals and administrators 
involved in the planning and delivery of services. It would also enable users 
and carers to exercise legal and political pressure to enforce the rights of 
people deemed to be mentally ill. 
Caretakers were given recognition by the Act. They not only played a part in 
multidisciplinary consultations, but for the first time they were given the power 
to detain patients on their own initiative through a holding power valid for six 
hours. 
Mental health legislation has contributed to changes in the work of caretakers 
and to changes in the civil rights of the mentally ill. Each new piece of 
legislation brought with it new definitions and new demands. Not all the 
changes have resulted in improved care for the mentally ill. It could be argued 
that there has been progression with regard to the civil rights of the mentally 
ill. However, any assumption along those lines must attend to the evidence 
which shows that the mentally ill have been socially and medically controlled 




The work of the men and women who care for the mentally ill has traditionally 
received very little attention. The investigation described in this thesis has 
sought to inquire into how government policies and legislations influenced 
the roles and responsibilities of the caretakers and the rights of the 'insane'. 
The evidence drawn on has included primary and secondary historical 
sources, and conversations with contemporary caretakers. The study is an 
attempt to provide original evidence of the changes in the work of caretakers 
between 1890-1990, and to collate information on how the provision of care 
and treatment for the mentally ill has changed. It has sought to find out how 
the mentally ill have been viewed over this period, and what care and 
treatment has been made available to them. 
From attendant to mental health nurse 
Since 1890, the care and treatment of the insane, the mad and the mentally ill 
has undergone many changes. The middle of the nineteenth century saw an 
unparalleled move towards the institutionalization of the insane in both private 
and state institutions. Pauper lunatics were accommodated in workhouses 
and the county borough asylums, while the middle classes were cared for in 
private madhouses. At this time psychiatry was being developed as a branch 
of medicine and started to provide the rationale for the bureaucratic 
supervision and control of the insane. The legislative approach embodied in 
the 1890 Lunacy Act emphasized safeguards for individuals against 
unjustified hospitalization, and conceived of the insane as persons with rights. 
The legislation did not focus on intervention, but emphasized the individual's 
rights vis-a-vis the state. This was a positive move, even though it was the 
middle classes, magistrates and commissioners who decided on the 
soundness of mind of mainly working class individuals. Commissioners, for 
example, would inspect institutions to assess the adequacy of the physical 
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conditions, but they did not assess the care given or the clinical decisions 
that were made. 
The 1890 Lunacy Act represented the formalization and legalization of insanity 
within the asylum. The legal approach to insanity was thought to be 
protecting sane rational individuals with free will from abuse. For example, 
individuals who were eccentric and wealthy were vulnerable, as they were 
likely to be consigned to licensed houses whose proprietors had a financial 
interest in their continued retention. 
The Mental Health Act 1930 changed all these arrangements by rejecting 
legalism in the interests of the early treatment of mental disorders. This Act 
marked a sharp break with legal certification and the dominance of the 
asylum, and its objectives were seen as contributing to public health and 
voluntarism. The asylums, now known as mental hospitals, retained their 
dominance alongside the new emphasis on clinics and psychiatric wards in 
general hospitals. This period saw the ideology of disease and the principles 
of general medicine imposed on mental treatment, and a move towards the 
therapeutic state, with state agencies engaged in the provision of care, 
treatment and cure of social problems. 
The caretakers were occupied with rules, routines and cleanliness. The 
training given concentrated on medical diseases and physical treatments. 
They saw their job as an occupation rather that as a profession, with most of 
their interventions dominated by medication and control. They saw hospitals 
as the best places for patients, although they were also seen as stigmatizing. 
This, Ramon (1985) argued, probably contributed to the development of the 
Mental Aftercare Association which favoured the establishment of cottage 
accommodation for patients at the point of leaving hospital. Some caretakers 
argued for psychiatric nursing to be given the same status as general 
nursing. 
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The 1959 Mental Health Act came into being in the context of the universalist 
National Health Service. Treatment now included more reliance on ECT, the 
new psychotropic drugs and the open door policy. The clinical-somatic 
approach to insanity continued to be the main approach to care and 
treatment. This approach, however, was increasingly criticized by 
sociologists, anti-psychiatrists, psychologists, new self-help groups and 
MIND. 
The training of caretakers was now organized and examined by the General 
Nursing Council and topics such as group work and interpersonal skills were 
in training programmes. Despite these changes, caretakers accepted that 
their role was uncritically to carry out medical staff's instructions and 
prescriptions. For the first time caretakers were working with distressed 
adults in the community. Some also worked as social therapists. As 
Community Psychiatric Nurses, most were content with administering 
doctors' orders. At the same time, social workers, psychologists and 
occupational therapists were growing in number and participating actively in 
patient care. 
The 1959 Act emphasized voluntary admission, which implied that patients 
were in hospital out of their own volition rather that through coercion; it 
afforded greater measures of citizens' rights and hence personal dignity for 
the patient. Day hospitals were established, together with observation units in 
general hospitals, domiciliary services and an open door policy, and there 
was greater use of psychotropic drugs. The negative impact of 
institutionalization on patients was recognized, and the need for alternatives 
to care within the traditional hospital was acknowledged. The harmful effects 
of ECT, psychosurgery and psychotropic drugs, although mentioned, were 
not taken seriously. People were still staying in hospitals because there were 
too few alternatives in the community, and continued hospitalization fostered 
chronicity regardless of the patient's status. 
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The 1983 Mental Health Act introduced stricter criteria for admissions, 
whether for assessment or treatment, and required social workers working 
with the mentally ill and having responsibilities for recommending compulsory 
admission to be specially trained as Approved Social Workers. Registered 
Mental Nurses were given the power to detain a patient already in hospital for 
six hours. This was a major change in the work and role of the caretakers, 
and was the first time that their custodial role had been formalized. 
The Act demands that patient's consent be sought for all treatments except in 
emergencies, when a one off-treatment can be given. The consent to 
treatment rules are overseen by a new body, the Mental Health Act 
Commissioners, whose remit is to protect the rights of detained patients. The 
Commissioners can receive complaints, monitor the use of the Act and visit 
hospitals to report on all aspects of a hospital's functions. 
The Act had attempted to respond to criticisms by MIND concerning the 
workings of the Mental Health Review Tribunal. The Tribunal can now overrule 
the Responsible Medical Officer and discharge a patient, and patients are 
now granted automatic hearings without having to appeal. 
Models of insanity and of caretaking work 
Throughout the period 1890 to 1990 the caretakers of the insane have 
responded to the wishes of superintendents and doctors and their work has 
been affected by changing legislation. By becoming nurses, caretakers left 
behind social skills of care and adopted a clinical-somatic approach to 
insanity. The clinical-somatic approach, although useful, cannot provide for all 
the needs of the insane, and it is only since the 1983 Mental Health Act that 
caretakers appear to be trying to regain the social within their work. 
Mental health legislation has formed part of a major series of changes in the 
social treatment of mental illness. First, there was the rise of the asylum and 
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the capture of this domain by the medical men. Secondly came an extension 
of the concept of mental illness, along with control and surveillance within and 
without the asylums and madhouses; and the development of new therapies 
and professions, notably, social work, psychology, psychoanalysis, the use 
of drugs and the beginning of the emptying of the asylums. The integration of 
the legal and the medical, therefore, emphasized the power of psychiatry as a 
method of defining and regulating social behaviour 
The Lunacy Act of 1890, the Mental Treatment Act of 1930, the Mental Health 
Act 1959 and the Mental Health Act 1983 all brought about changes in 
policies which affected the work of caretakers and the rights of the insane. 
Those changes affected the roles and functions of caretakers and established 
new rights for patients. Associated with the changes in the caretakers' roles 
were also changes in both medical and public perceptions of mentally 
distressed persons. This was seen clearly in the changes of the label for such 
persons, from lunatic, mad and insane in 1890 to mental illness in 1930 and 
1959, and mental illness and mental health problems in 1983. 
The Lunacy Act of 1890 required caretakers, then called asylum keepers and 
attendants, to supervise and exercise the insane inmates in accordance to the 
rules and regulations of the asylum. The attendants kept the institution clean 
and tidy, maintained order by controlling the inmates and functioned as the 
medical superintendent's servants. This period saw the shift in public thinking 
about madness, with madness being seen more as a physiological state than 
a disease related to possession by devils. With this thinking came the 
development of the asylum system to replace the haphazard mixture of 
private madhouses, public workhouses and prisons. At this time the training 
of caretakers took place in some asylums but it was varied and depended on 
the views and beliefs of the medical superintendents. 
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The 1930 and the 1959 Acts saw an influx of psychologists into mental health 
care. Caretakers remained central to the running of wards while only a 
minority became involved in community care. The clinical somatic approach 
to care resulted in most of the caretakers' functions being concentrated with 
maintaining medication. The same changes, however, made possible the 
development of caretaker skills including group work, therapeutic community 
skills, counselling skills and psychotherapy skills. Caretakers were once 
again emphasizing their role in developing interpersonal therapeutic 
relationships with patients. 
The 1983 Mental Health Act moved the approaches to care and treatment 
towards a more legal and rights arena, which, while not reducing the clinical-
somatic approach, attempted to increase the civil rights of patients. 
Social workers were now to be more involved in admission procedures. The 
Mental Health Review Tribunal was required to respond more rapidly. A new 
body, the Mental Health Act Commission, was established to ensure good 
practices and to make sure that the procedures for consent to treatment and 
second opinion rules were followed. Caretakers were given new powers to 
detain patients in hospital. 
Contemporary caretakers feel that the 1983 Mental Health Act has led to 
changes in provisions to ensure that patients' rights are respected. They see 
those changes as inhibiting to some degree patients' rights to care and 
treatment. They are also concerned about the rights expressed in the 1983 
Act and the difficulties which are still evident in ensuring that those rights are 
achieved. 
Caretaking today 
The ideology of the caretakers of the insane is usually expressed as an ethic 
of service. That is, the caretakers exist for the benefit of any member of 
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society who has need of their expertise. However, there has been a long 
history of critical opinions which argue that such claims meet the needs of the 
occupation of caretaking more than they do the needs of service-users (see 
e.g. Illich 1976; Wilding 1982). Such a critical approach suggests that 
caretakers seek to control the clients, through the power exercised over 
individuals. This situation is seen in the power of occupational groups, and 
the conferring of client or patient status is rejected by groups of people who 
recognize the impact that such a situation has on their lives (MIND 
Manchester Group, 1988). Further, terms such as 'client' and 'patient' are 
socially constructed by the power of health care professionals, casting 
people thus labelled into a passive role. Caretakers have the people they 
work with, their service-users, defined for them by psychiatrists. Psychiatrists 
draw on legal statutes for the power to diagnose and prescribe. Prescription 
by psychiatrists include assigning tasks to caretakers. Nurses frequently have 
the knowledge and skills to undertake diagnosis, but these are circumscribed 
by the power of doctors defending their control over this area of work. Such 
situations result in nurses developing strategies for influencing doctors 
(Johnson 1978; Keddy et a/.,1986; Schutzenhofer 1988; Damrosch et 
a/.,1987) The caretakers of the insane are in a similar position. Another area 
of concern derives from the development of modern nursing in the social, 
political and economic changes of the nineteenth century. This occupation 
provided openings for work for women within patriarchal structures. The men 
who were involved in such work were either located at the margins or they 
managed and controlled it. 
What is evident is that caretakers are controlled through the institutions of law 
and medicine, through the particular structures of their occupational rules and 
regulations and through the management of settings in which the insane are 
housed. Caretakers are therefore involved in power and social control 
processes as a collectivity and as individuals. They are involved in power and 
social control relationships with the insane. Within this web of power and 
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social control relationships, it must be remembered that clients/patients are 
primarily medical labels, and people are constantly in the process of 
establishing their active identities as service-users, in an attempt to create a 
situation where they are no longer passive recipients of sometimes 
questionable services. These ideas concerned with the empowerment of 
service-users are evident in the work of pressure groups such as MIND and 
self-help groups organized around a specific theme (Wilson 1987). 
Resistance and possibilities for change 
Within the framework of the limitations on their work imposed by legislation, 
professional ideologies, limited resources, and public attitudes, it is clear from 
this study that caretakers have some capacity to take forward a radical 
agenda for mental health service provision. 
The work of caretakers must be considered as a departure from general 
nursing. Perhaps a new professional group is required for the future. One 
thing is clear from this investigation: that, even if the workers with the insane 
remain within the professional category of nursing, in the future the emphasis 
on caretaking should be integrated with the nursing and the medical models. 
This would create a group of workers who would challenge the contradiction 
within psychiatry whereby it is simultaneously a regulatory social apparatus 
and a system of treatment and care, and would lead to a new emphasis on 
the need to empower and protect the rights of the person deemed to be 
insane. In so doing, caretakers would draw on the ideas of Karl Marx who 
saw the economic relationships of capitalism as having consequences for 
social relationships through the process of alienation. They would address 
the need to work with people at the community level, to know about 
unemployment, poor housing, low wages and the health of the environment, 
along with the social, health, welfare and educational services which exist. 
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As a more political group of care workers, caretakers could become more 
involved in the political process through joining with user groups to ask for 
more resources and better facilities to provide care. To ask survivors, were 
your rights infringed on by the mental health services and how? To ask users 
and carers, how can the mental health services ensure that rights are 
respected and not abused? 
In order to take on this role, caretakers would need a different type of 
education - one with more emphasis on the social sciences, counselling, 
mental health promotion, philosophy and law, along with specialist medical 
and psychiatric knowledge. These political activities might take place at both 
the community and the local level, and would include the interrogation of 
medical judgements and treatments for their effectiveness and safety, and 
especially the need for more information about the side-effects of prescribed 
drugs and the use of ECT. Caretakers can insist that any form of therapy, 
intervention or research acknowledges hidden political and gender issues. 
They could make more use of the 'conscience' clause in contracts when they 
are unhappy about participating in procedures with which they disagree. 
They have the potential to be involved in addressing the social divisions of 
patriarchy, class and racism, which result in life problems and help to 
'produce' mental illness. In so doing, caretakers can prevent the 
marginalization of feminist issues. They may also seek opportunities to re-
educate women to speak out against patriarchy and oppression, and insist 
that they are listened to. In seeing this agenda through, caretakers could 
assist women in, according to Ussher (1991), 'dethroning the patriarchs', and 
developing women-centred practices such as feminist therapy and 
community projects where women live and work. Such projects could provide 
for local political action, women's refuges and mental health support. All these 
activities would be presented in a multidimensional way, using the medical 
model where it suits women, along with feminist and humanist approaches. 
For example, a woman might need space away from family and society - an 
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asylum; and the need for asylum does not mean that people should be 
locked away, but that they should be provided with safety and space without 
coercion. Similarly chemicals may be needed to reduce depression, but they 
should not be seen as the sole cure, only as an aid. 
Caretakers are ideally placed to recognize the complexity of mental health 
and illness phenomena and not just to categorize, diagnose and label women 
in a one-dimensional way. Caretakers could address women's need for 
economic support, child support, therapy or medicines, by ensuring that 
different interventions are available at different times. However, to achieve 
some measure of help or care for women positioned as mad, the 
professionals will need re-education. 
Caretakers would need to develop a strong sense of accountability as a 
prerequisite for working with people. This accountability would need to be 
directed towards the men, women and children who use the mental health 
services. It would involve a commitment to respond to questions, challenges 
and the requests of users, and would be rooted in a belief that professional 
activity is a tool of the citizen and has no essential monopoly on truth or 
wisdom. 
Users may need to emphasize more their role in educating service-providers, 
including social workers, psychiatrists and caretakers. This would lead to a 
more positive and collaborative working environment. Caution needs to be 
exercised here, so that providers who are already working in a problematic 
area of health care are not demoralized. 
Another possible direction for the future is that caretakers build stronger 
alliances with other professionals involved in caring for the insane and with 
the various voluntary sector workers, users and survivors, charities and 
pressure groups such as MIND. Such alliances and interprofessional 
partnerships would enable co-operation and the sharing of power in the 
245 
planning, organization and the delivery of care. Building alliances also involve 
changes in language and underlying attitudes and values, so that users are 
enabled to participate more fully in discussion and debate. The work of 
caretakers is in a important sense rooted in the descriptions of experiences 
people themselves offer to express their distress. 
Activities which exclude users would be challenged. This might mean that 
users should not be talked about if they are absent; that confidential files 
should become more freely accessible; and that users are invited to functions 
from which they have historically been excluded. These activities would 
facilitate a general recognition of the strength of users. 
Taking up the challenge of developing these possible new ways of working 
and caretaking will not be easy. Caretakers' desire for power and status will 
still be there. The political, social and economic realities will be the same. But 
what history teaches us is that the essential power and uniqueness of 
caretaking work resides in the professional capacity of caretakers to work 
with, rather than on, those who use the mental health services. 
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The Rules relating to the Attendants in the Bethlem Hospital with the 
Duties of the Several Officers and Servants (1854) London: Bethlem 
GENERAL RULE: 
-The attendants and servants shall commence their duties at six O'clock in the 
morning in the summer, and at such time as shall be appointed, not later than 
seven O'clock in the winter. Their first duty shall be to write their names in the 
attendance books, to which they shall have access not later than ten minutes 
after the period appointed for the commencement of their daily services. 
RULES FOR ATTENDANTS-DUTIES OF PARTICULAR HOURS 
1. The Attendant shall unlock the bedroom doors of all the patients who 
are in a fit state to be at large; they shall then wash and dress the 
patients and carefully examine them, in order that any soreness or 
discolouration of the skin or other changes may be observed, and 
reported to the Medical Officer at the first morning visit, or immediately 
if the case appears to require it. 
2. The Chief Attendant of each ward shall go to the stores room for 
bread, butter and milk as required in their respective wards during the 
day, and shall then return to the store room all excess stores from the 
preceding day. 
3. All spare time before breakfast shall be occupied in cleaning the 
dormitories, day rooms and galleries. 
4. The patient shall have breakfast and special care be taken that those 
who are in the bedrooms be properly supplied at 8am. 
5. Immediately after breakfast, the Attendants shall continue the thorough 
cleansing of the day rooms, galleries, bedrooms, where not 
completed, and shall remove all foul linen, and all dirt and litter of every 
kind, after which the beds shall be made and the bedrooms left open 
for ventilation. 
6. All the patients selected for employment shall be ready to go with 
several Attendants and Servants under whose care they are to be 
occupied, and the sick in the infirmaries and in the wards shall be 
ready for the morning visit of the Medical Officer at 9am. 
7. The Attendants shall have completed the cleansing and proper 
arrangement of their several departments and shall be neatly dressed 
at 11 am. 
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8. The male patients in out door employment and the female patients 
occupied in the laundry shall have luncheon, as directed in the diet 
table. 
9. Half of the Attendants on each side of the hospital shall dine in the 
Attendants' dining room and immediately after their return to their 
respective wards, the remainder of the Attendants shall dine in like 
manner at 12 noon. 
10. A 12.45 pm. the Attendants in each ward shall be in readiness when 
the bell rings to receive from the kitchen the patients' dinners. 
11. At 1pm. the patients shall dine, and care shall be taken that every 
patient have a proper supply of food in accordance with the diet table 
or the directions of the Medical Officer. The helpless shall have their 
food divided into small pieces and when necessary they shall be fed. 
The food of patients who are in their rooms shall be taken to them by 
the Attendants and not by patients. 
12. The Chief Attendant in each ward shall be responsible for the return to 
the kitchen every day immediately after dinner of all the food found to 
be more that sufficient for that meal. 
13. At 5pm. the male patients in outdoor employment shall be brought to 
their respective wards by the Attendants and Servants who have had 
the charge of them; and every particular change that have been 
observed in the appearance or conduct of any of them whilst in 
occupation to the Medical Officer. 
14. The male and female patients shall have tea, after which they shall be 
encouraged to read, or enter into any of the amusement provided for 
them. 
15. At 8pm. the patients shall be put to bed, and their clothes taken out of 
their bedrooms. The bedroom door shall be locked and the gas turned 
off. 
16. The night Attendants shall enter on their duties after which the 
Attendants who have completed their several duties shall be at liberty 
to leave their respective wards at 8pm. 
17. At 10pm. all Attendants and Servants who have been out for the 
evening, with permission, shall have returned to hospital, and at this 
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hour all Attendants and Servants, except the night Attendants shall be 
required to retire to rest. 
18. They shall go through the wards at least once in every hour during the 
night, and shall give proof of having done so by registering the 
Attendance on the night clock. 
19. The first duty of night Attendants shall be to examine the list of patients 
requiring particular attention, and to ascertain that the food and 
medicine directed to be given to them during the night have been 
provided and left ready for use. 
20. They shall execute all the orders given by the Medical Officer for their 
observance during the night, and they shall endeavour to soothe all 
patients, who are restless, and shall supply their wants as far as may 
be prudent. They shall also take care that those patients who will not 
remain in bed be provided with a sufficiency of warm night clothing. 
21. They shall watch with special care all patients who are suicidal, or who 
in any respect require particular attention. 
22. They shall ring the night bell of the Medical Officer on the occurrence 
of any unusual event or where in any patient shall appear to them to 
require immediate medical care. 
23. They shall perform their duties with the least possible noise, and shall 
have with them at all times a light in lantern provided for their particular 
use. 
24. They shall call up the Attendants whose duty it is to take part in night 
watch at 2 O'clock every morning, and the Attendants and Servants 
every morning at the appointed hour by ringing the morning bell, and 
when the Attendants have taken charge of the wards, they shall send 
to the Matron or Medical Officer a book containing a written report of 
the state of the wards and of the patients during the night, after which 
their duties for the occasion shall terminate. 
DUTIES ON PARTICULAR DAYS 
SUNDAY 	 1. 	 The Attendants shall see that all the patients be dressed 
with neatness and that those who are directed to be 
taken to Chapel be ready in time, and be properly 
supplied whilst in Chapel with prayer book and hymn 
book. 
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2. Patients attending Chapel who are subject to sudden 
excitement, shall as far as practical be seated with one or 
more Attendants near the door so that when requisite 
may be easily removed. 
3. No work shall be done which can with propriety be 
delayed, and care shall be taken that the day be spent in 
a decorous and becoming manner. 
MONDAY 	 1. 	 Attendants shall take to the laundry such of their own 
clothing as requires washing. 
	
2. 	 On the first and third Mondays in every month with the 
exception of Christmas Day, New Years Day, Easter 
Monday, Whit Monday. The relatives and friends of the 
patient shall be allowed to see them between the hours 
of ten and twelve O'clock, but no visitors shall be 
permitted to see any patient, if the Medical Officer be of 
opinion that the visit be injurious to such patient or 
otherwise inexpedient. 
	
TUESDAY 1. 	 All patients in a fit state to be present at prayers, they 
shall be 
taken to the Chapel at the appointed time, by the 
Attendants, who shall perform this duty in rotation as far 
as their other duties can be suspended for the purpose. 
	
2. 	 The Attendants superintending the patients in the work 
room shall take to the store rooms all the clothing and 
articles made by the patients during the preceding week, 
and shall receive a supply of work for the current week. 
WEDNESDAY 	 Every male patient shall be shaved. 
THURSDAY 	 The patients and Attendants shall attend Chapel on 
Thursdays. 
SATURDAY 1. Every patient with such exceptions as the Medical Officer 
shall direct, shall have a bath, the temperature shall not 
be lower than ninety degrees nor above ninety eight 
degrees unless be special order. The patients shall 
remain in the bath long enough for the purpose of 
cleanliness, and on being taken out shall be rubbed until 
they are quite dry. 
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2. The Chief Attendant in each ward shall receive from the 
store rooms the allowance of tea, sugar, soap, candles. 
as required in the wards during the week, and shall at the 
same time return to the store room all excess of these 
stores remaining with each from the preceding week. 
3. The Attendants shall fetch from the laundry the clean 
linen and clothing of their respective patients. 
4. Every patient shall be provided with clean linen and all 
dirty linen shall be taken to the laundry as a general rule, 
all foul linen shall be taken to the laundry at the earliest 
convenient opportunity. 





a. How long have you worked with the insane? 
b. In what capacity have you worked with the insane? 
(one of or in a combination of the following or other) Nursing 
Assistant, Staff Nurse, Charge Nurse/Sister, Community Nurse, 
Teacher, Manager. 
c. Please describe for me what your current work with the insane 
entails. 
SECTION 2 
The four questions which follows are asking you specific questions. I would 
like you to answer these, and in addition to extend your answers into any 
other themes/ issues relevant to you which the question suggests. 
1. 	 What do you think is the function of Mental Health Legislations in 
relation to: 
a. clients/patients deemed to be insane. 
b. the work and role of the 'caretakers' of the insane. 
2. 	 With reference to the 1959 Mental Health Act how much dose this 
Act relate to: 
a. the work/role of 'caretakers' 
b. the responsibilities of 'caretakers' 
c. the civil rights of the insane. 
3. 	 With reference to the 1983 Mental Health Act how much does this 
Act relate to: 
a. the work/role of 'caretakers' 
b. the responsibilities of 'Caretakers' 
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c. 	 the civil rights of the insane. 
	
4. 	 Are there any other government legislations since 1890 to the 
present which have affected: 
a. the care given to the insane by 'caretakers' 
b. the civil rights of the insane. 
	
5. 	 Please give me an example/examples of a situation/situations 
where you felt the following may have played a part in your work: 
a. social control 
b. civil rights issues. 
	
6. 	 Please think of your career as a 'Caretaker. Can you remember any 
situation/situations when you felt your work and role met with or 





108 Oakdene Road, St. Mary Cray, Orpington, Kent BR5 2AW 
Dear 
I am researching the history of the 'Caretakers' of the insane, and the influence 
of government legislation and policy on their roles and responsibilities. 
Information is sought from contemporary 'Caretakers' with a focus on the 1959 
and 1983 Mental Health Acts. 
The areas which will guide the information collection are: 
a. the role of Mental Health Legislation 
b. the role and responsibilities of the 'Caretakers' of the insane vis-a-
vis the 1959 and 1983 Mental Health Acts 
c. the relevance of any other government legislation on the work of 
'Caretakers' 
d. government legislation and the Mental Health Acts of 1959 and 
1983 and the civil rights of the insane. 
If you are willing to participate, I am asking the following of you: 
a. to meet with you for an introductory discussion to answer your 
questions, to exchange information and to plan the interviews 
(approximately 45 minutes). 
b. to interview you (approximately 45 minutes) 
I have worked for many years as a psychiatric nurse. The areas of legislation, the 
civil rights of the insane and the role and responsibilities of the 'caretakers ' of 
the insane have always been of interest to me. 
This research is a part of may PhD programme at the Institute of Education 
London University. It is my intention to try to get the final report or parts of the 
final report published. If publication is achieved your identity will be protected. 
Throughout all the research activities your identity will be kept in strict 
confidence and data will not be shared with any other agency. 
I will telephone you approximately two weeks after you have received this letter 
to discuss further your questions, possible cooperation and hopefully plans for 
an introductory meeting. I can be contacted at the above address or by 
telephone. Telephone number - 01689 876905 
I look forward to your participation in this research 
I am, 
Yours Sincerely, 	 Tony Leiba. 
